

unconstrained
analytics

in a struggle, analysis must be unconstrained by preconceptions

Defeating the Islamic Movement Inside the United States: *A Strategic Plan*

Richard Higgins
Stephen Coughlin



Defeating the Islamic Movement Inside the United States: *A Strategic Plan*®

An Unconstrained Analytics Report

Richard Higgins
Stephen Coughlin

November 2016

©2016 Unconstrained Analytics, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

Unconstrained Analytics is a 501(c)3 dedicated to analysis of evidence unconstrained by preconceptions and biases. This includes thorough analysis of an enemy's threat doctrine unconstrained by bias, preconceptions and influence operations coming from the same.

Unconstrained Analytics
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Suite 27307
Washington, DC 20038

*unconstrained*analytics.org



We in this country, in this generation, are—by destiny rather than choice—**the watchmen on the walls of world freedom.** We ask that we may be worthy of our power and responsibility, that we may exercise our strength with wisdom and restraint, and that we may achieve in our time and for all time the ancient vision of ‘peace on earth, good will toward men.’ That must always be our goal, and the righteousness of our cause must always underlie our strength. For as was written long ago: *‘Except the Lord keep the city, the watchmen waketh but in vain.’*



—John Fitzgerald Kennedy, 1963

Key Points

1 Fifteen years after 9/11, the United States is **losing the war against the Islamic Movement**—not on the kinetic battlefield, but in the **information battle-space**, where the enemy has excelled at diverting our National Security efforts away from his true objective: a global Islamic State subordinated to Islamic law [sharia].

3 The Islamic Movement advances along multiple lines of effort, including **immigration, infiltration, and the compromising of key pillars of American society** ranging from academia, banking and finance, faith communities, and government to the legal system, media, military, and National Security.

5 The **Muslim Brotherhood forms the vanguard of the Islamic Movement inside the United States** but coordinates its civilization jihad campaign with its associated splinters, most notably the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and violent jihadi groups like Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.

7 The Islamic Movement and its Marxist partners **achieved such a critical degree of penetration and influence** by undermining America's commitment to its own founding principles. To regain that commitment and restore those principles, we must first **take back control of the language** used to describe the enemy and the war we are fighting.

2 The United States needs a **new strategic approach** that begins with **accurate threat identification** in support of operational plans to counter the Islamic Movement, most urgently inside the United States itself.

4 Those tasked with defending the Republic of Washington and Lincoln must develop and effectively execute a **whole-of-society strategy to defeat each of those lines of effort domestically**—even as a new National Security strategy is implemented to deal with associated offensive Islamic Movement activities in the global arena.

6 Since the late 20th century, the Muslim Brotherhood (like its Shi'ite counterpart, the Iran Lobby) has **worked closely with far left entities, including anarchists, communists, progressives, and other revolutionaries** likewise committed to the destruction of America and Western Civilization.

8 **Speaking the truth** in a language that recognizes and can express the truth is the first and most critical step in returning to a **fact-based, evidence-driven assessment of the Islamic Movement** and the jihad it wages against us. This National Security strategy Campaign Plan offers a framework to begin that process.

Executive Summary

The failure to identify, define, and counter the Islamic Movement endangers current and future generations of Americans and the future the Republic.

The United States began awakening to the war with the Islamic Movement after the terror attacks in September 2001. Our efforts have been ineffective. Despite the investment of lives and treasure, America is not safer. We are losing this war, and the people know it.

The U.S. Government needs to execute the strategy outlined in this document—with force, purpose and determination. The strategy has been developed without political filters and is grounded in facts that define the threat posed by the Islamic Movement.

How bad are things? Very bad. The failure to identify, define, and counter the Islamic Movement and its threat to the American political philosophy and way of life endangers current and future generations of Americans and may lead to the end of the Republic.

In five years, given current immigration rates and the gains being made overseas by Islamic Movement-affiliated entities, sharia-inspired wars will begin across Europe. In the U.S. Government's current state of reality dislocation, there is a high likelihood that U.S. policy will support the insurgent Islamic movements in these European countries.

In ten years, the Islamic Movement will have consolidated the new Caliphate under the leadership of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and begun the Caliphate's expansion into Europe. Domestically, the United States will be ideologically fractured by the growing alliance between the hard left* and Islamic ideologies, both of which are already fueling domestic conflict. In 20 years, the United States may no longer exist as a unified nation under a common political philosophy.

At present, the language used to fight the counter-terror war has been distorted in the name of moral relativism. **It traps decision-makers in false narratives that facilitate false understandings of the nature and scope of the threat and lead to false choices between either under- or over-reacting to events.** The language used by the U.S. Government today to discuss the war is structured to bring about our defeat. Failure to act now ensures our demise.

This document seeks to change the U.S. Government's strategic understanding of the nature of the war and offers an alternative pathway that leads to strategic victory. The strategy proposed here prioritizes the strategic defense of the United

* The term "hard-left" as used here refers to those who substantively depart from mainstream thought; tending towards extreme moral relativism or cultural Marxism.

States over foreign considerations. While working to secure the homeland, we will assist our allies abroad as we are able, but not at the expense of America's national security. This strategy emphasizes the need:

- **To get tough** by simply speaking the truth.
- **To get smart**, which includes putting American security first in furtherance of the most basic tenets of the social contract as demanded by the Constitutional Oath. If we want to remain a free and open society, we must control our borders, rebuild our military, and support local law enforcement as the first line of defense.
- **To remain threat-focused**, including against the Islamic threat. When it comes to Islamic-based terrorism, ignorance is not bliss—it's fatal.

This Campaign Plan seeks to rescale our efforts to fight the enemy where he operates, at the strategic political level, and re-orient the United States to recognize and respond properly to the enemy's explicitly stated threat doctrines. In so doing, this document serves as a roadmap that allows the United States to both defend against the Islamic Movement and begin aligning the requisite ways and means to achieve our country's strategic ends, defined in measurable, achievable, and realistic terms.

Speaking the truth is a challenge in a National Security establishment that has become informed by today's moral relativism. The objective of moral relativism is to reduce thinking to a state where, as philosopher Josef Pieper said, people are "satisfied with a fictitious reality created by design through the abuse of language." Blindness to the truth among the National Security elite was achieved by replacing factual, evidence-based analysis of the Islamic threat with relativist constructs that collapsed the strategic intelligence process. The days of deadly institutionalized ignorance must be brought to an end. On top of everything else, this document should serve as a guideline for a return to speaking truth, with common sense as the guiding principle.

The Campaign Plan presented here is structured to work within the current or proposed National Security and law enforcement statutory framework.

**Blindness to the truth
among the National
Security elite was
achieved by replacing
factual, evidence-based
analysis of the Islamic
threat with politically
correct models that
collapsed the strategic
intelligence process.**

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.0 BACKGROUND

1.1 General	1
1.2 A Concept Primer: What is the Islamic Movement?	3
1.3 A Concept Primer: The Counter-State and Political Warfare	5

2.0 ESTIMATE OF SITUATION

2.1 General	13
2.2 Economic, Social and Political Grievances	14
2.3 Strategic Appreciation of Islamic Movement	16
2.3.1 End State	16
2.3.2 Ways	17
2.3.3 Means	28
2.4 Islamic Movement Narratives	29
2.5 Islamic Movement Metrics	31
2.6 Current U.S. Approach and Shortfalls	35

3.0 ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC APPROACH

3.1 End State	41
3.2 Ways	43

4.0 MAIN EFFORT

4.1 Rule of Law	45
4.2 Information Warfare	47
4.3 Operational Sequencing	49

5.0 DISCUSSION

5.1 Results and Anticipated Enemy Actions	51
5.2 Metrics	53

6.0 CONCLUSION

6.1 Challenges	55
6.2 Expectations	55
6.3 Timelines	56
6.4 Summary	56

BACKGROUND

1.1 General

The United States has been under attack in an open-ended war with the Islamic Movement¹ since before September 11, 2001.

Prior to that date, the perception was that Islam-inspired attacks signified episodic political violence caused by economic, social, or political grievances overseas. As such, the response to attacks before 9/11 was seen as the responsibility of intelligence and law enforcement. Even after the warning prompted by attacks on the World Trade Center in 1993, the scale of the threat continued to be underestimated, regarded only as an operational and tactical concern and viewed as an intelligence and law enforcement responsibility.

After the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. Government began to recognize Islam-inspired violence as a persistent threat capable of strategic levels of violence. Even then, the Islamic Movement was misguidedly scoped as a relatively small network of “extremist” violent actors operating outside the norms of the religion. **No attention was paid to the wider Movement’s non-violent subversive actions, political agenda, or roots in Islamic doctrine.**

The U.S. Government implemented a strategy consisting of various operational and tactical approaches in an attempt to cleave this network of “extremists” from mainstream Islam, eliminate the individuals making up these networks, and eliminate the sanctuaries and enterprises that enable these networks. This initial strategic response—which erroneously assumed the Islamic Movement operated outside the boundaries of Islamic doctrine—has remained unchanged from the Bush to the Obama administrations, with only minor modifications in operational and tactical methods. With Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen, and Libya all in flames, an escalating

After the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. Government began to recognize Islam-inspired violence as a persistent threat capable of strategic levels of violence.

¹ Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *Priorities of the Islamic Movement in the Coming Phase*, Swansea, U.K.: Awakening Publications, 2000.

This is a war in which we fixate on the tactical manifestations while our enemies strategically hold the ideological high ground—what Lenin called the “commanding heights.”

European migrant crisis, Islamic State branches expanding globally, and a skyrocketing U.S. national debt, it is now clear that the U.S. Government's initial strategic approach has failed.

The Islamic Movement commenced planning and preparation for war with the United States several years—decades, in fact—before September 11, 2001. The Islamic Movement's preparatory operations inside the United States, which date back to the 1960's, went generally unperceived by the National Security establishment. The limited U.S. Government counterterror effort at that time focused solely on select elements of the Islamic Movement overseas, including Hamas, Al-Qaeda, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Regardless of its inception, the Islamic Movement has grown substantially since 9/11, threatening America and our allies alike.

As its leaders eagerly attest, the Islamic Movement is a global **political** project inspired by Islamic doctrine. The various individuals and organizations participating in the movement do so of their own free will, often conflating local political grievances with international ones. Members expressly seek to redress these ostensible grievances through the instantiation of a new form of governance that is compliant with Islamic law, or sharia.²

The failures of the United States following 9/11 to 1) properly identify the nature of the threat, 2) properly characterize the threat as a **political movement**, and 3) properly develop a strategy to defeat the enemy based on facts and the **enemy's explicitly stated doctrines** have marooned the United States in a open-ended war. This is a war in which we fixate on the tactical manifestations while our enemies strategically hold the ideological high ground—what Lenin called the “commanding heights.”

At its core, the Islamic Movement is waging war at strategic national and international levels. The Campaign Plan detailed on these pages seeks to rescale our efforts to fight the enemy at the strategic political level where he operates and re-orient the United States to properly recognize and respond to the enemy's explicitly stated threat doctrines. In so doing, this document serves as a roadmap and strategy that allows the United States to both defend against the Islamic Movement and begin aligning the requisite ways and means to achieve our country's strategic ends, defined in measurable, achievable, and realistic terms.

² While there is some academic debate about when and where the current Islamic Movement began, this document will not delve too deeply into this subject. Readers interested in learning more are encouraged to study the four schools of Sunni Islamic law along with the writings of Hassan Al Banna, Maududi, Dehlawi, Sayyid Qutb, Abdullah Azzam, Ayman al Zawahiri, and Anwar Al Awlaki. Readers interested in the Shiite Islamic threat should consider research of Khomani.

1.2 A Concept Primer: What is the Islamic Movement?


The term “Islamic Movement”³ is closely associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and a 1991 document called “An Explanatory Memorandum: On the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America,” written by Palestine Committee member Mohammed Akram. However, it has a much larger scope of meaning. In the 1994 “for subscribers only” pamphlet *The West in the Eyes of the Egyptian Islamic Movement*, Ibrahim Ghanem said the Islamic Movement is an integrated system that includes both “reformist” and “revolutionary” components, by which was meant both dawah and jihadi elements—one led by the Muslim Brotherhood and the other by the Jihad Group and the Islamic Group. Jihad is an obligation for all participants in the Islamic Movement, including those in the Brotherhood.

Fathi Yakan, in his 1990 *To be a Muslim*, relied on Brotherhood founder Hasan al-Banna to establish this point: “Imam Hasan Al Banna outlined ... responsibilities of the Islamic Movement” that include **“regularly making the intention to go on jihad with the ambition to die as a martyr.”** Banna went on to say that **“you should be ready for this right now, even though its time may not have come yet.”** As Yakan explained:

Muslims in an Islamic Movement are the true servants of Allah and their obedience is only to Allah, the Almighty, in all matters of life. It encompasses not only religious affairs but also worldly affairs. This is because Islam teaches its followers that there is no segregation or separation between religion and worldly affairs. Islam rejects the idea of secularism which is based on separation of religion and state in accordance with the superficial understanding of the supposed statement of the Prophet Jesus, peace be upon him, - Render unto Caesar what is Caesar's and unto God what is God's, which is translated into the idea that religion is for God [Allah] and the state is for everyone. The servitude of man means that he must reject all manmade philosophies and systems that by nature lead mankind to submit to the false gods of materialism. Islam rejects totally all of these paradigms, systems and methods because:

- 1) It is clear that they transgress against Allah's rights and rules. Allah, the Almighty, says: “The Command Rests with none but Allah.” [Qur'an 6:57]
- 2) All such man-made concepts and practices cause weakness and failure. Therefore they are unable to bring out the true nature of mankind in the trials of life. Allah,

Islamic Movement is an integrated system that includes both “reformist” and “revolutionary” components.



³ This section was taken from Part III “The Islamic Movement and Its Awakening,” *Catastrophic Failure: Blindfolding America in the Face of Jihad*, which provides additional information on information on the Islamic Movement.

the Almighty, says: "Is then He Who creates like one that creates not? Will you not receive admonition?" [Qur'an 16:17]




In *The Priorities of the Islamic Movement in the Coming Phase*, first published in 1990, "Shaykh" Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, the Muslim Brotherhood's chief jurist, delved deeper into the qualities of those in the Islamic Movement:

The core of this self-motivation is the unrest and tension that a Muslim feels inside himself when he becomes conscious of the Islamic Awakening. He feels a turmoil deep inside him resulting from the contradiction between his faith, on the one hand, and the reality of the state of the *Ummah* on the other. Upon this realization he launches himself into action, driven by his love for his *Din*, his faith in Allah and His Messenger, his faith in the Quran and the Muslim *Ummah*, his realization of his own weakness as well as those around him, and his keenness in fulfilling his duties and contributing to the revival of the neglected *fara'id*, which include obligations like:

- implementing the *Shari'ah* of Allah,
- unifying the Muslim *Ummah*,
- supporting the friends of Allah and
- fighting the entrenched enemies of Allah,
- liberating Muslim lands from all aggression and non-Muslim control,
- re-establish the *khilafah* [sic],
- renewing the obligation of *da'wah*,
- enjoining the *ma'ruf* [good] and
- forbidding the *munkar* [evil] and
- fulfilling the obligation of jihad, whether by action, word or by the heart [the latter being the weakest level of iman].

He strives for all of this so that the word of Allah reigns supreme in all spheres of life.



1.3 A Concept Primer: The Counter-State and Political Warfare

Whether by design or coincidence, the Islamic Movement follows insurgency models that closely resemble Mao Zedong's. Because the Movement's strategy is informed by the Maoist approach and uses language uniquely associated with it, a review of relevant aspects of Maoist insurgency is in order.⁴ The affinities are both conceptual and real. Compare Mao's famous comment to that of the Muslim Brotherhood's chief jurist and spiritual leader:

"The People are the sea that the revolutionary swims in."

