Exploiting Ignorance in the Post Subversion Phase
Assessing What ISIS Wants in Light of the ‘Countering Violent Extremism’ Narrative

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That the existential realm of man could be taken over by pseudorealities whose fictitious nature threatens to become indiscernible is truly a depressing thought. And yet, the Platonic nightmare, I hold, possesses an alarming contemporary relevance. For the general public is being reduced to a state where people are not only unable to find out about the truth but also become unable even to search for the truth because they are satisfied with deception and trickery that have determined their convictions, satisfied with a fictitious reality created by design through the abuse of language.

Josef Pieper
Abuse of Language – Abuse of Power, 1974

Graeme Wood’s March 2015 Atlantic article “What ISIS Really Wants” brought back a few bad memories from my days at the Pentagon, where I was mobilized to the Joint Staff Intelligence after 9/11. One such memory was the frequent assertion, beginning around 2003, that “Sistani is a ‘quietist.’” Another was the March 2007 Foreign Affairs article “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood.”

As both narratives supported strategic distractions, the fact that the two came together in the Atlantic article raised red flags. We have been here before—many times. These flags will be addressed in the following analysis in the context of their associated concerns.

It is argued that the Atlantic article supports narratives that continue to justify the outsourcing of the production of America's information requirements in support of the counterterror effort to non-U.S. actors, in this case Middle Eastern, in much the way that the Muslim Brotherhood controls the domestic debate through the “countering violent extremism” (CVE) narrative.

Cast as an effort to work with our partners in the Middle East to counter the burgeoning ISIS information juggernaut, the actual effect of “What ISIS Really Wants” is to further wrest control of the information requirements that drive America's counterterror effort and keep them vested in non-U.S. actors.
Despite its earnest and facially neutral designation, the CVE is, in effect, a sophisticated information campaign executed through the skilled imposition of a disarming pseudoreality. The CVE narrative assumes an infantilized level of thinking as described by Diana West in *The Death of the Grown-Up,* and is precisely what Josef Pieper had in mind when saying:

> Plato evidently knew what he was talking about when he declared sophists’ accomplished art of flattery to be the deceptive mirage of the political process, that is, the counterfeit usurpation of power, a power that belongs to the legitimate political authority alone.\(^5\)

As the duty to know national security threats is subsumed in the Article VI requirement to “support and defend against all enemies,” the very willingness to outsource our information requirements constitutes, by itself, a national security breakdown of strategic proportions. As with the Muslim Brotherhood domestically, the outsourcing works itself through the CVE.

**The Salaf al-Salih and ‘Quietist Salafism’**

A few observations on the *Atlantic* article: First, the Muslim Brotherhood does not appear to be a player in the piece. This is a change from the recent past. In what may reflect a return to the pre-2007 line of operation, the article reflects a strong Wahhabi influence. Beginning with the first edition of al-Qaeda’s *Inspire* magazine in June 2010, al-Qaeda announced that its target audience was the entire *salaf al-salih*:

> This Islamic Magazine is geared towards making the Muslim a mujahid in Allah’s path. Our intent is to give the most accurate presentation of Islam as followed by the *Salaf as-Salih*. Our concern for the ummah is worldwide and thus we try to touch upon all major issues while giving attention to the events unfolding in the Arabian Peninsula as we witness it on the ground. Jihad has been deconstructed in our age and thus its revival in comprehension and endeavor is of utmost importance for the Caliphate’s manifestation.\(^6\)

Al-Qaeda is a Wahhabi entity. Since the launch of *Inspire*, a tendency of Wahhabis to speak in terms of the *salaf al-salih* when addressing narrower Wahhabi interests has evolved. The *Atlantic* article positions “quietist Salafis” as a counterbalance to “extremist” Salafis, like ISIS or Jabhat al Nusra. A Google search of “Quietist Salafism” finds that the most prominent articles also refer to the *salaf al-salih*. Two examples from 2013, one from a book review by Jennifer London and the other from an article by Laurent Bonnefoy:

> In *A Quietist Jihadi: The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi*, Joas Wagemakers introduces Abu...
Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s writings as important parts of the complex intellectual terrain of Salafi movements today: movements constituted by diverse actors with different notions of how to emulate their pious forbears (al salaf al-sahihin).7

What is Salafism? “Salafism” is a contentious label. While it emerged in public debate in the West after the attacks in the U.S. of September 11th 2001, the branch of political Islam that it aims to describe has deeper historical roots. Contemporary Salafism has for long remained ill defined. It can nevertheless be depicted as an attempt to reform Sunni Islam, building in particular on the teachings of Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328), Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703-92) and Muhammad al-Shawkani (1759-1834). These religious scholars sought to purge Islam of a number of unwarranted innovations (bid‘a) and to return to the practice of the pious ancestors (salaf al-salih), i.e., the first three generations of Muslims.8

The salaf al-salih is associated with Salafism and is generally translated as “the righteous predecessors.” As historically defined, Salafism is the belief that the most perfect form of Islam is that which was practiced by Muhammad, his companions (the predecessors), and the four Rightly Guided Caliphs.

As such, both the salaf al-salih and Salafism apply to a much broader population than to just the Wahhabis. In the Islamic context, Salafism is a powerful unifying concept. As an ideological baseline, it is much broader than Wahhabism.

Yet both London and Bonnefoy characterize the Salaf in exclusively Wahhabi terms. For example, while the Brotherhood has recognizable Salafi characteristics, it is not a Wahhabi entity. When referring to the Salaf, both articles refer only to Wahhabis, and Bonnefoy actually defines Salafism as Wahhabism. The Atlantic article likewise identifies Al Qaeda with Salafism while leaving Wahhabism unmentioned:

Zawahiri’s companion in isolation is a Jordanian cleric named Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, 55, who has a fair claim to being al-Qaeda’s intellectual architect and the most important jihadist unknown to the average American newspaper reader. On most matters of doctrine, Maqdisi and the Islamic State agree. Both are closely identified with the jihadist wing of a branch of Sunnism called Salafism, after the Arabic al salaf al-salih, the “pious forefathers.”