—Mao Zedong

"An awakening is a tributary that supplies and reinforces a movement, while a movement is a guide that steers an awakening in the right direction: the relation between the two of them is one of interaction."⁵

—Shiekh Yusuf al-Qaradawi,
Chief Jurist, the Muslim Brotherhood



**Whether by design
or coincidence, the
Islamic Movement
follows insurgency
models that closely
resemble Mao
Zedong's.**

Maoist methodology is described as synchronized violent and non-violent actions, which Mao calls "**political warfare.**" This concept and approach envision the direct use of non-violent operational arts and tactics as elements of combat power.⁶ Political warfare operates as one of the five components of an activity undertaken by the "**counter-state.**"

In Maoist insurgencies, the counter-state is essential to seizing state power.⁷ Functioning as a hostile competing state within an existing state, it is complete with an alternate infrastructure, which "tightly controls and regulates the insurgency, recruiting manpower from a wide variety of strata."⁸



⁴ This discussion relies on Thomas A. Marks' treatment of the Maoist model as discussed in *Maoist People's War in Post-Vietnam Asia* (Bangkok, Thailand: White Lotus Press, 2007), 1 – 14. Hereafter "Thomas A. Marks, *Maoist People's War.*"

⁵ Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *Priorities of the Islamic Movement in the Coming Phase* (Swansea, U.K.: Awakening Publications, 2000) from http://www.witness-pioneer.org/vil/Books/Q_Priorities/index.htm [accessed on April 6, 2010]

⁶ Thomas A. Marks, *Maoist People's War*, 12.

⁷ Thomas A. Marks, *Maoist People's War*, 2.

⁸ Thomas A. Marks, *Maoist People's War*, 5.

To achieve the objectives set for the counter-state, Mao developed five components. The five components are listed below, followed by examples with statements from Muslim Brotherhood sources or the authors' explanations to demonstrate **the close fit of Brotherhood language to the Maoist model**:

■ (1) MASS LINE



Organizing an alternative society through the construction of clandestine infrastructure, that is, a counter-state. Local socio-economic grievances and aspirations are to be addressed by cadres, who then connect solutions to the party's political mechanism. As with all political action, appeal to perceived needs (not only grievances but also hopes and aspirations) seeks to win allegiance for the purpose of mobilization. The approach seeks a mass base.

■ Example:

"Toward a Worldwide Strategy for Islamic Policy [Worldwide Strategy]"⁹ is a 1982 document that was seized in November 2001 during a raid on Brotherhood leader Yusuf Nada's home in Lugano, Switzerland. It laid out the Muslim Brotherhood's policy objectives—calling for an Islamic state 34 years ahead of Bagdadi:

[5th Point of Departure] "This report presents a global vision of a worldwide strategy for Islamic policy [or "political Islam"]." What is the "Worldwide Strategy"? ***Ikhwan members are "to dedicate ourselves to the establishment of an Islamic state, in parallel with gradual efforts aimed at gaining control of local power centers through institutional action" [in furtherance of] "establish(ing) an Islamic power [government] on the earth."***¹⁰

■ Example:

"An Explanatory Memorandum: On the General Strategic Goal for the Group," written by Mohamed Akram in 1990,¹¹ is the American Muslim Brotherhood's strategic document for North America. It was seized in an FBI raid in 2004 and



Cover page of the American Muslim Brotherhood's strategic document for North America seized in an FBI raid in 2004.

⁹ Toward a Worldwide Strategy for Islamic Policy [*Points of Departure, Elements, Procedures and Missions*], 1 December 1982, seized in November 2001 raid of Muslim Brotherhood leader Yusuf Nada's residence in Campione de Italia, Switzerland [Lugano]. Hereafter "Worldwide Strategy."

¹⁰ *The Fifth Point of Departure*, Worldwide Strategy.

¹¹ "An Explanatory Memorandum: On the General Strategic Goal for the Group," Mohamed Akram, May 22, 1991, Elbarasse Search-3, Government Exhibit 003-0085/3:04-CR-240-G U.S. v. HLF, et al., United States District Court, Northern District of Texas, URL: <http://www.txnd.uscourts.gov/judges/hlf2/09-25-08/Elbarasse%20Search%203.pdf>. Cited hereafter as Mohamed Akram, Explanatory Memorandum.

offered into evidence in the 2008 Holy Land Foundation trial. As with the Luga-no document, the Explanatory Memorandum was never intended to be made a public document.

The general strategic goal of the Group in America ... is “Enable-ment of Islam in North America, meaning: establishing an effective and a stable

Islamic Movement led by the **Muslim Brotherhood** which adopts Muslims’ causes domestically and globally, and which works to expand the observant Muslim base, aims at **unifying and directing Muslims’ efforts**, presents Islam as a **civilization alternative**, and supports the global Islamic State wherever it is.”¹²

The Explanatory Memorandum further explains that the Islamic Movement’s mission in America is “settlement.” In this context, “civilization alternatives” call for “civiliza-tion jihads” that are to be executed from “Islamic Centers” across the country.

Settlement: “That Islam and its Movement become a part of the homeland it lives in.”¹³

4- Understanding the role of the Muslim Brother in North Amer-ica: The **process of settlement** is a “Civilization-Jihadist Process” with all the word means. The Ikhwan must understand that their work in America is a kind of grand jihad in eliminating and de-destroying the Western civilization from within and “sabotaging” its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and God’s religion is made victorious over all other religions.¹⁴

17- Understanding the role and nature of works of “The Islamic Center” in every city with what achieves the goal of the process of settlement: The center we seek is the one which constitutes the “axis” of our Movement, the “perimeter” of the circle of our work, our “balance center”, the “base” for our rise and ... to educate us, prepare us **and supply our battalions** in addition to being the “niche” of our prayers. This is in order for the Islamic center to turn - in action not in words - into a seed **“for a small Islamic society”**¹⁵ which is a reflection and a mirror to our central


¹² Mohamed Akram, Explanatory Memorandum, 18.

¹³ Mohamed Akram, Explanatory Memorandum, 19.

¹⁴ Mohamed Akram, Explanatory Memorandum, 21.

¹⁵ Muslim Brotherhood Chief Jurist –Qaradawi, mentioned above, also wrote *Non-Muslims in Islamic Society* in Arabic in 1985. In 2005, it was re-published it in a revised 2005 English language edition for American Muslims. *Non-Muslims in Islamic Society* discusses the appli-cation of shariah non-Muslim populations in Western societies that are the **targets of Muslim Brotherhood penetration and subversion efforts through its dawah mission**. In it, Qaradawi provides the shariah basis for the global Islamic mission to subordinate non-Muslim popula-tions to shariah as second-class citizens. It is not an accident that Qaradawi’s book is about

“The Ikhwan must understand that their work in America is a kind of grand jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and “sabotaging” its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and God’s religion is made victorious over all other religions.”



Qaradawi provides the shari-ah basis for the global Islamic mission to subordinate non-Mus-lim populations to shariah as second-class citizens.

organizations. ... Thus, the Islamic Center would turn into a place for study, family, **battalion**, course, seminar, visit, sport, school, social club, women gathering, kindergarten for male and female youngsters, the office of the **domestic political resolution**, and the center for distributing our newspapers, magazines, books and our audio and visual tapes ... **As much as we own and direct these centers at the continent level**, we can say we are marching successfully towards the settlement of Dawa' in this country.¹⁶

■ (2) UNITED FRONT



Making common cause with those, individuals and groups who share concerns but not necessarily party goals. That an armed political movement is able to address perceived needs does not necessarily carry with it enough momentum to overcome natural fear of participation in what, after all, is an illegal, underground, dangerous endeavor. **“Fellow traveler” status (even if it is concealed by the organization concerned) offers an alternative route** and may provide some benefits to the insurgency in the form of advancing legal, open organizations that swell the mass base.¹⁷

■ Example:

From the 1982 Worldwide Strategy document:

[7th Point of Departure] To accept the principle of temporary cooperation between Islamic movements and nationalist movements in the broad sphere and on common ground such as the struggle against colonialism, preaching, and the Jewish state, without however having to form alliances. This will require, on the other hand, **limited contacts between certain leaders, on a case by case basis, as long as these contacts do not violate the [Shari'a] law.** Nevertheless, one must not give them allegiance or take them into confidence, bearing in mind that the Islamic Movement must be the origin of the initiatives and orientations taken.¹⁸

the role of an “Islamic Society” governing in non-Muslim countries; that the lead Muslim Brotherhood entity in the United States is the “Islamic Society” of North America; or that Muslim affiliated mosques in America often take either the name “Islamic Society” of Greater Oklahoma City (or Houston, etc), or Islamic Center of Greater Oklahoma City (or Houston, etc).

¹⁶ Mohamed Akram, Explanatory Memorandum, 23.

¹⁷ Thomas A. Marks, *Maoist People's War*, 7.

¹⁸ *The Seventh Point of Departure*, Worldwide Strategy.

■ (3) VIOLENCE



The new alternative society, existing as it does illegally and clandestinely, necessarily relies upon armed action to maintain its security within and without. The “liberation” struggle progresses through three strategic phases. **Initially, the revolutionary movement will be on the defensive, then it will achieve stalemate, and finally go on the offensive.** During each phase, a particular form of warfare will drive the dynamic. During the defensive stage, terror and guerrilla actions will lead. During the stalemate phase, mobile warfare (maneuver warfare) will be the dominant strategy. This will see insurgent “main force” units, equivalents of government formations, take the field but not seek to hold territory. The final phase, the offensive, will see such seizure of ground, the so-called “war of position.”¹⁹

■ Example:

From the 1982 Worldwide Strategy document:

[8th Point of Departure] But we should not look for confrontation with our adversaries, at the local or the global scale, which would be disproportionate and could lead to attacks against the dawa [sic] or its disciples. **a- Elements:** To avoid the Movement hurting itself with major confrontations, which could encourage its adversaries to give it a fatal blow.²⁰

■ Example:


From the Muslim Brotherhood front group International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) imprint *Peace and the Limits of War*, by IIIT Executive Director Louay Safi:

Thus, it is up to the Muslim leadership to assess the situation and weigh the circumstances as well as the capacity of the Muslim community before deciding the appropriate type of jihad. **As one stage, Muslims may find that jihad, through persuasion or peaceful resistance, is the best and most effective method to achieve just peace, as was the case during the Makkan period.** At another stage, fortification and defensive tactics may be the best way to achieve these objectives, as was the case of the Battle of al Khadaq. **At yet a third stage, the Muslim leadership may decide that all-out war is the most appropriate measure to bring about a just peace, as was the case during the war against the Arab apostates.**²¹

¹⁹ Thomas A. Marks, *Maoist People's War*, 7.

²⁰ *The Eighth Point of Departure*, Worldwide Strategy.

²¹ The Makkan period is the Meccan period; the Battle of al Khadaq was the battle between Muslims and non-Muslim tribes [627 A.D.] in what is now Medina; and the war against the “Arab apostates” refers to the war launched by Caliph Abu Bakr [632-633 A.D.]. See Safi,



The CVE seeks to subordinate the U.S. counterterror effort to Islamic and hard left speech standards.

■ (4) POLITICAL WARFARE



Using **nonviolent methods**, such as participation **undermining the morale of enemy forces or offering to engage in negotiations, as an adjunct to violence**. These methods could be implemented at the strategic, operational, or tactical levels of warfare. Unlike the united front, Mao conceived of political warfare as a force-multiplier. The united front was a line of operation unto itself.²²

■ Example:

Countering Violent Extremism [the CVE]:

From DHS's 2008 promulgation of *Terminology to Define Terrorism* **directing that the counterterror community cease using language relating to Islam in counterterror analysis and work product;**²³

to the FBI's purging of such language from its counterterrorism lexicon later that year;²⁴

to the Department of Defense's official 2010 report on the Fort Hood shootings **designating Major [Nidal] Hasan's actions as "workplace violence;"**²⁵

to **Muslim Brotherhood front groups being brought into DHS Civil Rights & Civil Liberties** [CRCL] in 2010 to assist in standing up the CVE effort in the government;²⁶

to DHS CRCL promulgating *CVE Training Guidelines and Best Practices*²⁷ and to *Do's and Don'ts*²⁸ in 2011 that **subordinate the counterterror effort to diversity narratives** [while initiating the actual purge of work product and personnel from the counterterror effort in the government at all levels],

Louay M., *Peace and the Limits of War: Transcending Classical Conception of Jihad*. Herndon, VA: IIIT, 2001, 42-43.

²² Thomas A. Marks, *Maoist People's War*, 7.

²³ Shaarik Zafar, *Terminology to Define the Terrorists: Recommendations from American Muslims*, Department of Homeland Security, January 2008.

²⁴ Federal Bureau of Investigation Counterterrorism Analytical Lexicon, U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, undated but believed to be 2008.

²⁵ *Protecting the Force: Lessons from Fort Hood, Report on the DoD Independent Review*, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, 15 January 2010.

²⁶ "Countering Violent Extremism Workshop [CVE] Working Group Recommendations," U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Advisory Council, 26 May 2010.

²⁷ "Countering Violent Extremism [CVE] Training Guidance & Best Practices," Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, DHS, October 2011.

²⁸ "Countering Violent Extremism [CVE] Training: Do's and Don'ts," Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, DHS.

the CVE has been closely associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and the hard left domestically²⁹ and internationally³⁰ as well as with international organizations³¹ and the OIC.³²

Through facially neutral sophistic narratives, the CVE seeks to subordinate the U.S. counterterror effort to Islamic and hard left speech standards. As the lead Islamic Movement players in the United States, Muslim Brotherhood front groups seek to establish an Islamic counter-state as outlined in the Explanatory Memorandum. As such, it has front line responsibility for managing the full implementation of the CVE.

In June 2015, the House Committee on Homeland Security passed CVE legislation that, if it becomes law, would not only institutionalize the CVE at DHS, but **pass millions of dollars to community outreach partners overrepresented by Muslim Brotherhood affiliated entities.** As a classic double-agent operation, the counter-state player, the Muslim Brotherhood, will have successfully managed the transfer of its funding source overseas to the host government.

■ (5) INTERNATIONAL ACTION




Although not as prominent an element during Mao's struggle as it became to his pupils, international pressure upon the state, or in favor of the insurgents, was recognized as an important element in the equation.³³

■ Example:

UN Resolution 16/18:

UN Resolution 16/18 is a complement to the CVE, as they both arise out the Ten-Year Programme of Action (10-YPA) implemented by the OIC in December 2005 at the OIC's Third Extra-Ordinary Summit.³⁴ **OIC Summits are composed of heads of state of all 57 Islamic states.** Hence, the 10-YPA constitutes the



UN Resolution 16/18: Combating intolerance, negative stereotyping and stigmatization of, and discrimination, incitement to violence, and violence against persons based on religion or belief, was adopted by the UN Human Rights Council in March 2011.

²⁹ John Rossomando, "Soros Money, Muslim Advocates Leader, Helped Weaken Homeland Security Policies, An IPT Investigation, IPT News, October 7, 2016, IPT Webpage, <http://www.investigativeproject.org/5669/soros-money-muslim-advocates-leader-helped-weaken#>

³⁰ Open Societies Foundations, Europe, OSF Webpage, <https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/regions/europe>

³¹ For example, see "OSCE United in Countering Violent Extremism," OSCE Webpage, <http://www.osce.org/unitedCVE>

³² "Key Meeting Set for Tuesday," Bahrain News Agency, 9 August 2015, <http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/681103>

³³ Thomas A. Marks, *Maoist People's War*, 8.

³⁴ Paragraph 3, Section VII, "Combating Islamophobia," The Third Extraordinary Session of the Islamic Summit, Makka Almukarama, Organization of the Islamic Conference, 7-8 December 2005, **states**, "Endeavor to have the United Nations adopt an international resolution to counter Islamophobia and to call upon all states to enact laws to counter it, including deterrent punishment."



The OIC's 10 Year Programme of Action called for the standing up of an OIC Islamophobia Observatory charged with monitoring speech said to violate Islamic speech codes around the world.

execution of real state action. The 10-YPA also called for the standing up of an OIC Islamophobia Observatory charged with monitoring speech said to violate Islamic speech codes around the world.³⁵ As such, **the Islamophobia Observatory constitutes a foreign collection effort against, among others, U.S. citizens exercising their First Amendment rights inside the U.S. by foreign state actors.**³⁶ Within one month of passing the 10-YPA, the Danish Cartoon Crisis erupted.³⁷ In 2015, the year the 10-YPA came to an end, terrorists killed editors of Charlie Hebdo³⁸ and tried to kill the Danish publishers of *Jyllands-Posten*.³⁹

The CVE is one component of the 10-YPA; UN Resolution 16/18 is the other. The 10-YPA works through the United Nations to have all countries enact legislation implementing Islamic speech codes under the rubric of Islamophobia. Pakistan, on behalf of the OIC, submitted UN Resolution 16/18 to the Human Rights Council⁴⁰ as the instrument of implementation of the 10-YPA.

In July 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton met with the head of the OIC in Turkey and agreed to help in the passage of UN Resolution 16/18. **She promised to use “old fashioned techniques of peer pressure and shaming” against those Americans who ran afoul of Islamophobia standards.**⁴¹

Islamophobia, properly understood in the context of the actual foreign state power behind it, **constitutes the implementation of foreign speech laws against U.S. citizens inside the U.S. and should be understood as a hostile foreign act.**

³⁵ Section 2, Article VII, “Combating Islamophobia,” The Third Extraordinary Session of the Islamic Summit, Makka Al-Mukarama, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Organization of the Islamic Conference, 7-8 December 2005, states, “Affirm the need to counter Islamophobia, through the establishment of an observatory at the OIC General Secretariat to monitor all forms of Islamophobia, issue an annual report thereon, and ensure cooperation with the relevant Governmental and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in order to counter Islamophobia.”

³⁶ Section 2, Article VII, “Combating Islamophobia,” The Third Extraordinary Session of the Islamic Summit, Makka Al-Mukarama, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Organization of the Islamic Conference, 7-8 December 2005, states, “Affirm the need to counter Islamophobia, through the establishment of an observatory at the OIC General Secretariat to monitor all forms of Islamophobia, issue an annual report thereon, and ensure cooperation with the relevant Governmental and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in order to counter Islamophobia.”

³⁷ Anderson, John Ward. “Cartoons of Prophet Met with Outrage,” *Washington Post*, January 31, 2009.

³⁸ Dan Bilefsky and Maia de la Baume, “Suspects Identified in Attack on French Newspaper, Charlie Hebdo,” *New York Times*, 7

³⁹ Anderson, John Ward. “Cartoons of Prophet Met with Outrage,” *Washington Post*, January 31, 2009.

⁴⁰ “Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related form of Intolerance, follow-up and Implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action Human Rights Council, Agenda Item 9, Sixteenth Session, Human Rights Commission, United Nations A/HRC/16/L.38, 21 March 2011.

⁴¹ “Remarks at the Organization of the Islamic Conference [OIC] High-Level Meeting on Combating Religious Intolerance,” Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, United States Department of State, given at the Center for Islamic Arts and History, Istanbul, Turkey, 15 July 2011.

As with the CVE, UN Resolution 16/18 works with allies—international organizations and hard left-leaning organizations internationally as well as with the Muslim Brotherhood and hard left-leaning organizations domestically—to implement and assess the execution of the CVE and UN Resolution 16/18. While it is important to recognize international and domestic alliances, primarily with hard left-leaning entities, it is even more important to recognize that **the OIC, constituting the Ummah splinter, services the Muslim Brotherhood, the dawah splinter, in seamlessly integrated action plans** held together by a common orientation to the Islamic Movement that is itself informed by sharia.

Equally important, the Islamic splinters and the hard left seamlessly interoperate through carefully constructed narratives that allow for seamless integration of action plans. Foremost among those narratives is the diversity and hate speech memes.

In recognizing the counter-state, one becomes fully informed of the strategic design underlying both the Worldwide Strategy and the Explanatory Memorandum. Throughout this Campaign Plan, concepts and language will be used that relate back to the Maoist insurgency model. This section should serve as a quick reference.

2.0 ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

2.1 General:

Most Islamic immigration to the United States has taken place in the past 50 years (and most of that since 9/11). Pew Research reports that the Muslim population of the United States is approximately 3.3 million and that this number is growing at approximately 6 percent annually, with birth rates, conversions, and immigration driving this growth. This demographic information is significant because the Islamic Movement is rooted within the native and immigrant Muslim population. It should not be forgotten that the Islamic Movement understands the large-scale movement of people as a form of war known as hijra.⁴²

The Islamic Movement perceives Islam to be a complete way of life and a political system that includes its own financial, legal, governing, and educational systems. In National Security terms, classifying Islam as a religion grants the Islamic Movement religious protections that were never intended to defend dangerous political ideologies. Continuing on this path is a fatal mistake and will likely end in submission to Islamic law and/or civil war. The U.S. Government must develop an appreciation for

In National Security terms, classifying Islam as a religion grants the Islamic Movement religious protections that were never intended to defend dangerous political ideologies.

⁴² In the Explanatory Memorandum, the Islamic Movement in America positions hijrah in the “The Process of Settlement.” In the section “Understanding the Role of the Muslim Brotherhood in North America,” the Memorandum plainly states that “the process of settlement is a ‘Civilization-Jihadist Process’ with all the word means . . .” Mohamed Akram, Explanatory Memorandum, 19 - 21. Shamim Siddiqi likewise reflects the historic role of hijrah in “The Importance of Hijrah” written in 2000, <http://www.dawahinamericas.com/hijra.htm>

the political threat posed by Islam and the risks that uncontrolled Islamic immigration fosters.

2.2 Economic, Social, Political Grievances:

Central to the Islamic Movement grievance is that Islamic society—and ultimately the entire world—is not governed by Islamic law. Whether it is our coalition partners through the Organization of Islamic Cooperation [the OIC], the Muslim Brotherhood in America, the International Muslim Brotherhood, al-Qaeda, or Islamic State (aka ISIS), **all claim the implementation of Islamic law as their primary objective.**

Among the grievance allegations cited by the Islamic Movement and their entities and individuals are that the West is stealing Islamic resources, Western culture seeks to destroy Islam, and Western leaders are corrupting Islam. All of these grievances are **false narratives structured to conceal their central grievance: that Islamic law does not, but must, govern the World.**


The same tyrannies and dictators the Islamic Movement cites as enemies of the movement actually use substantial portions of their resources, specifically oil revenue, to further both the Islamic Movement and its objectives.

False grievances serve two purposes in the Islamic Movement:

1. To delegitimize the outside, non-Muslim world. This includes the alleged economic theft from the Islamic World by the West and the alleged purposeful propagation of Western cultural and moral norms into Islamic society.
2. To encourage greater participation of individual Muslims and organizations in the Islamic Movement's cause through active and passive measures.

These false grievances have a calculated influence on impressionable individuals, especially young men, thereby drawing them into the Islamic Movement's ideological worldview, which holds that Islam is under attack from the West and therefore justified in its efforts to destroy the non-Islamic world. The false grievances are, at their base, **disinformation**, used strategically as a pretext for instantiating Islamic law in the West.

Internationally, the most often cited economic grievance of the Islamic Movement is the West's alleged exploitation of Arabian and Islamic oil wealth and the West's support for the dictators and Arab tyrannies that enable that exploitation. The Islamic Movement consciously **emulates the socialist forms of governance and wealth redistribution**, even as they claim it as an original Islamic concept. [See Sayyid Qutb's book *Social Justice in Islam* for more information on this subject.] In other words, the



Islamic Movement claims to resent the enormous wealth bestowed upon dictators and tyrannies that are supported by the West.

Ironically, the same tyrannies and dictators the Islamic Movement cites as enemies of the movement actually use substantial portions of their resources, specifically oil revenue, to further both the Islamic Movement and its objectives. A Faustian bargain for some, a deep-seated commitment for others, state sponsorship of the Islamic Movement that may seem counter-intuitive is actually required by Islamic law and undertaken in order to retain a cloak of legitimacy for participating regimes. Such participation often occurs through **sovereign wealth funds, sharia-compliant financing institutions, charities, and academia.**

The Islamic Movement seeks to inhibit cultural integration in the United States while maintaining a separate society informed by Islamic norms that operate in parallel to American social and cultural norms. The Muslim Brotherhood and its numerous front organizations perform this mission by continuously reminding the U.S.-based Muslim population of these cultural differences.


In order to strengthen this pretext of legitimacy, the Islamic Movement—with the Muslim Brotherhood as its U.S. vanguard—leverages perceptive issues of “human rights.” In the Islamic context, human rights have been formally defined as sharia by the August 1990 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam. This means that the Islamic Movement’s concept of human rights is categorized as a subset of Islamic law. An American Muslim Brother’s idea of human rights is about human rights in name only. In fact, it is about a Muslim’s right to live in America under sharia, which, because it is understood to be the law of the land, is also to be imposed on non-Muslims.

From the global perspective, **the Cairo Declaration and the UN Declaration on Human Rights are fundamentally incompatible with each other.** The Cairo Declaration essentially codifies sexism, racism, and limits on free speech and is thereby hostile to American liberal democratic values.

The Islamic Movement further seeks to inhibit criticism and/or discussion of Islam through the creation of limitations on constitutionally protected speech and expression. The Islamic Movement, through the Cairo Declaration, is attempting to generate an exclusive, special, protected status for Muslims and Islam.

Whether explicitly stated or not, the principle grievance of the Islamic Movement in the United States is that the Constitution is not compliant with Islamic law. Having said that, the American-based Islamic Movement’s immediate operational objective is to **gain and then maintain direct control of the U.S. deliberate decision-making process** through information campaigns designed to **obfuscate** the move toward sharia compliance.


HUMAN RIGHTS and ISLAM— In summary, the 1990 Cairo Declaration states the Islamic world agrees with the International Declaration of Human Rights insofar as: (1) it does not contradict Sharia, and (2) the Muslim world only understands Human Rights as the Sharia defines it.



Notable differences:

- No freedom to leave religion
- NO right to change religion
- No marrying outside Islam (women)
- Superiority of Muslim men
- Discrimination against women
- Discrimination against non-Muslims
- Punishments according to Sharia
- No criticism of the Prophet
- No criticism of Islam
- No nationalisation, disruption or corruption of the Ummah

Defending the rights of the Ummah is each person's responsibility.



The principle grievance of the Islamic Movement in the United States is that the Constitution is not compliant with Islamic law.

This obfuscation is achieved through planned penetration and subversion of American institutions, including gaining political positions throughout the United States, and infiltrating the mindset of corporate, academic, and media elites. **Even our National Security apparatus has been affected.** These ongoing subversive activities have shaped U.S. domestic, foreign, and economic policy in fulfillment of the Islamic Movement's strategic and political objectives at the immediate cost of United States national security interests.

Alliances and functional relationships have formed between Islamic Movement elements and the political hard left, interfaith clerics, the media, academia, and even some leading conservative establishment figures. Part of this alliance development includes the funding of senior elected and appointed public officials, as well as groups such as the Clinton Foundation, by Persian Gulf oil countries such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.

2.3 STRATEGIC APPRECIATION

2.3.1 Islamic Movement's End State [Ends]

The Islamic Movement seeks to impose Islamic law and re-establish the Caliphate throughout the world. The success or failure of this global effort largely depends on the Movement's ability to leverage United States power to fulfill its objectives or, failing that, to at least prevent the United States from operating autonomously.

To accomplish these goals, the Islamic Movement in the United States executes a strategy of reality dislocation, or deception. In essence, **the Islamic Movement, particularly via the Muslim Brotherhood, deceives U.S. leaders by using our culture's commitment to moral relativism to gain access, then providing a fictional depiction of themselves and creating a straw-man enemy against which we then bring all elements of national power to bear.** These fictions mask the true nature

of the enemy and the war being fought, thereby dissipating power, undermining support, and prolonging any engagements. The consequence of this deception is that the real enemy is not only shielded from American power, he is enabled by it, as economic, informational, military, and diplomatic resources are appropriated in support of Islamic Movement objectives.

Sustained over time, submission to these deceptions has resulted in the **co-opting of U.S. Government leadership by the Muslim Brotherhood.** Every time the Muslim community favorably comments on the useful outreach of the U.S. Government and its leadership,

it uses flattery to extend the deception. This furthers the Islamic Movement's objectives, including control of U.S. decision-making, thereby establishing protected status for Islamic Movement entities and individuals and rendering the United



States compliant to Islamic Movement initiatives. As Josef Pieper observed regarding political warfare, flattery is “the deceptive mirage of the political process, that is, the counterfeit usurpation of power. ...”

The Islamic Movement objective inside the United States is not, at least at this point in their plan, the direct and obvious killing of American citizens. The currently envisioned end state is to **gain direct or indirect control over the anti-Western mindset within the United States in order to manipulate the decision-making process.** In this regard, the Islamic Movement has been successful. The long-term goal is the *de facto* and then *de jure* submission of the United States, along with all of Western Civilization, to sharia.

2.3.2 Islamic Movement Lines of Effort and Operation (Ways)

As the Explanatory Memorandum makes clear, the Islamic Movement seeks to develop a counter state—a nascent Islamic state that will sync with the efforts of the re-emerging Caliphate through the mobilization and resourcing of alternative societies. Within the United States, this will be accomplished through the proliferation of formal and informal subversive organizations⁴³ and will involve **cultivating political access, penetration, and subversion of our legal system.** It also will include the manipulation of immigration narratives and processes through, among other things, the “refugee resettlement” process. Alongside this effort, the Islamic Movement will:

- establish secure financial processes,
- training of cadres,
- secure communications and unhindered travel,
- counterfactual educational content promulgation,
- preferred access to the media, and
- the development of overt and clandestine infrastructure.

The Islamic Movement seeks to achieve these objectives through interactive and interoperable lines of effort designed to manipulate U.S. leadership into accepting/adopting threat profiles that either cloak or minimize the actual threat. This approach can be understood through the lens of the “Splinter Movement” theory of political warfare.

The Splinter Movement posits that a political movement can invent a more extreme branch than what is actually required in order to create an ideological space that appears to present the non-violent agent as more “centrist” and therefore more legitimate and populist.

The Splinter Movement posits that a political movement can invent a more extreme branch than what is actually required in order to create an ideological space that appears to present the non-violent agent as more “centrist” and therefore more legitimate and populist.

⁴³ For example, Explanatory Memorandum, 32 states “A list of our organizations and the organizations of our friends [Imagine if they all march according to one plan!!!]” and then lists 29 organizations.

The fox is brought in to guard the henhouse, as many of al Qaeda's political allies—posturing as “cultural advisors” and “citizens” interested in outreach and reconciliation—are brought into the deliberate decision-making process.

'In the Islamic Movement, groups like Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) serve this violent function. They draw attention to their horrific acts of violence, thereby portraying groups like the Muslim Brotherhood as “moderate” based upon their rejection of Al-Qaeda or IS tactics while actively obscuring entirely identical political objectives.

Such wishful thinking triggers two interconnected actions. The first is that the United States and its allies **react with greater focus on the violent actors**, consolidating resources on the kinetic players to the exclusion of those that actually perform the lead function of the enemy. Owing to our misguided commitment to moral relativism, **we turn to those purposefully constructed “moderate” alternative groups, which are affiliated with the same Islamic Movement, to assist us in our counterterrorism efforts.** The result is that the fox is brought in to guard the henhouse, as many of al-Qaeda's political allies—posturing as “cultural advisors” and “citizens” interested in outreach and reconciliation—are brought into the deliberate decision-making process.

It is the interoperable nature of splinters, who lack central command and control yet act within the boundaries set by wider movement, that makes this phenomenon so difficult to identify, target, and comprehend. The inherent deniability of this collaboration between splinters within the wider Islamic Movement, including action by states and those functioning in the state actor role, enables subversion and deception in the guise of moderation and assimilation.

Seeking to “counter violent extremism,” the U.S. Government retains an enemy purposefully seeking to establish a counter-state who infiltrates the very heart of U.S. Government policy-making and counterterrorism in a wide-ranging double-agent program. This is the Islamic Movement's strategic and operational design, the goal being to control U.S. decision-making while luring U.S. Government decision-makers into actions that are inimical to national security.


Facially hostile statements by one splinter group provide political operating space for the others by creating plausible distance between the two. For example, at a time when there is active legislation in Congress to urge declaration of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, comes the incredibly well-timed release of *Dabiq* - Issue 14 [April 13, 2016], which attacks the Brotherhood generally⁴⁴ and the American Brotherhood specifically,⁴⁵ thus **providing the Brotherhood with the much appreciated space to assert its “moderate” status.** (*Dabiq* is the official publication of the Islamic State, the jihadi group representing the violent splinter.)

The Islamic Movement promotes three splinters of the same movement simultaneously: the OIC, the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood, and the Islamic State. The result

⁴⁴ “The Murtaad Brotherhood,” *Dabiq* - Issue 14 “The Murtaad Brotherhood,” 1437 Rajab [April 13, 2016], <https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2016/04/the-islamic-state-22dacc84biq-magazine-1422.pdf>, 28.

⁴⁵ “Kill the Imams of Kufr in the West,” *Dabiq* - Issue 14, 8.

The Islamic Movement promotes three splinters of the same movement simultaneously: the OIC, the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood, and the Islamic State:



U.S. national security collaborates with the non-violent splinter elements executing the international and domestic political war against the United States while simultaneously convincing the U.S. Government to send our troops and treasure to fight the war on terrorism overseas.

is that U.S. national security collaborates with the non-violent splinter elements executing the international and domestic political war against the United States while simultaneously convincing the U.S. Government to send our troops and treasure to fight the war on terrorism overseas.