Like Inspire magazine, the Atlantic article identifies al-Qaeda with the salaf al-salih without mentioning Wahhabism. Hence, rather than identify Baghdadi based on the Wahhabism that drives his actions, the Atlantic article identifies him over broadly as a Salafi:
Baghdadi is Salafi. The term Salafi has been villainized, in part because authentic villains have ridden into battle waving the Salafi banner. But most Salafis are not jihadists, and most adhere to sects that reject the Islamic State. They are, as Haykel notes, committed to expanding Dar al-Islam, the land of Islam, even, perhaps, with the implementation of monstrous practices such as slavery and amputation—but at some future point. Their first priority is personal purification and religious observance, and they believe anything that thwarts those goals—such as causing war or unrest that would disrupt lives and prayer and scholarship—is forbidden.

It is important to recognize the ongoing word play with salaf al-salih by Wahhabis. Seeking to distinguish Baghdadi from other “Salafis” based on his willing use of violence, the Atlantic article concedes that “monstrous practices” attributed to him are likewise the objective of the larger Salafi community.

At best, “What ISIS Really Wants” argues the same sort of difference that exists between Bolshevism and Menshevism (i.e., the decision to engage in strategies of direct confrontation or longer-term subversion). The distinction boils down to nothing more than different points of view on timing and tactics. It’s also the closest the article comes to recognizing the staged subversion-based approach favored by the Brotherhood (and possibly some established Wahhabi states). There are indicators that the Atlantic article reflects a Wahhabi influence.

**Nixon Center’s Moderate Muslim Brotherhood**

The Atlantic article took me back to my days at the Pentagon, when, in February 2007, I received multiple emails reinforcing a buzz behind a pre-release of the March Foreign Affairs article “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood” by Leiken and Brookes at the Nixon Center. It was promoted as an instant “must read.” Many picked up the manufactured nature of the buzz and recognized the telltale signs that there were policy implications beneath the article—not because it set policy, but rather because it established the talking points for a policy that had already been put in motion. This is how we conduct IO on ourselves.

Back then, the “Moderate Muslim Brotherhood” was used to normalize the Brotherhood and position the group as our “moderate” partner against “radical” al-Qaeda. From an information operation perspective, this view positioned the Brotherhood as the “good cop” alternative to al-Qaeda’s “bad cop.” Analyzed along these lines, it is worth noting the mutually reinforcing nature of the Brotherhood and al-Qaeda narratives.

The shift to a Brotherhood-friendly policy set in motion a series of events beginning with the production of documents in 2008 at DHS and NCTC that placed the language of jihad off limits when analyzing (or even discussing)
Islamic-based terrorism. This was followed in 2010 by DHS bringing in Brotherhood leaders to help prop up the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) protocols that resulted in DHS institutionalizing the CVE through the production of “CVE Training Guidance & Best Practices” and related policy documents. It is through the CVE process that the purging of work product and personnel continues to this day.

An exchange of letters between the Brotherhood and the White House in late 2011 confirms the perception of Brotherhood leadership in the counterterror mission. In a 19 October 2011 letter, Farhana Khera, President & Executive Director of Muslim Advocates, demanded that the White House create a new counterterror training. Co-signed by leading Muslim Brotherhood groups, the letter urged the creation of a White House-led interagency task force with responsibilities that would include the initiation of a Soviet-style “purge,” “mandatory retraining,” “personnel reviews,” and the production of Brotherhood-friendly “guidance.” The object of the campaign was, and continues to be, citizens who fail to meet Brotherhood speech protocols.

John Brennan’s timely 3 November 2011 response affirmed the Brotherhood’s decisionmaking influence in counterterror policy by grounding it in the CVE mission. Brennan, who at the time was Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism and Deputy National Security Advisor and is now Director of the CIA, affirmed Khera’s concerns. He agreed with the Brotherhood’s derogatory characterization of the suspect training, repudiated it; and aligned the Brotherhood demand for action with DHS’s Interagency Working Group on Training that was focused on meeting the objectives of the CVE. The purging of dissenting work product and personnel has been an objective of the CVE from the beginning. For those on the receiving end of the purge, there would be no due process.

To this day, the “moderate Muslim Brotherhood” line of operation has been a disaster that has national security elites looking to Brotherhood groups like ISNA, CAIR, MPAC, and ICNA for guidance domestically while building up the Brotherhood in places like Egypt (Morsi), Libya, and Syria. While not obvious, the CVE plays an unseen role in “What ISIS Wants.” Just as we are experiencing a replay of “quietism” and “moderate Muslim Brotherhood” (this time cast as the “moderate al-Qaeda”), the ceding of our information requirements in the domestic counterterror mission to the Brotherhood through the mechanism of the CVE has its counterpart in the international sphere.

The CVE has all the characteristics of an information campaign that overwrites the combatting-terrorism mission domestically and, increasingly, internationally. Of course, Salafi Quietism, moderate al-Qaeda, and the globalization of the CVE constitute an escalation. We may not have recognized it as such, but we’ve been living with the CVE narrative at home and abroad for some time. For instance:
Domestically:

From the Official DoD Report on the Fort Hood Shooting:
• “Workplace Violence”

Protecting the Force: Lessons from Fort Hood
15 January 2010

From the Successful Prosecution of the Boston Marathon Bombing:
• Make no mistake, the defendant claimed to be acting on behalf of all Muslims. This was not a religious crime and it certainly does not reflect true Muslim beliefs. It was a political crime designed to intimidate and coerce the United States.

Carmen Milagros Ortiz
U. S. Attorney for the District of Massachusetts
16 May 2015

Prior Statements from the U.S. Attorney Now Leading the Investigation into the Chattanooga Shootings:
• This is an educational effort with civil rights laws as they play into freedom of religion and exercising freedom of religion. This is also to inform the public what federal laws are in effect and what the consequences are. [Killian said Internet postings that violate civil rights are subject to federal jurisdiction] That’s what everybody needs to understand.