In the context of splinter movement theory, this strategy paper seeks to elevate the focus of United States National Security beyond kinetic activities to include the non-violent, political, alliance, and international lines of effort being executed by the broadly strategic Islamic Movement.

FIVE Lines of Effort

1. Political

The central goal of the Islamic Movement is the organizing of an alternative society through the construction of a clandestine infrastructure or counter-state. Consistent with its declared leadership of the Islamic Movement, the Muslim Brotherhood represents the majority of organized Islam within the United States. Muslim community grievances, often contrived, are addressed by a cadre, which then ensures that all responses to those grievances enable the goals determined by the Islamic Move-

ment's political mechanism. In the United States, this political mechanism comprises the **Mosque, the Islamic Centers and Societies**, and other related **Muslim Brotherhood infrastructures and individuals**, including those cultural "moderates" who serve as **advisors to the United States Government**. The Muslim Brotherhood seeks allegiance of the U.S.-based Muslim population for the purpose of mobilizing and resourcing the wider Islamic Movement's strategic goals.


2. Violence

De-legitimization of the domestic political and societal order is the basic counter-state objective during insurgency operations. The purpose of the violence perpetrated by all forms of the Islamic Movement must be understood in the strategic and operational context within which it occurs. The goal is not simply the killing of

Americans, as is so often stated by the "experts." Rather, the violence serves many purposes, including the generation of fear calculated to induce a lack of faith in our system's inability to stop the violence. As such, **the objective of violence is to delegitimize our leadership, our system of government, and our Nation.**

While the violent splinter element of the movement is the most closely associated with violence and terror, the role of terror is commonly recognized across the **three principal Islamic Movement splinters**: the violent [jihadis], the non-violent [dawah],⁴⁶ and state actors.⁴⁷ The limited amount of violence taking place currently in America is directly attributed to a lack of need for violence at this time in *this* phase of the overall operation. Since we willingly continue to participate in the Islamic Movement's strategic pseudoreality, there is no need for the Movement to interrupt the process with violence.

The guerilla strikes by individuals, such as those committed recently in San Bernardino, Orlando, and Times Square, will most likely continue, but the Muslim Brotherhood cadre, representing the non-violent splinter,



⁴⁶ Siddiqi, Shamim, *Methodology of Dawah Ilallah in American Perspective*, Brooklyn, New York, USA The Forum for Islamic Work, 1989

⁴⁷ While on the Pakistani Army Chief of Staff, Brigadier S.K. Malik wrote the *Quranic Concept of War* to argue for the mandatory doctrinal status of terror in war owing to its Quranic basis. The book was endorsed by the Pakistani Chief of Staff (and future head of State) and by Pakistan's advocate general (and future Law Minister). On the use terror in war, Malik states: "Terror struck into the hearts of the enemies is not only a means; it is an end itself. Once a condition of terror into the opponent's heart is obtained, hardly anything is left to be achieved. It is the point where the means and end meet and merge. Terror is not a means of imposing decision upon the enemy; it is the decision we wish to impose upon him." Malik, S. K., Brigadier, Pakistani Army. *The Quranic Concept of War*. First Indian Reprint. New Delhi, India: Himalayan Books, 1986, 59.

knows that this is not the right time for kinetic operations with the United States. While we spend all of our efforts focusing on the improperly scoped violent aspects of the jihad, the enemy's main effort and actual defeat mechanism is the subversion of our laws, culture and will, primarily through non-violent political warfare. It is in this context that jihadi terror attacks can be understood to serve as a supporting effort and a deception.

Although vigilance partially explains why there have not been more attacks in the United States, timing may be the key factor. As long as the U.S. Government continues to support dawah efforts directed at this country, violence would be counter-productive to the intended strategic effect. In fact, the [non-violent] dawah "activist" has the luxury of playing good cop—even to the point of lamenting the ill-timed use of violence. For example, in 2003, Muqtedar Khan claimed publically that the American Muslim's "dream" of making an "already great power" into a "great society," through Islamization, "evaporated" due to the events of 9/11.

What "moderate"⁴⁸ Professor Khan knew then, and what this strategy seeks to account for now, is that the goal of violence is to maintain sufficient political pressure to keep our police, military, and intelligence elements **focused on the tactical-level violence to the exclusion of the strategic-level design**. In the meantime, the political leadership at all levels of government continue to rely on Muslim Brotherhood approved "moderates," their Deobandi and Shia equivalents, and "cultural advisors" who have become embedded in the decision-making and media apparatus for their critical information requirements as these "advisors" diligently step up their dawah mission.

3. Non-Violent

The purpose of this line of effort is to grow the movement, increase allies through information operations and agitprop, etc., that synchronize with other direct and indirect action.

The Islamic Movement uses social media, the Internet, and the larger information domain, including magazines, movies, and recruitment videos, in support of very sophisticated information warfare campaigns structured to inculcate and perpetuate Islamic Movement ideology with specific target audiences, particularly Muslim youth, domestically and around the world.

The Islamic Movement is politically active in almost every region of the world, with its centers of political mobilization being mosques associated with Muslim Brotherhood-con-

While we spend all of our efforts focusing on the improperly scoped violent aspects of the jihad, the enemy's main effort and actual defeat mechanism is the subversion of our laws, culture and will, primarily through non-violent political warfare.



⁴⁸ Sept 7, 2003 "Putting the American in American Muslim," *New York Times*. Professor Khan is a "Muslim intellectual" widely respected in the Shia community and viewed as an important voice in U.S. foreign policy.

trolled Islamic Centers and their associated training centers.⁴⁹ In America, penetration and subversion are the Movement's primary objectives. From the Explanatory Memorandum:

“Understanding the role of the Muslim Brother in North America: The process of settlement is a “Civilization-Jihadist Process” with all the word means. The Ikhwan must understand that their work in America is a kind of grand jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and “sabotaging” its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and God’s religion is made victorious over all other religions.”⁵⁰

There are also efforts to grow converts to Islam through dawah outreach via, for example, public education systems, counterfactual depictions of Islam, outreach through prison systems, interfaith activities, and coordinated efforts targeting minority populations.

4. International

Domestic operations of the Islamic Movement don't require international sanctuary in order to effectively function inside the United States. The level of command and control executed by the OIC can be shown through its declarations as well as through its meetings with American-based Muslim Brotherhood operatives, such as the Brotherhood's hosting of OIC-sponsored annual conferences in Chicago.


There is Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey funding the Muslim Brotherhood and other groups through SWF's, Zakat, and sharia-compliant finance houses. There is also the matter of OIC funding of Muslim Brotherhood-sponsored “Islamophobia” activities in the American academy. The greatest international sanctuary the Islamic Movement enjoys is the atrophied and antiquated legal and political framework through which this problem is viewed. The very way we seek to understand the threat guarantees we cannot know it.

5. Alliances (United Fronts)

In the 1980s, the Islamic Movement began pursuing a policy of penetration, temporary alliance development, and measured escalation in Western jurisdictions in order

⁴⁹ From the Muslim Brotherhood's 1990 strategic plan for America, the Explanatory Memorandum, Paragraph 17 provides explicit description of the role of Islamic Centers under the control of the Muslim Brotherhood inside the United States: “17- Understanding the role and the nature of work of “The Islamic Center” in every city with what achieves the goal of the process of settlement: The center we seek is the one which constitutes the “axis” of our Movement, the “perimeter” of the circle of our work, our “balance center”, the “base” for our rise and . . . to educate us, prepare us and supply our battalions in addition to being the “niche” of our prayers. This is in order for the Islamic center to turn - in action not in words - into a seed “for a small Islamic society” which is a reflection and a mirror to our central organizations,” Mohamed Akram, Paragraph 17, Explanatory Memorandum, 23.

⁵⁰ Mohamed Akram, Explanatory Memorandum, 21.



to establish long-term dawah and jihad capacity. In an early state of weakness, and recognizing the hard left's success in subjecting Western thought to a dialectic

schema designed to reduce it to incoherence, the Islamic Movement choose to draft in the political warfare slipstream of postmodern narratives structured to undermine national, cultural, religious, and even sexual identity. Terms like "civilization alternative" and "civilization jihad" in furtherance of "eliminating and destroying Western civilization from within" speak directly to attacks on national and cultural identity that have been a priority of the Islamic Movement since the 1980s. They also speak to the counter-state nature of the Brotherhood's activity in America. Initially, this was as simple as inserting "Islamophobia" into the hard left's "racism, sexism, homophobia and xenophobia" narrative.

Because both the Islamic Movement and the hard left recognize the benefits of a political warfare strategy that places the violent line of operation in support of the non-violent, the Islamic Movement's principal ally has been the hard left. This is in keeping with Carlos the Jackal's 2003 statement that **"only a coalition of Marxists and Islamists can destroy the United States."** It is through the skilled manipulation and cooptation of multicultural narratives that the Islamic Movement has been able to manipulate American culture, along with its deep commitment to racial and inter-faith generosity, to its advantage. **The Islamic Movement, adept at manipulating the hard left's commitment to moral relativism and multiculturalism, has coopted these narratives to its own end.** At the point where it touches the average Ameri-

Because both the Islamic Movement and the Hard Left recognize the benefits of a political warfare strategy that places the violent line of operation in support of the non-violent, the Islamic Movement's principal ally has been the Hard Left.

can, Islamic Movement narratives have been seamlessly integrated into those of the hard left and are now fully interoperable with them.

This did not just happen. The Islamic Movement/Hard Left's political warfare lines of operation work at all levels of engagement from international, to national, to local:



a.) Internationally, the OIC coordinates with NGOs with known hard leftist affiliations, as well as with institutions, identified nation-states, and organs of the European Union. For example, as part of its effort to execute UN Resolution 16/18, the OIC implements strategies that align with the efforts of “Article 19,” an NGO supported by the “Open Society Foundation,” an organization founded by George Soros.⁵¹

While the OIC coordinates Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) efforts at international forums, the Muslim Brotherhood does so domestically. Sharing a common orientation to the ummah as governed by sharia, the OIC and the Muslim Brotherhood enjoy a longstanding working relationship that includes coordination meetings and the joint staging of events where smooth battle-handovers from international to national occur. They serve as two splinters relentlessly interoperating along a common recognition of sharia demands and outcomes.

b.) Nationally, another example of the united front can be found in the Occupy Wall Street movement (OWS). When the hard left staged the October 2011 Occupy Movement, the Muslim Brotherhood's domestic political warfare entity, the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), was a visible and active participant.⁵² At the same time, Iranian “students” in Europe staged supporting activities using identical narratives.⁵³ As the OWS progressed, Iran openly identified with the movement, going as far as to sponsor major events in Tehran.⁵⁴

⁵¹ Unknown to most people is that the Open Society Foundation and other like organizations often “plant” associates into high-level government positions (using IPA billets), including as policy advisors for the Department of State and the Department of Defense.

⁵² For example, see “Video: Muslim Groups Back Occupy Wall Street Protesters [CAIR],” CAIRtv [Voice of America on YouTube], October 23, 2011, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9o-1QBhuMKTs>; “CAIR at Occupy Wall Street – For Some Reason,” MRCTV, October 24, 2011, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cm43nng8d4>; Katie Pavlich, “The Latest Addition to Occupy Wall Street? Radical Islamist Group CAIR,” TownHall, October 21, 2011, http://townhall.com/tipsheet/katiepavlich/2011/10/21/the_latest_addition_to_occupy_wall_street_radical_islamist_group_cair; Neil Munro, “Islamist Groups Joins with Occupy Wall Street,” The Daily Caller, October 23, 2011, <http://dailycaller.com/2011/10/23/islamic-group-joins-with-occupy-wall-street/>; “Is Occupy Wall Street Movement Occupied?,” IPT News, November 29, 2011, <http://www.investigativeproject.org/3312/is-the-occupy-wall-street-movement-occupied#>

⁵³ Some of these narratives and operational strategies have actually been developed by the United States government, for example, USAID, who are well aware that their “play book” is being appropriated for use by such groups. Recent Wiki leaks also document Soros funding of the Democratic Party, Muslim Advocates (a Muslim Brotherhood front group), and BLM.

⁵⁴ For example, see “Islamic Awakening & Occupy Wall Street Movement Main Themes for Tehran Festival, PressTV [Iran] via DailyMotion, “Sabbath 9, 2012, http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xtesx5_islamic-awakening-occupy-wall-street-movement-main-themes-of-teh

c.) **Black Lives Matter.** From Occupy Wall Street, efforts escalated to the more aggressive Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement. Because the hard left and the Islamic Movement both have long histories of exploiting racial tensions, especially in the African American community, it should come as no surprise that both are involved in BLM. Not only are there indicators of financial support and close personal relations between the hard left and the Islamic Movement, there are indicators that the Muslim Brotherhood has on-going plans to use BLM to further its own radical agenda. At the December 2015 MAS-ICNA Conference, for example, CAIR's Executive Director declared that "Black Lives Matter is our matter, Black Lives Matter is our campaign." Meanwhile, a Muslim American Society (MAS) Executive Director declared that

"we need to make a conscious admission to ourselves that Black Lives Matter. ... We are the community that staged a revolution across the world. If we can do that, why can't we have a revolution in America? ... You know what you should do. And if we do it, Allah has promised us the same victories that he granted to those who came before us."

From the Muslim Brotherhood perspective, this is an open declaration of jihad.

With BLM, all elements of the Maoist Model come into play, including the use of splinter activities that target state authority through attacks on law enforcement. Just as the Islamic Movement's main effort is non-violent lines of operation [e.g., the Muslim Brotherhood] with violent splinters [e.g., al Qaeda, ISIS, etc.] serving in support, it is through the recognition of how splinters operate that one appreciates the role their interoperational activities play when the "non-violent" BLM declares an event that targets law enforcement that predictably ends in the execution-style killing of police.


NOTE: With the Muslim Brotherhood in America calling for revolution along the lines of the Brotherhood-inspired "Arab Spring" at its December 2015 conference, it should not surprise that CAIR called for an uprising when learning of President-elect Trump's victory on the evening of November 8, 2016. In a Twitter message, Hussam Ayloush, Executive Director of CAIR-LA, posted: "Ok, repeat after me: *Al-Shaab yureed isqat al-nizaam*. [Arab Spring chant]." A call for incitement, this was the



Khalilah Sabra's speech in Chicago

Home / Programs / Food for Thought

Mon Apr 11, 2016 10:11AM



In this episode of Food For Thought, Khalilah Sabra, an American Muslim advocate and author best known for her work with refugees in the Middle East, gives a speech in 14th MAS-ICNA annual convention in Chicago about the Black Lives Matter movement.



[ran-festival_news](#); "Tehran University Occupy Wall Street Conference," Press TV [Iran via the Internet, February 22, 2012, MEMRI Video Clip #3339 Broadcast: February 22, 2012, <http://www.memri.org/clip/en/0/0/0/108/0/3339.htm>; "Iran Hosts Occupy Wall Street Poster Exhibition," PressTV [Iran], August 31, 2015, <http://www.presstv.com/Detail/2015/08/31/427121/Iran-OccupyWallStreet-IDO-York>

"the people want to topple the regime."

Brotherhood chant during the Arab Spring, and it translates as “the people want to topple the regime.”⁵⁵


It should likewise not surprise that Soros-funded groups like BLM and MoveOn called for protests that same evening as if coordinated.⁵⁶ While in Arabic the call was for an actual uprising, in English the calls were for “dozens of organizations to gather peacefully outside the White House and in cities and towns nationwide to take a continued stand against misogyny, racism, Islamophobia, and xenophobia.”⁵⁷

It is through our understanding of splinter movements that we are able to reliably anticipate violence when the Brotherhood and the hard left call for such peaceful activity. Also not surprising is that the mainstream media has been virtually silent on this.

d.) Interoperable Narratives. The Islamic State and the hard left have developed common interoperable narratives. This can be seen in publications on Islamophobia such as “Fear, Inc.: The Roots of the Islamophobia Network in America” from the Center for American Progress [CAP], that have the same look and feel, including the production of target lists, as Muslim Brotherhood productions like CAIR’s “Confronting Fear: Islamophobia and Its Impact.” Even the lead editor of “Fear, Inc.” has Muslim Brotherhood ties, reinforcing the close relationship between the Islamic Movement and the hard left.

e.) The Purge. The use of a common narrative allows the united front in the war against American culture and rule of law to coordinate and disseminate information campaigns quickly, seamlessly, and effectively. For example, when National Public Radio [NPR] highlighted counterterrorism training at the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], it set up CAIR’s demands for the cancellation of that training. The training was subsequently cancelled due to political pressure from senior Executive Branch officials, thereby fulfilling Muslim Brotherhood domestic objectives that conform to OIC directives.