Bill Killian
U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Tennessee
21 May 2013

Internationally:

Coordination between Rashad Hussain and the OIC on the day following the Benghazi terror attack

Official Statement by the OIC:
• The Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Prof. Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu […] said the violence that had emanated from emotions aroused by a production of a film had hurt the religious sentiments of Muslims. […] The Secretary General believed that the solution could only be found by addressing the issues pertaining to the freedom of religion and freedom of expression through structured international engagement and referred to the OIC initiative embodied in UN Human Rights Council Resolution 16/18 …

Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu
Secretary General, OIC
Jeddah, 12 September 2012
Rashad Hussain’s note to Ufuk Gokcen, OIC Ambassador to the United Nations

- I hope you are doing well. I am sure you are considering putting out a statement on the film and the related violence. In addition to the condemnation of the disgusting depictions […]

Rashad Hussain  
White House Special Envoy to the OIC  
12 September 2012

With the exception of U.S. Attorney Killian’s comments, each of these statements reflects an imposed CVE-compliant narrative that replaces factual descriptors of overt acts of jihadi terrorism known to have occurred. On top of everything else, these replacement narratives are not true, and the public knows it. In Killian’s situation, his narrative seeks to intimidate citizens from exercising their free speech rights when discussing their concerns with regard to Islam.

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This entire line of operation plays off a systemic vulnerability brought on by the institutional demand to associate with “moderates,” a demand that hostile third parties relentlessly exploit by insinuating themselves into the national security debate through facially neutral memes that resonate the “moderate” narrative but which are in fact hostile.

This line of operation plays off an existing state of strategic incomprehension within the national security domain, seeks its enforceable institutionalization, and drives toward the end-state objective of inducing an epistemic-level collapse that leaves our national security community in such a state of incomprehension that it loses the capacity to articulate its own bona fide national security interests.

If this observation seems hyperbolic, consider the following comments from two past Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a Special Operations general that clearly establish the systemic nexus between not knowing the enemy and not having a strategy to defeat him:

From General Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in comments at the National Defense University in December 2005:

- I say you need to get out and read what our enemies have said. Remember Hitler. Remember he wrote Mein Kampf. He said in writing exactly what his plan was, and we collectively ignored that to our great detriment. Now, our enemies have said publicly on film, on the Internet their goal is to destroy our way of life. No equivocation on their part.
From General Myers, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in his 2009 book:

- This lack of a comprehensive global strategy has been a problem since 9/11. Sadly, this broader strategy never gets the attention and hard thought it deserves, as the importance and urgency of the moment always trumps the time needed to develop a more strategic view.  

From Major General Michael Nagata, U.S. Special Operations, comments on Combating ISIS, December 2014:

- We do not understand the movement, and until we do, we are not going to defeat it ... we have not defeated the idea. We do not even understand the idea.

As with the “Moderate Muslim Brotherhood,” the pre-release of “What ISIS Really Wants” came with the same manufactured buzz, although this time the policy shift was not in the direction of the Brotherhood but rather toward the Wahhabis. And in an echo of 2007, it was part of a building narrative that seemed to make sense to those with a superficial understanding of threat doctrine by playing into expectations supported by ongoing CVE narratives.

Just a year ago, Foreign Affairs published an article by Will McCants and Michael Doran advocating that we work with “moderate” elements of al-Qaeda. Bill McCants is also relied on as an authority in the new Atlantic article. There is notice that “What ISIS Really Wants” may be understood as a support to the unfolding “moderate al-Qaeda” meme.

In 2011, McCants was at the West Point Counter Terror Center along with his associate Bill Braniff, and the two played their role in the CVE by purging Islamic content from all analytical, briefing, and training materials used in the counterterror effort. McCants then helped stand up the State Department’s Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC), currently coordinated by Rashad Hussain.

Today, McCants works for the Brookings Institute at the Brookings Doha Center in Doha, Qatar, where he is writing a book on ISIS’s “apocalyptic” and “millennial” thought. These concepts are among the main themes of the Atlantic article. While it may be true that Sunnis often speak of today’s realities in terms of persons being judged at the End of Days, there is the sense that the Atlantic article either confuses or suggests an exclusive association with Shia eschatology.

‘Quietism’

The other bad memory conjured up by the Atlantic article concerns the term “quietist.” In the Atlantic article, quietist refers to “Quietist Salafis.” When quietism first became de rigueur in national security circles in late 2003, it was associated with Shi’ism, most notably in regards to Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani. In
2004, for example, the Council on Foreign Relations, publisher of *Foreign Affairs*, came out with an article claiming quietism to be a “more traditional Shi’ite position” and ascribed it to Sistani. The article relied on the “Shia quietism” paradigm but did not define it.

In 2006, a Norwegian think tank published Reidar Visser’s “Sistani, the United States and Politics in Iraq: From Quietism to Machiavellianism.” While skeptical of labeling Sistani a quietist, Visser did not challenge the “quietist thesis” and likewise did not offer a substantive definition. All the articles reviewed for the current analysis were sourced to Western think tanks or academia. The characterizations inherent in the “quietist” narrative satisfy bureaucratic demands for content-free narratives capable of driving “scientific” models that create the illusion of analytical depth.

Even as policy arguments hung on notions of “Shia Quietism,” no one ever felt the need to provide a definition of quietism let alone ground that definition in actual Shia Islam. In 2004, Western ruminating on “Shia Quietism” became so annoying to Shias that Ibrahim Mousawi, the chief editor of Lebanese Hizbullah’s Al-Manar television station, not only voiced skepticism concerning trendy notions of “Shia quietism,” he rejected Sistani’s being classified in that way.

Back then, I openly expressed skepticism that the Shias have something they call “quietism” and that, if such a doctrine did exist, people developing national security profiles based on this doctrine were fundamentally unaware of it. My efforts as a mobilized reserve officer in those Pentagon discussions to dissuade seniors from their addiction to the bright shiny narratives popular at the time were futile (but I did try).

To this day, trendy narratives like “Shia Quietism” and “moderate Muslim Brotherhood” remain so pervasively addictive they prevail even in the face of properly presented persuasive contradictory information. This is the memory of quietism that struck me when reading of “quietist Salafis” in the *Atlantic* article. We are still beating ourselves with the same stick.

Along with “encyclical,” “millenarianism,” “excommunication,” and “apocalypticism,” “quietism” is a term that has a specifically Christian basis that the *Atlantic* article freely associates with Islam. In a Google search of “quietism,” all top-level hits identified quietism as a Christian movement. While some sources noted antecedents in ancient Stoicism, Brahmanism, or Buddhism, none associated quietism with Islam.

A search of the term “quietist Salafi” yielded a noticeably short list of hits—all from Western academies or think tanks, and all by Western authors or non-Western authors publishing in Western journals. Given the overwhelmingly secular orientation of national security elites and their penchant for scientism (i.e., masking ill-formed ideations in the language of science that sustains false
narratives based on imputed knowledge), it is not unreasonable to think that they not only don’t know anything about “Salafi quietism” (if it even exists), they actually don’t know anything about Christian concepts of quietism of which their ideations are a one-off—or that they are dealing with a knock-off at all.

Returning to the same examples used earlier concerning the salaf al-salih analysis that equates Salafism with Wahhabism, we see that those discussions also rely on a notion of “Salafi Quietism” that leaves the term undefined. Hence, in Bonnefoy’s 2013 “Saudi Arabia and the Expansion of Salafism,” Quietist Salafism is associated with an obscure Islamic term that is tangential to the explanation provided:

The second is the quietist Salafi movement, which is also labelled [sic] scholastic (‘ilmi). It calls for loyalty to the Muslim ruler in order to preserve the community from strife and disorder (fitna), and has favoured [sic] strong links between the movement and a number of governments, particularly that of Saudi Arabia.46

“‘Ilmi”—as used by Bonnefoy—is a difficult term to nail down. ‘Ilm, however, refers to “sacred knowledge.”47 Book A “Sacred Knowledge” in Reliance of the Traveller—A Classic Manual of Sacred Islamic Law explains sacred knowledge.48 Book B “The Validity of Following Qualified Scholarship” concerns a Muslim’s duty to follow qualified scholars of “sacred knowledge”—i.e., imams qualified in shariah.49

b7.3 The proof of the legal authority of scholarly consensus is that just as Allah Most Glorious has ordered the believers, in the Koran, to obey Him and His Messenger, so too He has ordered them to obey those of authority (ulu al-amr) among them, saying [quotes Verse 4:59]50

p40.2 The Prophet [Allah bless him and give him peace] said: “He who obeys me obeys Allah, and he who disobeys me disobeys Allah. He who obeys the leader obeys me, and he who disobeys the leader disobeys me.”51

The lone pre-9/11 reference to quietism in this line of scholarship comes from a few sentences in Bernard Lewis’s 1993 book Islam and the West concerning the Shia, in which he writes: “The quietist tradition is classically grounded in the Qur’anic text [4:59]: ‘Obey Allah, obey his Prophet and obey those among you who hold authority’ and is amply documented in tradition and in jurisprudence.52

This lines up with Reliance and seems to be the basis of Bonnefoy’s use of the term “scholastic.” This concept doesn’t reflect a political philosophy but rather a legal doctrine that holds that subjects are to obey their leaders. As Baghdadi
has the Islamic credentials that meet the “qualified scholar” threshold, there is no reason to think that he or ISIS would disagree with any of this. In fact, ISIS bases the duty to engage in brutal forms of jihad, including takfirism, on the necessity of re-imposing sacred knowledge against those they believe unqualified to lead.

In Jennifer London’s 2013 review of Joas Wagemakers’ 2012 book “A Quietist Jihadi,” she noted that Wagemakers’ characterizations of quietism play off Quintan Wiktorowicz’s classification of Salafis into three groups: “purists,” “políticos,” and “jihadis.” As London observed, Wagemakers’ classification was rejected because “it distorts our understanding of Salafi activists by failing to address the fact that ALL Salafis support jihad.” As noted earlier, and important to this discussion, Bonnefoy, London, and Wagemakers also rely on quietism to support a novel concept of Salafism that is specifically grounded in Wahhabi constructs.

As it happens, in the same month (February 2015) that Atlantic pre-released an article discussing “Quietist Salafis,” the Brookings Center in Doha, Qatar, announced the release of an Analysis Paper by Jacob Olidort titled “The Politics of ‘Quietist Salafism’.” Go figure. Even more coincidentally, just like London, Olidort went through Wagemakers to rely on Quintan Wiktorowicz:

Joas Wagemakers, for example, equates “quietist” with “apolitical” and elsewhere defines it as follows: “Quietists focus on the propagation of their message (da'wa) through lessons, sermons and other missionary activities and stay away from politics and violence, which they leave to the ruler.” See Joas Wagemakers, [...] Quintan Wiktorowicz has popularized the term “purist,” which he borrows from the International Crisis Group. He explains the term in the context to the present group of Salafists as follows: “they emphasize a focus on nonviolent methods of propagation, purification and education. They view politics as a diversion that encourages deviancy: [...] The term is vague, and is not entirely accurate, as these groups do engage with political issues, albeit they do not overtly acknowledge that these issues are political.

Let’s look at the dates of the articles in this line of scholarship. From Wagemakers’ 2012 “A Quietist jihadi” to the Brookings Doha Center’s release of “The Politics of ‘Quietist’ Salafism” in 2015 (and two 2013 papers in between), one can see not only that this line of scholarship is thin and reaches back only to 2012, but also that it is the product of Western scholarship, even when funded by Middle Eastern concerns from Wahhabi states.

Also of interest is that both London’s and the Brookings Center Doha’s treatment of “Salafi Quietism” find their basis not in Salafi Islam but rather in the the-
ories of the American political scientist Quintan Wiktorowicz. As it stands, even if subsequent scholarship manages to manufacture a solid basis in Islam for concepts of quietism now being proffered as if such an Islamic basis had been demonstrated, it will not change the fact that those driving today’s “quietism” narrative based their reasoning not on Islamic sources but rather on Western behavioral models. The argument can be made that the “Salafi Quietist” classification is little more than a Western academic contrivance.

So who is Quintan Wiktorowicz? A former assistant professor of international studies at Rhodes College, Wiktorowicz became the White House Senior Director for Community Partnerships on the National Security Staff under the Obama administration. Wiktorowicz helped devise the administration’s new “countering violent extremism” strategy, which is based on his notion of why people become extremists premised on “social movement theory.”

In 2011, Wiktorowicz was involved, as were McCants and Braniff, in the administration’s policy of purging law enforcement training materials that addressed the role of Islam and jihad in the counterterror effort.