Another example involves the targeted purging of personnel and work product. No organization, not even the Department of Defense, is immune. All National Security organizations have seen politically incorrect staffers terminated—not because their



⁵⁵ Hussam Ayloush, @HussamA Twitter, November 8, 2016, https://twitter.com/HussamA/status/796219993226547200?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw

⁵⁶ Joseph Klein, “Soros and Other Far Leftists Instigate Revolution against Trump,” FrontPage, November 14, 2016, <http://www.frontpagemag.com/fpm/264824/soros-and-other-far-left-ists-instigate-revolution-joseph-klein>

⁵⁷ “America on Edge: MoveOn Organizes Anti-Trump Protests around Country,” Breitbart News, November 9, 2016, <http://www.breitbart.com/live/2016-election-world-reacts-donald-trumps-stunning-upset-victory/moveon-protests-white-house/>

work product was defective, but rather because they were accurate—as the U.S. Government prioritized the hard left’s agenda over and above real national security issues. This includes the infamous “JournoList”⁵⁸ with ties to the ACLU who published misleading and incendiary exposés that set up CAIR demands—in the same news cycle—for the cancelling of national security training courses at national defense and law enforcement institutions as well as for the firing of military officers and personnel, who were then fired.

f.) The Islamic State. In a recent development that bears watching, *Dabiq*, the Islamic State’s English language magazine, has taken to attacking Western agents of influence in the non-violent lines of operation in an effort to cast them as moderate alternatives, when contrasted with ISIS. This sheds light on how violent splinters that compete with non-violent splinters on one level often provide support on another level.

A few examples: In March 2015, Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham stirred up a firestorm by meeting with Abdelhakim Belhadj, leader of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) and ISIS in Libya. That same month, *Dabiq* Issue 8 declared Belhadj a “*Murtadd*,” or apostate. In September 2015, in Issue 11, *Dabiq* again declared Belhadj an apostate. In April, 2016, the entire issue of *Dabiq* #14 [“The *Murtadd* Brotherhood”] was an assault on the Muslim Brotherhood, including the Brotherhood in the United States, at a time when legislation was pending to declare the Brotherhood a terrorist organization.

In July 2016, in the same news cycle during which Khizr Khan leveraged the death of his son, a U.S. Army officer killed in combat, to speak at the Democratic National Convention in order to advance Islamic immigration objectives while attacking the Republican candidate, *Dabiq* Issue 15 [“Break the Cross”] featured a picture of Captain Humayun Saqib Muazzam Khan’s grave marker with the caption “Beware of dying as an apostate.”

All National Security organizations have seen politically incorrect staffers terminated—not because their work product was defective, but rather because they were accurate.

⁵⁸ JournoList, sometimes called the J-List, is a Google Groups composed of prominent left wing academics, political activists, and journalists. In the 2008 presidential election, journalists on the Journalist—including reporters from *Time*, *Newsweek*, *The Associated Press*, *Reuters*, *The Washington Post*, *The New York Times*, *Politico*, *Bloomberg*, *Huffington Post*, PBS and NPR—coordinated and colluded in their reporting of the 2008 presidential election in support of Barrack Obama and hard left leaning candidates.

2.3.3. Islamic Movement's Assets/Resources (Means):

Military and Paramilitary

- Operators (Brotherhood, Deobandi, Hezbollah, and others)
- ISIS and AQ operatives
- Individual jihadi operatives
- Weapons
- Digital sanctuaries
- Cyber Sanctuaries for Recruiting as well as Command/Control
- Lack of secure United States borders
- Training at Mosques and Islamic Centers–Tarbiyya Guide, etc.

Information

- **Education**–co-opt universities and school books–use free speech to further incite the Muslim population.
- Communications (Use their own **lexicon**/terms of art against them)
- Information control and propaganda through **western media outlets** with U.S. Government sanction
- **Student groups** (Muslim Students Association)
- Organizations purpose built for information warfare (CAIR, Muslim Advocates)
- Recruiting programs and **propaganda materials** (*Inspire*, *Dabiq*, etc.)
- **Enforced Islamic dress code** on U.S. Muslim population, hijab, etc.
- **Co-opted U.S. Government officials** operating on behalf of the Islamic Movement to offer information on efforts to silence critics of Islam and enforce–albeit unwittingly–Islamic law

Diplomatic

- Participating and/or Muslim Brotherhood aligned foreign officials and dignitaries operating on behalf of the Islamic Movement to put political pressure on American politicians, silence critics of Islam, and enforce–albeit unwittingly–Islamic law
- Access to political leadership (Federal, state, and local level)
- Immigration loopholes and visa waivers and family re-unification, including clerical exceptions for imams, majids, etc.
- Muslim Brotherhood, Deobandi, and Hezbollah front organizations

Financial

- Banks and financial institutions

- Foreign sponsorship through mosques/funds/etc.
- Shariah Compliant Finance (SCF)

Intelligence

- Media organizations
- Civil rights councils at Federal, state, and local levels
- Dual use organizations (transportation, immigration advisors)
 - 501c(3), think tanks, other NGOs
- Cultural outreach and advisors (chaplain program, the Congressional Muslim Staffers Association, etc.)
- Interfaith Programs (subversion, dawah)
- Civil outreach programs
- Infiltration of Federal, state, and local Intelligence and Law Enforcement

Economic

- Foreign direct investment and bond holdings
- Sharia-compliant banking and businesses
- Economic leverage over U.S. fiscal institutions and USG

Legal

- Hate speech laws, racism laws, special protected class laws
- Legal support to thwart critics / threaten opponents
- International legal teams at United Nations
- Parallel legal infrastructure development (AMJA, Sharia Law)
- Immigration law and resettlement funding

Development

- Mosque-based community development activities—used to institutionalize the counter-state
- Foreign funding of mosques and schools (ideological alignment of domestic counter-state with hostile foreign state actors and associated hostile foreign state policies.

2.4 ISLAMIC MOVEMENT NARRATIVES

The key to understanding the strategic communication of the Islamic Movement in the United States is recognizing the simultaneous transmission of two messages: one for Muslim audiences and another for non-Muslims. In some cases, the messages differ and may even be inconsistent. But often, the same message is carefully crafted so as to have two different meanings, **one for non-Muslims unfamiliar with**

The key to understanding the strategic communication of the Islamic Movement in the US is recognizing the simultaneous transmission of TWO MESSAGES: one for Muslim audiences and another for non-Muslims.

Islamic law, and the other, secondary meaning that those familiar with Islamic law, its references, and metaphors, will understand.

For example, two of the leading narratives used to advance Islamic Movement objectives arise out of the OIC's *Ten-Year Programme of Action* and are stated in facially neutral language: UN Resolution 16/18 and the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) narrative.

Islamic Movement Theme

A popular version of the Islamic Movement narrative that targets America's citizens, media, and elected leaders is that *"Islam has nothing to do with terrorism and, in fact, is a religion of peace."* This script perpetuates the idea that we should not need to be, and therefore are not, at war with Islam, since it is loving and peaceful. Furthermore, according to this script, we could not possibly win a war against a religion that has 1.6 billion followers worldwide. The message boils down to this: Islam is not a threat, and even if it were a threat, we couldn't beat it anyway, so don't bother trying. This narrative has been incredibly effective despite its transparent factual inaccuracy and deceptive, manipulative nature.

Islamic Movement Theme

In order to cover for the violence, the Islamic Movement propagates the notion that there is a war within Islam. Yet when pressed to identify the "other side" in this fight, the purveyors of this narrative often go silent. The Islamic Movement is permissive of media opposition that facilitates the illusion that there is dissent within the Islamic community because it has the effect of influencing Westerners into believing counterfactual concepts regarding the doctrinal tenets of Islam which are not actually under serious dispute by those splinters that direct their violent and non-violent political warfare effort at America.

For all the popularity many Muslim "reform voices of Islam" have garnered in American think tanks and media, **they have little or no doctrinal basis for their vision of Islamic reform, especially when viewed in the context of undisputed Islamic law or authoritative pronouncements from the imams of al-Azhar.**

Yet the picture that is painted leads many in the National Security and associated think-tank community to credit this with a status worth investing in at the cost of ***ignoring the enemy's actual threat doctrine and the firm doctrinal basis on which it rests.*** Even this could be mitigated if the gain/loss of such activity came close to balancing. The sad reality is that a substantial number of those who follow "reform Islam" narratives are decision-makers and think-tankers who, believing positive change is afoot, stay their hand in the actual prosecution of the war. The result is that the focus of the war shifts from being threat-centered to "reform" narrative obsessed.

The Islamic Movement is permissive of such opposition because it **sustains a strategic distraction that leaves the Movement with greater room to maneuver.** Allowing the National Security community, its associated think tanks, and media elites

to focus on such nonsense serves the strategic interests of the Islamic Movement, especially when those promoting such views are—or at least appear to be—sincere.

Islamic Movement Theme

Another theme often put forward by the Islamic Movement is that political discourse about Islam and Muslims will actually cause terrorist attacks. The goal of this narrative is to **suppress even the most innocuous discussions of Islam** long before they can challenge the narratives co-opted in furtherance of Islamic Movement goals. Efforts to silence Americans from all walks of life with fear of being labeled Islamophobic have, for the last 15 years, been highly effective.

The Islamic Movement puts forward a very different set of messages for Muslims living abroad compared with those used to reach Muslims in the United States. For uncommitted Muslims, the Islamic Movement simply presents messages along the lines that Islamic law calls for dawah and jihad until the earth is made Islamic. If uncommitted Muslims do not wish to participate, that's fine unless they oppose the Islamic Movement's efforts.

Uncommitted Muslims are also targeted with the simple message that they will have to choose sides at times when the Islamic Movement knows it cannot lose the doctrinal debate inside the Muslim community. The message is that it's a Muslim's duty to support the Islamic Movement—actively when called on and passively when not. In the context of the Maoist counter-state, they are the sea in which Islamic Movement swims.

For committed Muslims, especially those active in the Islamic Movement, the message is that “the tide of history is turning. Stay strong. The Caliphate is here and our movement is growing.”

Uncommitted Muslims are targeted with the simple message that they will have to choose sides at times when the Islamic Movement knows it cannot lose the doctrinal debate inside the Muslim community.

2.5 ISLAMIC MOVEMENT METRICS:

A recognized vulnerability of U.S. National Security planning is its inability to recognize, in any meaningful way, warfare outside the specifically operational and kinetic. Despite a concerted effort to understand the communist threat, absent in the current approach to strategy formulation is any recognition of political warfare as a strategic consideration in the deliberate decision-making process. Articulated as a secondary support effort, it becomes an outsourceable activity to third parties who offer model-based analysis based on theoretical constructs that are then used to replace real threat analysis. These replacement processes are antithetical to real-world decision-making. Yet, the metrics the counterterror community uses to measure success are pegged to them.

The very way the Islamic Movement is discussed guarantees that it will be ineffectively assessed. The enemy knows this and has succeeded in subordinating our threat identification processes to sophistic models (leaderless jihad, self-radicalization, human terrain, etc.) and constructs (the CVE) that have **reduced the coun-**

The very way the Islamic Movement is discussed in US National Security guarantees that it will be ineffectively assessed.

terterror effort to babbling incoherence masquerading as threat analysis in the sophistic language of political science.




The Islamic Movement's main effort is political warfare executed at all levels of engagement, from the tactical to the operational and leading to the strategic. The metrics used to gauge both tangible and intangible measures of effectiveness [MOEs] are tailored to that end with the assurance that our counterterror/counterintelligence efforts lack the ability to recognize the true lines of effort being measured.

Playback. For political warfare efforts heavily weighted on securing information dominance, the key MOE is “**playback.**” **The Islamic Movement seeks to influence our perceived situational awareness and decision-making through control of the language used to frame it.** This is done through the measured infusion of terms, memes, and narratives into the information domain that informs the national security debate.

Once these hostile terms gain official sanction, they are then disseminated to those who will repeat the narratives until they become “true,” assuring *de-facto* control of the decision-making process that has been repurposed to at least prevent behaviors inconsistent with, if not enabling, Islamic Movement interests.

“Terminology is important in defining our goals as well as removing roadblocks into hears and minds. The 9/11 Commission identifies Islamic terrorism as the threat. The Muslim Public Affairs Council recommends that the US Government find other terminology.”

–Muslim Public Affairs Council

	 FBI Counter-Terrorism Lexicon	 National Intelligence Strategy - 2009	 9/11 Commission Report
Violent Extremism	29	9	3
Enemy	0	0	39
Jihad	0	0	126
Muslim	0	0	145
Islam	0	0	322
Takfir	0	0	1
Muslim Brotherhood	0	0	5
Religious	3	1	65
Hamas	0	0	4
Hizbollah	0	0	2
al-Qa'ida	0	1	36
Caliph/Kalif	0	0	7
Shari'a	0	0	2

Playback describes the measures by which the adoption of hostile terms, memes, and narratives as the language used to discuss threat awareness and decision-making is assessed. Playback for the Islamic Movement measures its success in swapping the accurate and strategically useful language of U.S. National Security and counterterrorism for sophistic expressions and obfuscations that create the illusion of subject-matter depth. In Orwellian fashion, words take on a double-speak quality that **prevents meaningful National Security threat analysis**, marooning analysts in a void where they are rendered speechless and incapable of supporting effective threat articulation in support of effective war fighting decision-making.

It is important to note that such language manipulation is global, and that state power and collective state action are behind Islamic Movement information efforts. For example, the OIC is an intergovernmental organization representing the interests of 56 sovereign states and the Palestinian Authority at the head-of-state level. The group publishes an annual *OIC Observatory Report on Islamophobia* that manages the successful implementation, execution, and enforcement of Islamophobia memes designed to enforce Islamic speech codes in Western jurisdictions.

A textbook example of how information campaigns designed around the implementation of memes are created and then authenticated through playback is found in

Closed and open views of Islam		
Distinctions	Closed views of Islam	Open views of Islam
1. Monolithic / diverse	Islam seen as a single monolithic bloc, static and unresponsive to new realities.	Islam seen as diverse and progressive, with internal differences, debates and development.
2. Separate / interacting	Islam seen as separate and other – (a) not having any aims or values in common with other cultures (b) not affected by them (c) not influencing them.	Islam seen as interdependent with other faiths and cultures – (a) having certain shared values and aims (b) affected by them (c) enriching them.
3. Inferior / different	Islam seen as inferior to the West – barbaric, irrational, primitive, sexist.	Islam seen as distinctively different, but not deficient, and as equally worthy of respect.
4. Enemy / partner	Islam seen as violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive of terrorism, engaged in 'a clash of civilisations'.	Islam seen as an actual or potential partner in joint cooperative enterprises and in the solution of shared problems.
5. Manipulative / sincere	Islam seen as a political ideology, used for political or military advantage.	Islam seen as a genuine religious faith, practised sincerely by its adherents.
6. Criticism of West rejected / considered	Criticisms made by Islam of 'the West' rejected out of hand	Criticisms of 'the West' and other cultures are considered and debated.
7. Discrimination defended / criticised	Hostility towards Islam used to justify discriminatory practices towards Muslims and exclusion of Muslims from mainstream society.	Debates and disagreements with Islam do not diminish efforts to combat discrimination and exclusion.
8. Islamophobia seen as natural / problematic	Anti-Muslim hostility accepted as natural and 'normal'.	Critical views of Islam are themselves subjected to critique, lest they be inaccurate and unfair.

narratives that, when used by our National Security analysts and media, constitute the playback.


Two key observations emerge from this example: First, the Islamic Movement relies on its alliance with the hard left to implement its Islamophobia-based information campaign through infusion of multi-cultural terms. Second, the use of terms like “Islamophobia” reflects hostile non-U.S. state action in furtherance of hostile non-U.S. state objectives.⁶¹

There are 3 levels of playback:

Tactical

At the tactical level, playback is measured by the successful suppression and replacement of targeted concepts. Returning to the Runnymede example, the “Closed View” that “Islam is seen as a single monolithic bloc, static, and unresponsive to new realities” is to be replaced by the “Open View” that “Islam is seen as diverse and

the 2010 *Third OIC Observatory Report on Islamophobia*, which identifies target language along with replacement memes through reliance on Runnymede Trust,⁵⁹ a hard left-leaning organization operating out of London.⁶⁰ In this example, a matrix provided a list of targeted language designated “closed views” alongside a list of “open views” comprising **replacement**



This report manages the successful implementation, execution, and enforcement of Islamophobia memes designed to **enforce Islamic speech codes** in Western jurisdictions.