While no longer in the administration, Wiktorowicz spoke of the great danger posed by ISIS in October 2014, when addressing the need to outsource our information requirements and counter-ideology efforts to Muslim organizations abroad. Outsourcing this capability to non-U.S. entities is necessary, Wiktorowicz reasoned, because it violates the First Amendment for American analysts to analyze and counter ISIS (also called ISIL) based on the Islamic doctrines that unquestionably animate that group as well as al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood:

> While the government has tried to counter terrorist propaganda, it cannot directly address the warped religious interpretations of groups like ISIL because of the constitutional separation of church and state. U.S. officials are prohibited from engaging in debates about Islam, and as a result will need to rely on partners in the Muslim world for this part of the ideological struggle.

It is important to restate what Wiktorowicz said to draw out what it means:

1. Because the First Amendment prohibits U.S. officials and analysts from even discussing ISIS doctrines understood to be based on Islamic principles;
2. The Obama administration advances the policy that the United States turn national security issues concerning clear and present dangers to America over to third party nations beholden to Islamic principles;
3. Thus eviscerating the Article VI duty to undertake direct threat analysis in furtherance of “supporting and defending the Constitution against ALL enemies;”
4. Thereby subordinating U.S. national security to whatever third-party nations and entities are willing to support based on non-U.S. interests and objectives that may or may not be friendly to America or supportive of America’s interests and objectives.

First, there is no such First Amendment bar to undertaking competent threat analysis. Second, Wiktorowicz is not an attorney. And yet this novel legal theory directly undermines the Article VI requirement to “support and defend the Constitution against all enemies.”

Could Wiktorowicz be relying on the Brotherhood for his legal reasoning? On 18 December 2014, the Brotherhood wrote to Lisa O. Monaco, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism and Deputy National Security Advisor, demanding that the “White House should immediately issue guidance to address impacts on religious exercise, freedom of expression and the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause,” including:

- Prohibit federal employees from using or promoting CVE training and CVE training materials that single out expressive conduct, including through alleged indicators or predictors of violent extremism or “radicalization” that focus on patterns of religious observance, political activism or religious beliefs.
- Prohibit federal employees from implementing any program, directly or indirectly, that has the effect of defining participants by reference to religion.

Contrasting his recognition of the lethal effectiveness of ISIS’s threat doctrine with a ridiculous First Amendment theory, Wiktorowicz—as an immediate consequence of that prohibition—manufactures a follow-on requirement to outsource critical information requirements to third-party state actors beholden to shariah standards.

Yet, if Wiktorowicz held to his own rules, how could he state that ISIS’s interpretations of Islam are “warped” and use that conclusion to justify a decision to outsource our information requirements?

Beyond this, if what Wiktorowicz said on the prohibition and subsequent outsourcing of intelligence requirements is true, then the duty to support and defend the Constitution is necessarily subordinated to whatever third-party state actors are willing to provide in light of shariah considerations as understood by Wahhabs.

If what Wiktorowicz said on the prohibition and subsequent outsourcing of intelligence requirements is true, then the duty to support and defend the Constitution is necessarily subordinated to whatever third-party state actors are willing to provide in light of shariah considerations as understood by Wahhabs.
The former White House counterterror strategist went on to say that “as a result of this and other factors, we’re seeing the reincarnation of al Qaeda as ISIL in Iraq and Syria.”

In effect, Wiktorowicz attributes the rise of al-Qaeda to our failure to counter the very ideology the CVE prohibited the counterterror community from discussing on the ridiculous claim that it violates the First Amendment. It is through the CVE that the threat language of groups like ISIS, al-Qaeda, and the Muslim Brotherhood was purged from our national security and law enforcement sectors.

Hence, it is because of the CVE and not in spite of it that the threat vocabulary defining this enemy has been purged, leaving us defenseless and unable to counter ISIS in the information battlespace or, it seems, anywhere else.

How does one allocate resources to counter an ideology that one is not allowed to discuss? For Wiktorowicz, the solution is obvious: the Obama administration should increase resources to the counter-ideology effort through the funding of partners in the Muslim world “who can push back against the ideology.” This “push back” should be understood in the context of Wiktorowicz’s counterterror construct, which holds, among other things, that the First Amendment would likewise bar due diligence and quality assurance assessments of our “partners’” counter-ideology efforts regarding any activities that involve Islam. This is the context in which we should consider the role that think tanks like the Brookings Doha Center may be playing, as reflected in its sub-rosa influence on the Atlantic article. Enter Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.

For the purpose of this discussion, the focus on Qatar is limited to the Brookings Doha Center. Part 6 of my book *Catastrophic Failure* raises concerns regarding Brookings’ close relationship with the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), especially regarding Brookings’ role in facilitating the OIC’s UN Resolution 16/18 program. As the same entities that concern themselves with the CVE are also tightly focused on UN Resolution 16/18, it is not unreasonable to see Brookings Doha as a place where the two issues meet and merge. This author is not alone in expressing concerns regarding the Brookings Doha Center. In October 2014, the Investigative Project on Terrorism published a four-part special report, “Brookings Sells Soul to Qatar’s Terror Agenda,” which is well worth the read.

On meeting and merging, it is not always clear where the CVE narrative ends and Resolution 16/18’s begins. The resolution seeks the passage of the OIC’s Ten-Year Programme of Action, an initiative ratified by all the Muslim heads of state at an OIC Summit in 2005. The Ten-Year Programme seeks to make defamation of Islam a crime in every jurisdiction. Recent statements by two officials from Arab states demonstrate that the CVE and the resolution remain high priority efforts of the OIC and its Member States. From Saudi Arabia in late
July 2015, Abdulmajeed al-Omari, Director for External Relations at the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, said:

We have made it clear that freedom of expression without limits or restrictions would lead to violation and abuse of religious and ideological rights.”

On 20 July 2015, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum, the Prime Minister of the United Arab Emirates and Emir of Dubai, sent a Twitter blast declaring that:

The UAE today issued a new law against any form of discrimination on the basis of religion, caste, doctrine, race, colour or ethnic origin;¹⁴

The New law Guarantees freedom of individuals against religious intolerance & hate crimes and underpins UAE’s policy of inclusiveness;⁷⁵

The new law criminalizes any acts that stoke religious hatred or insults religion through any form of expression.⁷⁶

Sheikh Mohammed's statements related the decree issued that day by UAE President Sheikh Kalifa bin Zaey al-Nahyan “criminalizing any acts that stoke religious hatred and/or which insult religion through any form of expression, be it speech or the written word, books, pamphlets or via online media.”⁷⁷ The new law is expressed using the hate crimes, hate speech, incitement narrative⁷⁸ and brings with it stiff penalties.⁷⁹ To the extent that the U.S. engages with UAE entities for the production of threat awareness and counter-messaging, it is essential to recognize that all the information requirements and the means of communicating them will necessarily be circumscribed by the limitations inherent in this decree.

Along with the Brotherhood's December 2014 demands to the White House, a startling realization emerges that Wiktorowicz’s position on the First Amendment already puts the United States in enforceable compliance with the shariah speech standards called for by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. It creates a new perspective on the comments by the U.S. Attorney from Tennessee concerning free speech.⁸⁰

It also provides a necessary context for understanding DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson’s response to New Yorker reporter Ryan Lizza’s question, “Why do you, and the Obama Administration, describe this as violent extremism and not—and refuse to use the phrase—Islamic extremism?” Just days after the jihadi execution of four U.S. Marines in Chattanooga on 23 July 2015, Johnson’s response made it clear that the sensitivities of the Muslim community were paramount:
I believe strongly—and I hear this over and over again from Muslim leaders in this country—that to refer to ISIL as ‘Islamic extremism’ concedes too much. It dignifies them as occupying some part of the Islamic faith, which is about peace. [...] And so if you call it ‘Islamic anything,’ uh, we are dignifying this terrorist organization with occupying a part of the Islamic faith which Muslims in this country I know, push back very strongly on, So if I went into these [Muslim] communities calling it ‘Islamic extremism,’ I’d get nowhere.81

But for DHS, the FBI, the Obama administration, and, it would seem, even Republican Congressional leadership, the relevant “sensitivities” they are responding to are those of Muslim Brotherhood leadership who state that they only conduct outreach to subvert.82 The overarching primacy of this “sensitivity” has the immediate effect of overwriting the facts on the ground and, hence, the safety of our citizens and our nation’s national security. Secretary Johnson continued:

And so here domestically, I think it’s critical that in order to build our relationships and build our level of cooperation with the Islamic community here. Um, we have to say to them ‘Look, we understand that what this depraved terrorist organization is doing is no part of your religion.’83

Given this view by one whose job is to protect and defend America and its interests, it should come as no surprise that, also in July 2015, the UAE announced the establishment of a new U.S.-led anti-ISIS counterterror center in Abu Dhabi called the Sawab Centre.84 Jointly launched by the State Department and the UAE,85 the Sawab Centre was created because of the perceived failures of the State Department’s Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC) owing to its “lack of strategy towards content and understanding [of] Daesh’s narratives and [their] sophisticated approach to social media.”86 [“Daesh” is another name for ISIS.] Hence, the Sawab Centre was formed to “compliment the efforts of the CSCC and the two will be working closely together.”87 It also allows the CSCC to more closely coordinate with Middle Eastern allies “as well as prominent religious scholars”88 [meaning imams].

This is the same CSCC that Will McCants helped develop.89 Created in 2011 by executive order, the CSCC resides in the office of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and has interagency responsibilities.90 The CSCC’s mission is to “expand international engagement and partnerships to counter violent extremism” (CVE).91 Rashad Hussain is the current CSCC Coordinator.92 Because Hussain is concurrently the White House Special Envoy to the OIC,93 international engagement and partnership efforts should be understood to be primarily directed at OIC Member States.
The other international forum the State Department uses to extend its counter-terror mission is the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF). Formed in September 2011 with 30 founding member states, including the United States, the GCTF’s “primary focus is on countering violent extremism” (CVE). 34

In September 2014, the State Department announced the GCTF’s launch of Hedayah, an "international center of excellence on countering violent extremism (CVE) in Abu Dhabi." 95 Hedayah’s mission is to be “the premier global institution for expertise and experience in training, dialogue, and research to counter violent extremism in all its forms.” 96

Whether through the CSCC or the GCTF, the State Department understands America’s counterterror mission in terms of the CVE narrative, with both organizations outsourcing their main effort to organizations that operate in OIC Member States that actively seek to suppress protected speech and control what can and cannot be said about Islam.

Worth noting, both Sawab and Hedayah have names that point to Islamic law. Meaning “the right and spiritual path,” Sawab is evocative of shariah, “the path to be followed.” 98 While the Hedayah Fact Sheet is correct when stating that hedayah means “guidance,” 99 even Wikipedia explains that it refers to “guidance provided by Allah to humans primarily through the Qur’an.” 100 Hedayah is also associated with the classic 12th Century text of Islamic law bearing that title. 101

This is the reality to which Wiktorowicz speaks when saying the Obama administration should increase resources to the counter-ideology effort through the funding of partners in the Muslim world “who can push back against the ideology” because American counterterrorism analysts “cannot directly address the warped religious interpretations of groups like ISIL because of the constitutional separation of church and state.” 102 The Wiktorowicz construct has the effect of rendering the United States a passive partner in its own war of ideas on an issue or immediate concern to its own national security. It is also institutionalized malpractice. 103

Where does this leave us? The CVE is used by the Muslim Brotherhood domestically to deny America the information requirements capable of driving competent threat analysis, while internationally it is used to sideline America in the information battlespace concerning its own national security to non-U.S. third parties beholden to OIC norms on speech and terrorism—which, it must be emphasized, are not the same as those of the United States.

In reading “What ISIS Wants,” it is worth considering whether the picture it paints is a product of the discipline imposed by the CVE and whether, on closer scrutiny, there is actually less to the article than meets the eye.

The Atlantic article, if only mildly, even plays into the proscription against
speaking about or analyzing Islam with comments like “Western officials would probably do best to refrain from weighing in on matters of Islamic theological debate altogether.” When discussing future strategies to engage ISIS, the Atlantic article speaks to “the incompetence of our previous efforts as occupiers” when downplaying those advocating an active or interventionist engagement policy.