The Islamic Movement relies on its alliance with the Hard Left to implement its Islamophobia-based information campaign through infusion of multi-cultural terms.

⁵⁹ Third OIC Observatory Report on Islamophobia, OIC Observatory, May 2009 to April 2010, OIC Observatory, 22 May 2010, URL: http://www.oic-oci.org/uploads/file/Islamophobia/2010/en/Islamophobia_rep_May_22_5_2010.pdf, 7.

⁶⁰ “Islamophobia – A Challenge for Us All,” The Runnymede Trust, Runnymede, UK, 1997, [available in PDF] URL: <http://www.divshare.com/download/launch/9605806-94b>

⁶¹ Trevor Phillips, the former head of Britain’s Equalities and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) who commissioned the Runnymede Report on Islamophobia in 1997, has since repudiated the findings admitting that he “**got almost everything wrong**,” Raheem Kassam, “UK Equalities Chief Who Popularized the term ‘Islamophobia’ admits: ‘I thought Muslims would blend into Britain . . . I should have known better,’” Breitbart, April 10, 2016, <http://www.breitbart.com/london/2016/04/10/thought-europes-muslims-gradually-blend-britains-diverse-landscape-known-better/>

progressive.”⁶² One need only review that “closed” vs. “open” chart when templated against the prevailing narrative to realize the success of this effort.

Other examples:

- The use of terms like “Islamophobia,” especially when U.S. state actors use such language to attack American citizens
- Use of terms like “violent extremists” as replacements for Islamic terrorist or jihadi
- Replacing “individual jihad” with “lone wolf”

Operational


Playback at the operational level manifests itself in the reshaping of policies around constructs established by narratives, such as when **U.S. military rules of engagement are modified to be made compliant with Islamic law**. Intangible measures of success at the operational level can also include measurable levels of inaction by law enforcement, the counterterror community, and the Intelligence Community in circumstances where such inactivity indicates a successfully executed narrative structured to lead to that end. For example, when known hostile Islamic Movement entities become our outreach partners or attend U.S. Government holiday festivals at the White House.

Other such indicators may include:

- Increased influence over governmental agencies and departments leading to more direct influence of deliberate decision-making
- Unchallenged media presence
- Unimpeded domestic operations inside the United States
- Appearances at jihadi terrorist events by Muslim Brotherhood-associated leaders and first responders that establish narratives friendly to the Islamic Movement ahead of law enforcement, then shift the focus to limitations on the First and Second Amendments

Strategic

Strategic-level playback can be seen in the institutionalization and even statutory ratification of hostile narratives. For example: the Department of Homeland Security banning the use of language integral to threat identification while adopting Counter-



⁶² Summary “Islamophobia a Challenge for us All,” The Runnymede Trust, undated, URL: <http://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/publications/pdfs/islamophobia.pdf>


ing Violent Extremism (CVE) narratives as replacements for policy, or the House Committee on Homeland Security seeking to legislate this activity into law. Another example would be U.S. Department of State support for UN Resolution 16/18 and subsequent Congressional ratification of it.

GOAL	GOALS, BEST PRACTICES
1. Training and training should be expert and well-regarded.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1.1. Training should be designed by experts in the field of CVE, with input from a diverse range of stakeholders, including law enforcement, community leaders, and individuals with lived experience of CVE. 1.2. Training should be designed to be relevant to the audience, with content that is tailored to the specific needs and challenges of the community. 1.3. Training should be designed to be engaging, with interactive activities and exercises that encourage participation and discussion. 1.4. Training should be designed to be accessible, with content that is presented in a clear and concise manner, using plain language and visual aids.
2. Training should be sensitive to constitutional values.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2.1. Training should be designed to be sensitive to the First Amendment, ensuring that it does not promote or endorse any particular ideology or viewpoint. 2.2. Training should be designed to be sensitive to the rights of individuals, including the right to free speech and the right to assembly. 2.3. Training should be designed to be sensitive to the rights of communities, including the right to self-determination and the right to participate in the political process.
3. Training should facilitate further dialogue and learning.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 3.1. Training should be designed to facilitate ongoing dialogue and learning, with opportunities for participants to share their experiences and insights. 3.2. Training should be designed to facilitate collaboration and partnership, with opportunities for participants to work together on projects and initiatives. 3.3. Training should be designed to facilitate reflection and evaluation, with opportunities for participants to reflect on their own learning and the impact of the training.

DO	DON'T
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Do use a variety of training methods, including lectures, group exercises, and role-playing. 2. Do use real-world examples and scenarios to illustrate the concepts being taught. 3. Do encourage participants to share their own experiences and insights. 4. Do provide opportunities for participants to ask questions and seek clarification. 5. Do use plain language and avoid jargon. 6. Do use visual aids to support the content. 7. Do provide opportunities for participants to reflect on their learning. 8. Do facilitate ongoing dialogue and learning. 9. Do encourage participants to work together on projects and initiatives. 10. Do provide opportunities for participants to evaluate the impact of the training. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Don't use a one-size-fits-all approach to training. 2. Don't use fear or intimidation to motivate participants. 3. Don't promote or endorse any particular ideology or viewpoint. 4. Don't violate the rights of individuals or communities. 5. Don't use jargon or technical language. 6. Don't use misleading or false information. 7. Don't provide opportunities for participants to engage in hate speech or harassment. 8. Don't facilitate ongoing dialogue and learning. 9. Don't encourage participants to work together on projects and initiatives. 10. Don't provide opportunities for participants to evaluate the impact of the training.

Related indicators include:

- Increased political access for Islamic Movement actors and organizations
- Increased influence over Federal, state, and local politicians
- Increased funding
- Use of media to attack non-conforming organizations and individuals
- Codification and criminalization of hate speech narratives in support of Islamic Movement objectives in contravention of the First Amendment, leading to the official propagation of the Movement's agenda while suppressing dissent
- Chronic U.S. fiscal drain of money, material, and resources
- Open displays of al-Qaeda and Islamic State (IS) support
- Cultural Islamic indicators, such as hijabs and recognition of holidays



Internationally, measures of Islamic Movement effectiveness include indicators of its rising ascendance overseas, such as:

- Emergence of Caliphate
- Defeat of Islamic State designated apostate regimes
- Growth in the size of overall Islamic Movement
- Increases in the number and openness of recruiting, forced and unforced conversions, etc.

2.6 CURRENT U.S. APPROACH AND SHORTFALLS

Fighting wars without using all available tools, including the valuable tool of rhetoric, is unwise. And we are being tragically, almost pathologically unwise. In the case of this enemy, not only are we unable to discuss the ideological underpinnings of his strategy, we can't even refer to him by name. **Buying into the political hard left's**

Refusing to name the enemy or orienting on his doctrines violates the most basic requirement of reason and puts us in violation of the first principle of war: “Know the enemy.”



“I say you need to get out and read what our enemies have said [that] we collectively ignored that to our great detriment. Now, our enemies have said publicly on film, on the Internet their goal is to destroy our way of life. No equivocation on their part.”

—General Peter Pace

mission of silencing dissent through enforced speech codes under the rubric of moral relativism, we have muzzled ourselves and refused to state the obvious.

However, refusing to name the enemy or orienting on his doctrines violates the most basic requirement of reason and puts us in violation of the first principle of war: “Know the enemy.” Because we do not realize, or do not admit, that we violate this principle, the second principle, “Know yourself,” is likewise violated. The enemy knows this, and he knows we have been rendered witless. Consequently, the United States is on the wrong side of Sun Tzu’s first rule of war: **“If you do not know your enemies or yourself, you will be imperiled in every single battle.”**

While our National Security leaders are quick to point out we do not lose our tactical engagements, **this enemy makes clear that his main effort, and hence his most important lines of operation, is fought at the political warfare level.** The enemy knows his strategy and knows that we do not. This makes the enemy the beneficiary of Sun Tzu’s first rule of war. If we do not know him or ourselves, he can lose every tactical engagement and not be imperiled. Simply stated, the reality dislocation of our National Security leadership is so profound, they fail on page one of Sun Tzu’s Art of War and on the most basic rules of definition that directly impact basic truths of war. This raises serious questions of core competency at the leadership and institutional levels of our National Security and counterterror establishments.

Because you cannot have a strategy to defeat an enemy you refuse to define, prosecuting a war on those terms leads to another of Sun Tzu’s principle’s: “Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.” Recognizing that the enemy engages us but not understanding how or why, we communicate our disorientation. From Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Peter Pace’s warning at the National Defense University in 2005 that we have yet to undertake credible threat analysis,⁶³ to

Chairman Richard Myers acknowledging that we never had a strategy in 2009,⁶⁴ to Special Operations General Michael Nagata acknowledging we have yet to understand the enemy’s political warfare strategy (or that he even has one),⁶⁵ **the enemy**

⁶³ General Peter Pace, USMC, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, keynote speech presented at National Defense University, “Extemporaneous Remarks on Our National Strategy for Victory in Iraq,” Washington, DC, December, 1 2005, http://www.jcs.mil/chairman/speeches/051201remarks_NationalStrategyVictoryIraq.html; “I say you need to get out and read what our enemies have said . . . [that] we collectively ignored that to our great detriment. Now, our enemies have said publicly on film, on the Internet their goal is to destroy our way of life. No equivocation on their part.”

⁶⁴ Myers: “Counterterrorism begs for a strategy,” *The Washington Times*, 29 October 2009, at <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/oct/29/myers-counterterrorism-begs-for-a-strategy/>; “This lack of a comprehensive global strategy has been a problem since 9/11. Sadly, this broader strategy never gets the attention and hard thought it deserves, as the importance and urgency of the moment always trumps the time needed to develop a more strategic view.”

⁶⁵ David Martosko, “‘We do not Understand the Movement’: Top Special Forces General Confessed the U.S. is Clueless about ISIS as FBI Agent Warns about Terror Army’s Youth Recruiting,” *Daily Mail*, 29 December 2014, URL: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2890266/We-not-understand-movement-Special-Forces-general-confessed-clueless-ISIS-FBI-agent-warns-terror-army-s-youth-recruiting.html>; “We do not understand the Movement, and

not only knows we are in a state of strategic incomprehension, he has integrated that awareness into his political warfare strategy.

That the Muslim Brotherhood serves as our counterterror partner even as its known political warfare strategy calls for a “civilization jihadist process” structured to impose a “civilization alternative” on America⁶⁶ suggests that the Islamic Movement has **successfully filled our strategic void with their disinformation**. Indicators suggest that the officer corps senses a compromised leadership: 95% of officers surveyed believe the U.S. military does a poor job of retaining its best leaders, 74% believe it does a poor job of weeding out poor leaders, 78% believe this contributes to the high exit rate of quality junior officers (which further constitutes a national security threat), and 66% believe this contributes to a less competent general officer corps.⁶⁷

Because the National Security leadership’s incoherence has led to **the Islamic Movement’s imposing its political will on our war-fighting effort**, the current approach is doomed. The failure is bipartisan in nature, as neither party provides viable political solutions other than incremental adjustments to the overall strategic appreciation. This creates challenges in formulating a strategy, thereby effectively shattering the U.S. ability to deal with the threat.

The U.S. Government does not recognize the Islamic Movement legally or otherwise. It chooses instead to recognize only its component parts, disjointed from each other and disassociated from the Movement, and to **remain militantly unaware or unwilling to admit that such a unified effort could even exist**.

The three principle components of the Islamic Movement—the Ummah (OIC), the Dawah (the MB), and the Jihad (AQ, ISIS, et al)—can act independently while also

functioning as supporting splinters to each other, serving the Islamic Movement and reconciling their efforts through a common understanding of Islamic law. Failure to understand the counterterror effort at the Islamic Movement level denies us the ability to recognize a political warfare footprint that would bring clarity to hostile interoperable schemes of maneuver that can only be made comprehensible by deliberately committing to the deliberate decision to recognize their unity of effort. Recognition of how violent (jihadi) splinters systematically support the non-violent ones (ummah and dawah) would then lead to a decision to bring all elements of national power to bear against the results of such analysis and let the chips fall where they may.



“This lack of a comprehensive global strategy has been a problem since 9/11. Sadly, this broader strategy never gets the attention and hard thought it deserves, as the importance and urgency of the moment always trumps the time needed to develop a more strategic view.”

—General Richard Myers



“We do not understand the Movement, and until we do, we are not going to defeat it. We have not defeated the idea. We do not even understand the idea.”


— General Michael Nagata

until we do, we are not going to defeat it. We have not defeated the idea. We do not even understand the idea.”

⁶⁶ Mohamed Akram, Explanatory Memorandum, 21, 18.

⁶⁷ Tim Kane, “The Entrepreneurial Army: A Survey of West Point Graduates,” The Kauffman Foundation, Kansas, MO, January 4, 2011.

The three principle components of the Islamic Movement—the Ummah (OIC), the Dawah (the MB), and the Jihad (AQ, ISIS, etc)—can act independently while also functioning as supporting splinters to each other, serving the Islamic Movement and reconciling their efforts through a common understanding of Islamic law.



If every member of ISIS were killed tomorrow, the Islamic Movement would persist.

Without this awareness, there can be no systematic approach to preventing the Islamic Movement's subversive non-violent efforts. The non-violent dawah splinters will go **unrecognized**, and our culture, laws, and **National Security will continue to be subverted**. But this is not a distant threat. Even now, subversives are being brought in to advise senior USG officials, whose trust they have gained.

Many experts in the U.S. Government, even those purporting to understand the centrality of sharia to the challenges we face, do not understand the conceptual dilemma because **they do not recognize the political warfare aspects of Islam**. In keeping with Sun Tzu's principles, U.S. foreign policy and associated diplomatic and military actions do not address the Islamic Movement with anything resembling strategic coherence because of a collapsed intelligence assessment process and a silenced electorate, both of which have been corrupted by **hostile information campaigns designed to undermine our commitment to truth and our basic principles of evidence and facts**.

Other approaches and shortfalls:

In the face of substantial evidence to the contrary, certain elements within the U.S. Government continue to conform to the narrative that economic deprivation and social issues drive the Islamic Movement. The effect of following this narrative is that warfighting considerations have been subordinated to social welfare/nation building considerations, with the U.S. Government being held responsible for the outcome while American citizens pick up the tab. Yet the empirical evidence bears out time and again that economic deprivation is neither a necessary nor sufficient explanation for why so many Muslims join the Islamic Movement.

The Muslim Brotherhood is the lead dawah player in the United States, yet the Obama administration and key Congressional leadership perversely view it as a strategic “ally” against al Qaeda. Moreover, the principal tools to stop the Brotherhood are not being used. The U.S. Government is lax in the enforcement of the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA),⁶⁸ while the use of Terrorism Enterprise Investigations⁶⁹ has been curtailed without its special authorities being applied to the non-violent splinters, which fulfill the long-term strategic subversion objectives of the Islamic Movement.

Having limited ourselves to operational responses to strategic-level political warfare efforts, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, GEN Dunford, appearing on *60 Minutes*, outlined a four-pronged strategy for dealing with the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS): These four lines of effort were:

- 1) Sanctuary Elimination
- 2) U.S. Partner Capability and Capacity Development
- 3) Fiscal Resource Elimination
- 4) Competing Narratives

⁶⁸ From the Department of Justice, “the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) was enacted in 1938. FARA is a disclosure statute that requires persons acting as agents of foreign principals in a political or quasi-political capacity to make periodic public disclosure of their relationship with the foreign principal, as well as activities, receipts and disbursements in support of those activities. Disclosure of the required information facilitates evaluation by the government and the American people of the statements and activities of such persons in light of their function as foreign agents. Authority for FARA is located at Title 22 U.S.C. 611 et seq. (<https://www.fara.gov>)

⁶⁹ Terrorism Enterprise Investigations (TEIs) focus on investigations of enterprises that seek to further political or social goals through activities that involve force or violence, or that otherwise aim to engage in terrorism [as defined in Title 18 U.S.C. 2331(1) or (5)] or terrorism-related crimes [as defined in Title 18 U.S.C. 2332b(g)(5)(B)]. Like racketeering enterprise investigations associated with RICO, TEIs are concerned with investigations of entire enterprises, rather than just individual participants and specific criminal acts, and authorizes investigations to determine the structure and scope of the enterprise as well as the relationship of the members. The Department of Justice classifies TEIs as “Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations. The Justice Department’s “Attorney General’s Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigation” explains TEIs in Section B under “Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations (<https://www.justice.gov/ag/attorney-generals-guidelines-general-crimes-racketeering-enterprise-and-domestic#domestic>).