Catastrophic Failure argues the case for institutionalized malpractice in the counterterror effort, so there is no disagreement here with such claims of incompetence. Yet, it is argued that the single greatest point of failure in the counterterror effort has been to entrust our warfighting policy to soft-science academicians like McCants and Wiktorowicz who have worked to undermine bona fide threat analysis based on the enemy’s stated threat doctrine while outsourcing critical information requirements to third parties on matters for which the U.S. Constitution demands specific subject matter competency among those beholden to the oath to support and defend.

Less than Meets the Eye

Before closing on “quietist Salafis,” let’s check this analysis against Breton Pocius, the Atlantic article’s example of an American “Salafi Quietist.” First, a quick review: Wahhabism is common to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, al-Qaeda, and ISIS; Salafism has been repositioned as Wahhabism by those advocating “Salafi Quietism;” and “Salafi Quietism” lacks a bona fide Islamic identity.

The first thing we are told is that Breton Pocius is a 28-year-old American convert to Islam who is now a Salafi imam going by the name of Abdullah. As Abdullah explains, “the Prophet said: as long as the ruler does not enter into clear kufr [disbelief], give him general obedience” and that “the classic ‘books of creed’ all warn against causing social upheaval.” Then the article says that “Pocius cites a slew of modern Salafi theologians who argue that a caliphate cannot come into being in a righteous way except through the unmistakable will of God.” Having built this bulwark against jihadi groups like ISIS, the Atlantic article nevertheless concedes that ISIS would agree with everything Abdullah said by simply asserting that Allah anointed Baghdadi as its leader.

Aside from picking winners in the “inside Islam” debate on ISIS, the Atlantic article acknowledges that Abdullah and Baghdadi agree on the main points that distinguish “Salafi Quietism” from ISIS. As the article points out, it is not clear how Pocius’s “quietist Salafism” offers an “Islamic antidote to Baghdadi-style jihadism.” With this in mind, a review of Pocius’s Twitter account reveals a deeply Wahhabi individual who quotes Wahhab to accuse ISIS of being Khawarij. When Sunnis break from jihad, they accuse those undertaking the effort of being Wahhabi. When Wahhabis break from jihad, they accuse fellow Wahhabis of being Khawarij.
What does “What ISIS Really Wants” Advocate?

As the *Atlantic* article associates active measures in fighting the War on Terror with incompetence, what does it advocate for moving forward? The article, in effect, builds a rationale for accepting the humanitarian carnage and maintaining the minimalist status quo of the Obama administration:

Given everything we know about the Islamic State, continuing to slowly bleed it, through air strikes and proxy warfare, appears the best of bad military options. Neither the Kurds nor the Shia will ever subdue and control the whole Sunni heartland of Syria and Iraq—they are hated there, and have no appetite for such an adventure anyway. But they can keep the Islamic State from fulfilling its duty to expand. And with every month that it fails to expand, it resembles less the conquering state of the Prophet Muhammad than yet another Middle Eastern government failing to bring prosperity to its people.

The humanitarian cost of the Islamic State’s existence is high. But its threat to the United States is smaller than its all too frequent conflation with al-Qaeda would suggest. Al-Qaeda’s core is rare among jihadist groups for its focus on the “far enemy” (the West); most jihadist groups’ main concerns lie closer to home. That’s especially true of the Islamic State, precisely because of its ideology.¹¹³

There is a close relationship between Wahhabism, al-Qaeda, and ISIS that the *Atlantic* article minimizes to the point of concealing. When an ISIS jihadi with links to an American Muslim Brotherhood center attacks somewhere in the United States using targeting, tactics, and techniques from al-Qaeda’s English language *Inspire* magazine, we can talk about “conflation” in the context of obscuring.

**Disarming Language**

In the section on “Dissuasion,” the *Atlantic* article raises the common but never fully analyzed meme that Islam “allows many interpretations”:

The religion allows many interpretations, and Islamic State supporters are morally on the hook for the one they choose. And yet simply denouncing the Islamic State as un-Islamic can be counterproductive, especially if those who hear the message have read the holy texts and seen the endorsement of many of the caliphate’s practices written plainly within them.

Muslims can say that slavery is not legitimate now, and that crucifixion is wrong at this historical juncture. Many say pre-
cisely this. But they cannot condemn slavery or crucifixion outright without contradicting the Koran and the example of the Prophet. “The only principled ground that the Islamic State’s opponents could take is to say that certain core texts and traditional teachings of Islam are no longer valid,” Bernard Haykel says. That really would be an act of apostasy.

[...] Musa Cerantonio and the Salafis I met in London are unstumpable: no question I posed left them stuttering. [...] To call them un-Islamic appears, to me, to invite them into an argument that they would win.\textsuperscript{114}

While some recognize the contradictions following the “many interpretations” comment, experience has shown that most simply register the term “many interpretations” and then read past what could render the statement meaningless. On closer inspection:

Yes! “The Islamic State supporters are morally on the hook for the interpretations they choose\textsuperscript{115} and they are fine with it.

Yes! “Simply denouncing the Islamic State as un-Islamic can be counterproductive\textsuperscript{116} in light of recognized shariah as practiced through the centuries.

Yes! “Muslims can say that slavery is not legitimate now, and that crucifixion is wrong at this historical juncture\textsuperscript{117} but cannot do so without contradicting the Qur’an and hadith, thus rendering those statements both incorrect and invalid.

Yes! It is apostasy to argue “certain core texts and traditional teachings of Islam are no longer valid.”\textsuperscript{118}

Yes! Calling properly trained Salafis “un-Islamic” can invite arguments that they can GENUINELY win – and typically do.\textsuperscript{119}

On the last point, “What ISIS Really Wants” may be tipping its hand when acknowledging that the “extremists” win the debate because they may be right. On the suggestion that Islam “allows many interpretations,” a close reading of “What ISIS Really Wants” argues just the opposite—that some interpretations are wrong, and some are wrong to the point of apostasy. Within the Atlantic article’s narrow range of permissible interpretations, there is no reason to think that ISIS would object to “many interpretations” when the concept is as strictly construed as it is here.