Warfighting considerations have been subordinated to social welfare/ nation building considerations, with the U.S. Government being held responsible for the outcome while American citizens pick up the tab.

As noted, **ISIS is but a part of one splinter component of the Islamic Movement.** If every member of ISIS were killed tomorrow, the Islamic Movement would persist. Any operational-level strategy to defeat ISIS must take place in the context of the larger strategic shift proposed in this document. Additionally, no strategy to defeat ISIS would be complete without understanding **how** ISIS understands its own defeat, which would necessarily have to be defined in Islamic, not Western terms.

The Chairman's strategy does not account for the Islamic Movement in the context of ISIS components growing in the West, specifically in the United States. Senior intelligence and law enforcement officials recently testified before Congress that they are running out of resources to deal with the threat from the violent jihadis. That said, it is the non-violent or pre-violent dawah that set the conditions that have caused the strategic paralysis that law enforcement refuses to recognize.

Intentional and non-intentional actors working to misinform the U.S. Government must be confronted before we can begin to form valid policies and correct threat appreciation. The success of Islamic Movement actors in disseminating their narratives stems from their recognition of the lack of even the most basic subject-matter awareness in the U.S. National Security establishment of hostile information campaigns. Here are three examples:

- **Apologists for Islam**, many of whom have fiscal ties to foreign entities, who develop and disseminate false “feel good” Islamic narratives, need to be identified, called out, and discredited. Minimally, identified apologists should be challenged and those challenging them protected from reprisal. Decision-makers seen as overly susceptible to such narratives should be confronted; such gullibility in professional National Security decision-making is at least nonfeasance and perhaps malfeasance, a violation of their professional commitment to our National Security and their oath to “support and defend.”
- **“Useful idiots and fellow travelers”** are individuals (both Muslim and non-Muslim) who present their own idiosyncratic interpretations of Islam as viable alternatives to what is, in fact, black-letter sharia grounded in classical doctrine and supported by modern Islamic scholars. Because these ideations obviously lack credibility inside the Islamic world, they need to be exposed, challenged, and excluded from the deliberate decision-making process. Threat identification is not an academic pursuit. The real enemy states his doctrines in clear non-theoretical terms so that anyone who takes the time can read and understand them. The insertion of both “useful idiots” and “apologists” into U.S. National Security institutions, purposely or not, creates time-consuming debate, dissension, and diversion of resources in furtherance of the enemy's strategic goals.
- **Current and former USG officials** trading on their past governmental positions when on the payroll of Gulf and jihadi exporting states need to be held accountable in the court of public opinion for their actions. For

The real enemy states his doctrines in clear non-theoretical terms so that anyone who takes the time can read and understand them.

example, former senior government officials on the boards of multinational corporations that have multi-billion-dollar contracts with states like Saudi Arabia should be required to disclose their conflicts of interest and current financial affiliations when authoring articles that draw on their previous lofty positions in the U.S. Government.

The **current U.S. approach fails** to recognize the Islamic Movement. It insists on:

- excusing Islam from acts which are often and openly declared to have been done in the name of Islam;
- sanitizes the analytical process and disregards jihadi actors' appeal to Islamic law for authority to act when engaging in killing actions;
- and, most disturbingly, has developed policies for ensuring that even the words "Islam" and "Muslim" are expunged from any discussion of their violent acts.

This means that groups like the Islamic Movement and the Islamic State cannot be named in analytical products in which these groups are the primary focus. Such behaviors not only fail to protect America and Americans, they actually assist in the encroachment of Islamic ideology. **They cast the U.S. Government, through a series of ill-considered strategic decisions, in the role as the Islamic Movement's greatest enabler.** Operating under this regime, the Islamic Movement in America has been permitted to stand up its counter-state in the open presence of an FBI tasked with the statutory mission to keep it from occurring. It is time for a change!

3.0 ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC APPROACH

The most important requirement in developing an alternative strategic approach is that it meet the enemy at the strategic political warfare level while affirming the legitimacy of the American way of life.

The campaign must be positive, front-footed and should enable core American principles, specifically the fundamental right of freedom of speech. Many Americans feel they have lost their voice, their ability to express their love of country, let alone challenge Islamic ideology and its racist, sexist desire for religious and political domination. **Protecting the American voice and non-violent forms of expression—publicly, in the media, in academia, and even in the government—will prove to be a powerful antidote to the Islamic Movement.** This Campaign Plan proposes a political warfare response that not only engages the enemy in all lines of operation (which would constitute a declaration of war that identifies and confronts the Islamic Movement) but also will offer and assist Americans, every American, with the proper civil tools to fight.

A central theme is that long-term investments need to be made in the American educational system, including charter schools and schools in urban centers that

emphasize topics such as civics, Western civilization, and American history, with curricula that are free from post-modernism, moral relativism, and cultural Marxism.



The restoration of the principles on which the country was founded permeates the dynamic driving the Trump Campaign. “Make America Great Again” resonates with an underlying sense, if not always a clear understanding, that what made America great in the first place is at risk. Returning to the immutable truths of the Declaration as a foundational legal principle is critical. First among the immutable truths is that there are immutable truths that frame the American way. Restoration of traditional activities, including things like reciting the Pledge of Allegiance and standing for the national anthem are likewise a necessity.

We need to meet the enemy at the strategic political warfare level while affirming the legitimacy of the American way of life.

The proposed strategic approach calls for an operational pause on all non-critical counterterror operations. The purpose of this operational pause is to reset and reorient the National Security establishment on a new footing. Also needed is an operational pause on immigration that would apply to all Islamic countries and all immigrants and refugees who cannot be thoroughly and reliably vetted by U.S. organizations.

This new footing's overall strategic concept is best described in terms of a *political warfare posture* known as the *Strategic Defensive*.

The new approach is reality-based and directly targets the enemy's purposefully constructed pseudoreality that has so thoroughly succeeded in confusing and obfuscating our ruling and media elites. Threat-focused and fact-driven, as mentioned in Section 2, this effort seeks to engage the enemy along his well-entrenched lines of effort and respond to his specific operations in order to scuttle his campaign and strategic design. Along with the pause on immigration, the strategy gives recognition to the Constitutional obligation to know all enemies as we undertake a strategic pivot that prepares all citizens to proudly renew their commitment to American values and reengage in the fight to take back their country even as the Obama administration calls them Islamophobic and subjects them to intimidation campaigns meant to force them into a silence that only enables and emboldens the enemy.

The pause calls for serious analysis and decision-making in a war-fighting environment. **It is time to act.**

3.1 END STATE

The end state of the proposed strategic approach anticipates the following:

- Sustainable peace is re-established under long-standing American leadership and values;

- The Muslim Brotherhood in America is fully exposed and discredited;
- The most appropriate tool to assess the threat from the Islamic Movement is the Political Warfare Model;
- The strategic level of warfare is re-introduced as the national level of warfare and encourages participation from all Americans as part of an informed national debate;
- The United States fulfills its National Security obligations consistent with Constitutional requirements when freeing itself of pseudorealities;
- The Islamic Movement is defined as it defines itself, as a political system that seeks to replace the Constitution and American way of life as a “civilization alternative” and, as such, constitutes a clear and present danger;
- The Islamic Movement influence in the United States is identified, reduced, stopped, and shut down;
- Elimination of the U.S.-based Islamic Movement counter-state;
- The United States regains control of U.S. National Security decision-making;
- U.S. foreign, economic, and domestic policy and alliance development is informed by a new strategic threat appreciation that is used to assess the OIC, the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Qaeda, ISIS, and associated movements;
- The United States properly organizes, trains, and equips its National Security/counterterror institutions and personnel along fact-driven/threat-focused criteria;
- Elimination of sanctuaries inside the United States, including digital sanctuaries;
- Suspension of immigration (future immigration to be conditional – political Islam affiliation constituting a bar to entry). (This includes temporary worker and student visas as a basis for remaining for any sustained period);
- The strategic nature of the oath to support and defend the Constitution is re-established as the bedrock principle on which all national security is based.

3.2 WAYS

Political:

It is vital for public and popular support for the mobilization and resourcing of America's push against the Islamic Movement to be generated at all levels of society. This endeavor must be framed in positive, pro-American language that highlights American principles, and not in negative, anti-Islam terms. It must also include a reversal of the Obama administration's position on punishing anyone who pushes back on Islamic ideology or exposes probable dangerous persons (e.g., Nidal Hassan, the San

It is not an accident that Islamic Movement front groups like the Islamic Society of North America operate at international, national, state, and local levels to influence political, cultural, social, and religious leaders at all levels.

There needs to be massive counterintelligence and counterinfluence efforts to roll back Islamic Movement influence inside the U.S. Government at all levels.

Bernardino killers), as well as established protections for their anonymity or, if they want to come forward publicly, protections for their safety and security.

The Islamic Movement engages through political warfare strategies in which the violent supports the non-violent, where penetration and subversion are the main effort, and which are executed at all lines of effort and operation, from strategic [national/international levels], to operational [states, major organizations], to tactical levels [state and local]. It is not an accident that Islamic Movement front groups like the Islamic Society of North America [ISNA] operate at international, national, state, and local levels to influence political, cultural, social, and religious leaders at all levels. It is not by chance that CAIR, the lead information warfare agent of the Islamic Movement, is in the media at all levels, often with allies from the hard left, when issues spring to the fore and call for a response from the “Muslim Community.” There is a reason why ISNA is able to mobilize its “Shoulder to Shoulder” campaign to get Christian and Jewish clergy to publicly side with them against their own faithful. To be effective, the proposed strategy must generate a mobilization and adequate resourcing to scuttle the effort of these groups and foster a pro-American movement at the societal level.

Violence:

Domestic police and intelligence services must leverage coercive elements of the government to enforce newly developed legal paradigms for dealing with these threat organizations and individuals. While escalatory violence may occur, the objective is to be precise in the targeting, starting with non-kinetic resources like immigration and taxation (*a la* Al Capone) as forms of coercion. Halting their domestic terrorism efforts should be given the highest priority, and every effort should be made to constrict their ability to operate within the domestic United States or from bases along the border or in the near abroad. This includes massive counterintelligence and counterinfluence efforts to roll back Islamic Movement influence inside the U.S. Government at all levels. It also includes accounting for potential proxies, such as Black Lives Matter, and those who fund and support them. As part of the counterterror effort, **attention must be given to our responses to violent attacks to ensure the response does not facilitate Islamic Movement objectives**, especially when the objective might reasonably be assessed to be a provocation intended to cause an immediate ill-considered violent response.

Non-Violence:

The U.S. Government and private sector partners should put forward a massive **information campaign that rolls back the Violent Extremist narrative and replaces it with a factual depiction grounded in threat-based analysis of the Islamic Movement and the Islamic doctrine driving it**. Social media and other cyber capability should play a central role as well. There are legal constraints to the U.S. Government’s engaging in domestic “political influence operations.” It is permissible

and necessary, however, for government entities across all sectors, in conjunction with citizen's groups, non-profits, and related NGOs, to engage the public directly and openly on the true nature and consequences of the Islamic Movement.

Alliances:

The United States Government should work with all interested parties, specifically including groups that have been targets (and victims) of Islamic law and the Islamic Movement. When appropriate, the U.S. Government should also work with allies overseas, whether they are current heads of state or activist political groups in countries afflicted by the Islamic Movement.

International:

Prohibit the OIC as well as international Islamic Movement enablers, such as the UN, from domestic policy formulation. Eliminate international sponsors (fiscal) of the Islamic Movement from domestic conduits. Direct and indirect allies of the Islamic Movement must be challenged.

4.0 MAIN EFFORT

4.1 The Rule of Law in the Conflict:

The enemy's main effort is to maintain a strategic pseudoreality through warfare lines of effort focusing on the political and ideological arenas. This effort supports the international Islamic Movement's center of gravity—to grow the Movement by creating the perception among Muslims around the world that it is achieving its objectives. The U.S. Government urgently needs to undertake a strategic approach that coordinates domestic, economic, and foreign policies to focus on the best policies and strategic communication to quickly and decisively defeat Islamic Movement efforts. Most important, we need to take seriously that we must, as Sun Tzu advises, break their will to fight. Therefore, defeat must be swift, openly assured, and certain so that everyone recognizes it and no-one denies it, especially within the target audience of Muslims both in the United States and abroad.

Our current legal paradigms are not only insufficient, they actually work against this strategy and, consequently, against our own national security. "Hate speech" legislation hobbles the general population, stifles scholarly discussion, corrupts professional analytical work product, and puts fear of retribution into the hearts of our leadership. It is a direct assault on the First Amendment that seeks to institutionalize prior restraint. The Islamic Movement is well aware of this and has shown the ability

"Hate speech" legislation hobbles the general population, stifles scholarly discussion, corrupts professional analytical work product, and puts fear of retribution into the hearts of our leadership. It is a direct assault on the First Amendment.

The defeat mechanism the enemy uses to undermine U.S. power and prestige is penetration and subversion through sustained information campaigns designed to reduce the National Security community to incoherence and lose the goodwill and faith of the American people.

to manipulate our own laws against us—a form of war known as lawfare.⁷⁰ While this phenomenon is drawing the attention of many, there has been little effective push-back to date. We have made ourselves vulnerable to this form of attack. The United States must take a war-footing approach to defending the integrity of the U.S. legal system—and the international legal system—under whose authority we now wage kinetic activities.

Strong consideration should be directed at adopting the following legal maneuvers that re-establish the integrity of the legal system, outlaw compliance to sharia domestically, and declare war on the Islamic Movement’s subversive activities internationally. At a minimum, we must:

- Roll back successful instantiation of sharia in the United States;
- **Designate the Muslim Brotherhood a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) operating inside the United States.**
- Assign the counterterror mission to the FBI and local law enforcement in a manner that does not compromise the criminal law enforcement mission;
- Alternatively, develop a new designation for “Hostile Foreign Powers” encompassing groups that are subversive but not terrorist or violent per se, especially when shown to be operating within a splinter construct or otherwise acting under color of foreign authority;
- Set up legal protections (and maybe even incentives) for whistleblowing regarding Islamic, pro sharia, organizations;
- Establish legal protections for academics, media personages and others who are working in good faith to expose the truth about the Islamic Movement and its role in undermining America;
- Establish legal protections for government workers who, in good faith, act as watchdogs on policy and operational leaders who are ignoring the threat;
- Create the enforceable presumption that statements known to be true based on discoverable facts cannot be made the object of accusations of hate speech;
- Undertake an investigation, assessment, and disposition of mosques associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and related Islamic Movement in America entities in a manner consistent with the FTO designation. **As stated in the Muslim Brotherhood’s Explanatory Memorandum, mosques associated with the Islamic Movement mission constitute “the ‘axis’ of our Movement ... the ‘base’ for our rise ... to educate us, to prepare us and supply our battalions. ...”**⁷¹

⁷⁰ “What is Lawfare,” [The Lawfare Project, http://thelawfareproject.org/lawfare/what-is-lawfare-1/](http://thelawfareproject.org/lawfare/what-is-lawfare-1/)

⁷¹ Mohamed Akram, Paragraph 17, Explanatory Memorandum, 23.

Information Campaign/Narrative Design and Evolution:

The defeat mechanism the enemy uses to undermine U.S. power and prestige is penetration and subversion through sustained information campaigns designed to reduce the National Security community to incoherence and lose the goodwill and faith of the American people. Because these narratives have succeeded in sustaining a deceptive mirage, a pseudoreality that has immobilized our counterterror effort, they must be identified, countered, and defeated as a first priority effort. This includes not only the narratives and memes, but also those responsible for them and their forms of transmission.

4.2 Information Warfare:

The main effort of this Campaign Plan is the production of a **blueprint for information warfare messaging design and evolution that seeks to re-establish facts, published doctrines, and reality as the basis for National Security intelligence collection, analysis, and deliberate decision-making.** The defeat mechanism for the Islamic Movement operating inside the United States is its ability to keep Americans from focusing on the reality of what is happening around them, including the intrinsic role sharia plays in driving the enemy's domestic and foreign strategies. Any campaign to break through this constructed pseudoreality—itsself grounded in false relativist assumptions—must be based on information warfare efforts that **re-introduce the factual reality of Islamic dawah and jihad doctrines to the American people** in a manner that aligns all elements of national power with this new situational appreciation.

No U.S. Government organization is currently tasked with communicating to the American public about the war. In fact, since 9/11, the political level of communication by elected officials has been under the active influence of hostile actors conducting high-level influence operations against U.S. political leadership, some witting and some not. This constitutes a critical vulnerability in need of immediate redress. To overcome this shortcoming, consideration should be given to standing up a **purpose-built organization tasked with coordinating strategic communications themes both domestically and overseas.**

To accomplish this mission, the organization should coordinate with White House Public Affairs, the Department of State, the NCTC, involved domestic agencies, local law enforcement, the private sector, public interest groups, and NGOs. It should produce large, small, and micro-media strategies that include major broadcast, digital, and social media. The organization should focus on:

- Creating a strategic communications arm capable of adroit, strategically focused political communication across the spectrum of targeted audiences, including foreign and domestic allies;
- Identifying the Islamic Movement, its allies, and neutral parties both domestic and abroad;

Since 9/11, the political level of communication by elected officials has been under the active influence of hostile actors conducting high-level influence operations against U.S. political leadership.

- Co-opting the European Union and liberal governments through controlled communications capabilities;
- Limiting engagement through Christian and Jewish organizations and groups, as they play into divisive narratives;
- Creating an active measures working group tasked with identifying hostile influence campaigns and purging those that cannot be convinced to drop the Islamic Movement narrative;
- Crafting fact-based messaging that establishes the moral superiority of Western Civilization and the American way of life. Actions undertaken in fulfillment of this effort include:
 - Recognize the alliance between the Islamic Movement and the hard left in real terms;
 - De-couple Islamic Movement narratives from the postmodern/cultural Marxist ones—especially as they manifest themselves inside the Countering Violent Extremism and evolving Hate Speech narratives, both of which are designed to make them interoperable and supportive of one another;
 - Identify the organizations, individuals, and missions of the Islamic Movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the OIC, and identify their relationship to groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS as well as to specific nation-state actors supporting their overall strategic objectives;
 - Work on challenging the postmodern relativistic mindset in America so that truth, reason, objectivity, and evidence, and critical thinking are valued, and then ensure that an accurate history of Islam is disseminated;
 - Use political throw weight inversion to leverage actions of jihadi organizations and individuals and showcase intent to counter Islamic Movement allies.⁷² Identify exploitable seams in Islamic doctrine and among Islamic Movement players to divide the Islamic Movement.
- Synchronizing operations in support of information warfare in order to reach out to neutrals and discourage alignment with the Islamic Movement;
- Identify, then eliminate or neutralize hostile narrative penetrations, especially counter-factual designs in legal, political, educational, and intelligence;

⁷² Political Throw Weight is a term, adapted from language of Cold War-era strategic nuclear calculation, used by the television industry to assign political value to B roll, film with specific events, persons, places and things of value. In this instance, the violent actions of Islamic Movement elements (i.e., AQ) are leveraged to smear and bring political pressure against allies of the Islamic Movement. This is accomplished by tying the violent actions of one element of the Islamic Movement to the non-violent splinter/organizations/individuals for the purpose of increasing political cost.

- Identify and “mainstream” awareness of penetration efforts designed to infuse hostile narratives;
- Stop elites from acting as internal advocates for foreign interests.

This is about America First—peace through economic and military strength—and restoring the American way of governance.

4.3 Operational Sequencing and Phasing:

Campaign plans involve not only the production of execution orders but also the sequencing and phasing of the actions that arise from them. Timing is a key planning consideration in the chronology of events and also in terms of the internal ordering of activities. It is important not to shoot until one is in range of the target (phasing) and also not until one has first aimed at the target (sequencing).

Priority Actions:

DECLARE AN OPERATIONAL PAUSE

■ The proposed Campaign Plan's first action is to call for an immediate operational pause on the war on terror and Islamic immigration. As part of the pause:

- **Suspend all Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) activities.**
 - No activities more clearly demonstrate the crippling consequences of failing to recognize an enemy's strategic-level political warfare campaign than the CVE and UN Resolution 16/18. Both reflect non-violent lines of operation arising from a single state-action policy initiative that involves all three Islamic Movement splinters: the violent (jihad), the non-violent (dawah, the Muslim Brotherhood), and state action (the Ummah, the OIC).
- **Withdraw support of UN Resolution 16/18.** [see above]
- The **pause on immigration is based on enforcement of the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952.** The Act denies entry to “immigrants who were unlawful, immoral, diseased in any way, politically radical etc. and accepting those who were willing and able to assimilate into the U.S. economic, social, and political structures.”⁷³ While the principal focus at the time of passage was communists, the Act is more broadly phrased to account for any individual or group advocating illegal or radical ideals deemed hostile to U.S. National Security. Under this Act, the government has the authority to limit immigration of Muslims, especially those from areas of war and instability or who adhere to doctrines hostile to the United States and its people.

⁷³ 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S. Immigration Legislation Online, undated, http://library.uwb.edu/static/USimmigration/1952_immigration_and_nationality_act.html

- Conduct massive *de novo* intelligence preparation of the environment (IPE) that assumes nothing carries over from the current threat assessment. As it relates to the threat, there are to be no assumptions. The IPE should be a threat-based, factual, and comprehensive assessment of the Islamic Movement that accounts for all elements of its threat doctrine and strategic posture, including its political warfare orientation and splinter movement activities at all levels of engagement. This should be a collaborative effort that includes the Intelligence Community, the counterterror communities at all levels, law enforcement at all levels, and the private sector.
- From the IPE, conduct large-scale operational preparation of the environment (OPE) in conjunction with national, state, and local law enforcement;
 - From the OPE:
 - Structure purpose-driven education and training of the Intelligence Community, the counterterror community, and law enforcement at Federal, state, and local levels;
 - Provide parallel education and training that includes recognition of lawfare as an actual weapon of war for U.S. attorneys, judges, states attorneys, and district attorneys;
 - Undertake targeted counterterror investigations that are prioritized ahead of criminal activities.
- Foster active information-sharing among all law enforcement agencies within the United States in order to:
 - Promote informal relationships that facilitate the sharing of information among Federal, state, and local counterterror and related law enforcement activities;
 - Reduce and eliminate classification systems that obstruct information flow between counterterror and law enforcement entities at Federal, state, and local levels.

5.0 DISCUSSION

The synthesis of actions described in this domestic Campaign Plan is comprehensible only in the context of political warfare in which we **acknowledge that the enemy's main effort is both strategic and non-violent**. Islamic Movement narratives are crafted on postmodern/cultural Marxist ideological underpinnings with which they are fully synchronized. It relies on structured terms, memes, and narratives to influence, undermine, and ultimately control our understanding of events. It is through unwitting fidelity to those narratives that our decision-making is rendered ineffective in a predictable manner, leading to engagements in which the enemy has already war-gamed courses of action to favorable outcomes detrimental to U.S.

national security. We are left with a sense of hopelessness on one hand and a false sense of accomplishment on the other.

Playback assures our compliance with narratives that create perverse dependencies on hostile influencers for our orientation on, and communication about, the Islamic Movement and its subversive activities. **Valued relationships with the Islamic Movement entities are among the mechanisms that set the conditions for our defeat;** flattery is used to maneuver decision-makers into actions inimical to America's national interest. This is the culmination of what Josef Pieper warned of when saying, *"flattery is the deceptive mirage of the political process, the counterfeit usurpation of power, a power that belongs to the legitimate authority alone."*

As this Campaign Plan's proposed strategy unfolds, we must understand that purposeful recognition of the language we use to explain events is an integral part of the decision-making process as well as the overall strategy. The language used to explain our strategy must be organic to our operational requirements as informed by the strategic nature of the oath. It must clarify the nature of the threat, identify the seams through which it operates, and target it for kinetic and non-kinetic defeat.

Islamic Movement narratives are crafted on postmodern/cultural Marxist ideological underpinnings with which they are fully synchronized.

5.1 Anticipated Results and Enemy Actions

The Islamic Movement will fully execute the range of options its purpose-driven narratives afford it and its identified proxies. When confronted with countermeasures, the Islamic Movement reaction will be controlled, escalatory violence—both tangible and intangible—in support of efforts to re-establish influence and control over U.S. deliberate decision-making. In undertaking a response, the Islamic Movement will move on all lines of effort.

Enemy Influence activities include:

- Increased funding and influence through political contributions to retired senior officials, who then write op-eds and television news-cycle hits related to the same

We must reach out to lower-level government officials, academics, etc., who have been harmed, ostracized, or threatened because of their attempts to bring Islamic Movement issues to light and document their stories.

Additional anticipated threat responses include:

- Increased efforts to affect the administration, government agencies, and Congress:
 - On targeted issues by leveraging information activities such as the CVE; and
 - Efforts to get their U.S.-based personnel inside U.S. Government official positions.

- Escalate *ad-hominem* accusations of victimhood, persecution, and Islamophobia:
 - Energize the “Shoulder to Shoulder” influence operation, which uses the interfaith movement to flatter ministers, priests, and rabbis into publicly doing its bidding, including attacking members of their own faith communities on behalf of the Muslim Brotherhood and in furtherance of its ends.
- Escalate (to increasingly hysterical) claims that counterterror scrutiny directed their way interferes with the Islamic Movement’s ability to stop al-Qaeda and Islamic State domestically—relying on fear narratives:
 - Having been rendered pliant and compliant by Islamic Movement narratives, the counterterror community has been dulled to the fact that, stripped of the flattering and evasive language, these Islamic Movement claims are actual threats of violence if scrutiny of Muslim Brotherhood individuals and activities is not suspended. In essence, they are saying, “If you do not stop investigating and surveilling us, al-Qaeda will attack.” This is one way in which the violent splinter supports the non-violent.
- Increased digital and social media-based dawah efforts;
- Increased legal challenges through lawfare to policy and legal paradigms;
- Increased domestic and international claims of human rights abuse against the U.S.; via aligned NGO’s and other international organizations like UNHRC and Amnesty International;
- Increase hostile efforts by UN and OIC elements to control U.S. military and diplomatic capabilities; for example, consolidating Turkish power over U.S. military operations in Turkey at a time when Erdogan has become the named leader of the OIC or by declaring a “Day of Rage” that catches decision-makers off-balance;
- Increased media [CAIR] and academic presence at the elementary, high school and university levels [MSA] as permitted through academic grounds;
- Energized protest activities by the Islamic Movement and the hard left.

Reduced Signatures:

- Overt Islamic affiliates of the Muslim Brotherhood may go underground, including the sanitizing of online websites and posts;
- Increased portion of enemy efforts may become clandestine, including greater use of end-to-end encryption and Dark Web applications/communications;
- Greater reliance on dual-use organizations and outreach efforts;

- Operational deployment of special action units targeting policy support personnel and organizations, including targeted killing, pseudo-operations, false flag operations, and black propaganda.

Modulated Violence:

- Enough domestic violence to keep intelligence and law enforcement focused on the strictly tactical;
- Yet not enough violence to trigger a wholesale mobilization by our side;
- Increased attacks against U.S. interests overseas.

5.2 Metrics

5.2.1 Tangible Metrics of Success

- Passage of the Muslim Brotherhood terrorist designation act;
- Formal designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department;
- Narrative shifts by the Islamic Movement, as predicted above;
- Playback of Campaign Plan-informed terms and concepts within National Security and media:
 - Politicians, media, elites, students, and youth begin to articulate talking points from this Campaign Plan;
 - Media accounts present alternative narrative that eventually adopts America First narratives and Western notions of governance, law, culture, etc.
- U.S. politicians actually stop, or at least begin limiting interaction with or support for Islamic Movement entities;
- Congressional investigations undertaken to identify domestic subversive elements and remove their hostile influence inside the USG;
- Counterintelligence and counterespionage is re-introduced, re-invigorated, and re-focused to account for threats in today's environment as required by the Constitutional oath;
 - Supportive counterintelligence and counterespionage campaigns initiated.
- Grow a cadre of U.S. experts on Islam and Islamic law and provide them a role in the intelligence cycle and related critical decision-making activities in the USG;
- Military services and intelligence agencies add Islamic threat doctrine to professional education and promotion requirements;
- Visibly reduced presence of hijabs, Islamic Centers, etc.;

- Increased number of arrests and prosecutions relating to Islamic Movement subversion activity;
- Closing, shuttering, or otherwise limiting U.S.-based dual-use or purposed Islamic Movement organizations;
- Criminalize and prosecute sharia compliant finance under Title 18 2339A and 2339B;
- Criminalize or otherwise reduce funding from Islamic Movement entities to U.S. politicians and U.S.-based Islamic Movement elements;
- Desynchronize/sever the Hard Left/Islamic Movement alliance, and undermine hard left group support for Islamic Movement entities;
- Develop national security-focused language and supporting terminology to account for the Islamic Movement threat that captures the factual basis of those entities, including associated organizations and doctrines, in such a manner that it supports evidentiary standards as articulated in the Federal Rules of Evidence;
- Strategic pause that:
 - Provides time for reassessment of the counterterror effort; and
 - Halts Islamic Immigration.

5.2.2 Intangible Metrics of Success

- Popular response to the issue results in pressure on media, politicians, and clergy to change their appreciation and perception of events;
- Islamic Movement sympathizers, fellow travelers, media, and political supporters are shunned;
- Reduced uncertainty and apprehension on the part of U.S. National Security personnel dealing with Islamic terror and related activities;
- Reduced uncertainty and apprehension on the part of concerned citizens when dealing with Islamic terror and related topics;
- Increased willingness by the general public to report concerns and speak up;
- Increased fear and greater efforts by the Islamic Movement to minimize their losses and strategic setbacks;
- Church and synagogue—parishioners and congregation members—directly challenge their leadership for engaging with known Islamic Movement entities whose anti-Christian and anti-Semitic views are manifestly public;
- U.S. political parties are forcefully challenged by constituencies to get on the right side of this issue;
- Successful implementation of media and corporate boycotts that target support of Islamic Movement initiatives and organizations.

6.0 CONCLUSION

6.1 Challenges:

- The American public is the center of gravity and they are currently unprepared for the political/cultural warfare required. Public education and awareness must be raised carefully as to what is to be done and why;
- The enemy [the Muslim Brotherhood] controls the narrative and the supporting narrative [Cultural Marxism];
- Implementation and execution present challenges;
- The Islamic Movement has strategic situational awareness that our side lacks and, thus, will be postured in full anticipation of our initial moves;
- Shifting the moral basis for action to confront the Islamic Movement in the face of overwhelming opposition from political, clerical, and media opponents to this world view;
- Shifting fiscal and budgetary policy to align with this new strategic paradigm;
- Inertia, defeat level, lack of awareness.

6.2 Expectations:

Introduction of this new strategic paradigm will face overwhelming resistance. This resistance will be particularly tenacious because the enemy's very survival depends upon defeating the Plan's implementation.

The cost to the United States of conducting the war—political, economic, morale—will be reduced through the conduct of this Campaign Plan . . . after the initial difficulty of the change.

Historical alliances and sphere participants shall shift their political base of support and economic decision-making in reaction to this proposed change. While initially perceived as cause for concern, these alliance adjustments are necessary and will bring to light the unperceived yet actual enemies and alliances facing the United States at present.

“And it ought to be remembered that there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things. Because the innovator has for enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new. This coolness arises partly from fear of the opponents, who have the laws on their side, and partly from the incredulity of men, who do not readily believe in new things until they have had a long

experience of them. Thus it happens that whenever those who are hostile have the opportunity to attack they do it like partisans, whilst the others defend lukewarmly, in such wise that the prince is endangered along with them.” – *Machiavelli*

6.3 Timelines:

This Campaign Plan is a time-critical immediate action document and is the basis on which follow-on policy development and war-gaming by those with decision-making authority shall craft timelines based on political and fiscal support.

6.4 Summary Statement:


This domestic Campaign Plan reflects the authors’ analysis of the U.S. response to the war on terror and is driven by their understanding of enemy threat doctrine as it interacts with national security and perception management. The Plan relies on Maoist political warfare concepts to frame our understanding of the enemy threat doctrine and develops a competing theory on the nature of the threat divorced from the memes and narratives that hitherto have controlled our understanding and decision-making.



in a struggle, analysis must be unconstrained by preconceptions

For more Unconstrained Analytics reports, go to:

unconstrainedanalytics.org



Unconstrained Analytics is a 501(c)3 dedicated to analysis of evidence unconstrained by preconceptions and biases. This includes thorough analysis of an enemy's threat doctrine unconstrained by bias, preconceptions and influence operations coming from the same.

Unconstrained Analytics
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Suite 27307
Washington, DC 20038

*unconstrained*analytics.org