For the postmodern Western mind, because there are no facts, there is no truth, and everything is a matter of interpretation. The postmodern Western mind, especially the bureaucratic and academic mind, can no longer handle absolutes.
The other side knows this and relentlessly constructs narratives to exploit it. After a period of programmed repetition, the “many interpretations” narrative echoes the postmodern dogma that “everything is a matter of interpretation” by simply repeating the mantra “Islam allows many interpretations.” Just saying the word “interpretation” can cause many readers to read right over what is actually being said.

**Conclusion**

The discussion of “What ISIS Really Wants” was used to focus on three points that generated two observations. The three points are these:

1. The recognizably peculiar positioning of the use of the term *salaf al-salih* in the context of the general discussion on Salafism;

2. The similarity between the way the 2007 *Foreign Affairs* article “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood” and the 2015 *Atlantic* article “What ISIS Really Wants” both hit the ground at full speed, complete with a constructed “buzz” in support of a surfacing policy; and

3. The reintroduction of the “quietism” meme that disoriented intelligence analysis at a time when we were extending great effort to secure Iraq from 2003 to 2005.

The two observations lying beneath the surface of the *Atlantic* article are that: 1) there is a Wahhabi influence; and 2) there is an administration influence.

The article came just months after a former White House counter-terror strategist said our national security apparatus operates under the Wiktorowicz Doctrine, which enforces a ban on threat-based counterterror analysis owing to a contrived First Amendment bar to such activity.

The analysis demonstrates a nexus between this activity and the CVE. The incredibly destructive role of the CVE has been exposed as the actual driver of the purge of evidentiary information domestically and the outsourcing of our counterterror information requirements abroad. All of this in an article that was written in support of the current minimalist policy.

When validated, the most disturbing aspect of the CVE will be the realization that national security elites beholden to the oath to support and defend the Constitution have been manipulated into taking active measures to suppress true threat analysis that is supposed to be undertaken in support of the primary intelligence mission: to know the enemy. Such are the consequences of infantilized thinking.

As it stands, America is fighting the counterterror war according to narratives
that declare actual fact-based threat analysis unconstitutional on religious
grounds yet allow imams abroad to serve as the arbiters of our counter-ideolo-
gy campaigns based on language requirements and legal doctrines that are not
our own.

Now, with Congress set to vote to institutionalize the CVE in the national securi-
ty establishment, it is time to ask whether this is the wisest decision.

America is fighting the counterterror war according to narratives that declare actual fact-
based threat analysis unconstitutional on religious grounds yet allow imams abroad to
serve as the arbiters of our counter-ideology campaigns based on language requirements
and legal doctrines that are not our own.
Notes


4 AS DIANA WEST stated in the Death of the Grown-up:

   “It can’t be just a coincidence that this acquiescence to this state of cultural negation coincides with the cultural practice of nipping maturity in the bud. In other words, the loss of identity would seem to be linked to the loss of maturity. At the very least, the easy retreat from history and tradition reveals a kind of callow inconstancy and lack of confidence that smacks of immaturity as much as anything else. It seems we have stopped “growing up,” we have forgotten “who” it was we were supposed to grow up into.”


9 The Atlantic article, 6.

10 The Atlantic article, 28.


16 Letter to Lisa O. Monaco, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism and Deputy National Security Advisor, Office of the Homeland Security Advisor, signed by, among others, numerous organizations known to be associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, PDF document dated 18 December 2014, 4, 5.
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17 Note: This is the same Farhana Khera who, in Senate testimony earlier in 2011, stood by the statement on her Muslim Advocates website warning Muslims in America not to talk to the FBI unless consulting first with a lawyer in circumstances where the contacts had nothing to do with the person being involved in any investigatory process.

18 Letter to Farhana Khera, President and Executive Director, Muslim Advocates from John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism and Deputy National Security Advisor, the White House, 3 November 2011, 1. Note: Attribution of the 19 October 2011 Letter to the White House to Farhana Khera of Muslim Advocates is based on the fact that Brennan’s response was addressed to her and her organization.

19 Letter to John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism and Deputy National Security Advisor, The White House, signed by, among others, numerous organizations known to be associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, dated 19 October 2011, 1. States: “The undersigned Muslim, Arab, and South Asian organizations write regarding the federal government’s use of biased, false and highly offensive training materials about Muslims and Islam. The seriousness of this issue cannot be overstated, and we request that the White House immediately create an interagency task force to address this problem …”

20 Letter to John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism and Deputy National Security Advisor, The White House, signed by, among others, numerous organizations known to be associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, dated 19 October 2011, 6, 7. For example: the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA) and the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC)

21 Letter to John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism and Deputy National Security Advisor, The White House, signed by, among others, numerous organizations known to be associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, dated 19 October 2011, 5.

22 Letter to John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism and Deputy National Security Advisor, The White House, signed by, among others, numerous organizations known to be associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, dated 19 October 2011, 5.

23 Letter to Farhana Khera, President and Executive Director, Muslim Advocates, from John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism and Deputy National Security Advisor, the White House, 3 November 2011, 1. States: “Thank you for your letter of October 19, 2011 in which you raise a number of important issues regarding the training provided to law enforcement, the military, and other government officials on cultural competency and countering violent extremism [CVE].”

24 Letter to Farhana Khera, President and Executive Director, Muslim Advocates, from John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism and Deputy National Security Advisor, the White House, 3 November 2011, 1. States: “I am aware of the recent unfortunate incidents that have highlighted examples of substandard and offensive training that some United States Government elements have either sponsored or delivered. Any and all such training runs completely counter to our values, our commitment to strong partnerships with communities across the country, our specific approach to countering violent extremist recruitment and radicalization, and our broader counterterrorism (CT) efforts.”

25 Letter to Farhana Khera, President and Executive Director, Muslim Advocates, from John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism and Deputy National Security Advisor, the White House, 3 November 2011, 1, 2. States: “Your letter requests that “the White House immediately create an interagency task force to address this problem,” and we agree that this is necessary. That is why the White House’s National Security Staff identified training as a critical area for improvement last November, and tasked the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to form an Interagency Working Group on Training to catalogue, review, and improve CVE-related instruction across all levels of government. Recent efforts of this working group include: (1) a CVE Training
Guidance and Best Practices paper, which will give specific guidance to federal, state, local, and tribal government officials charged with organizing training related to CVE, CT, or cultural awareness; and [2] an Information Bulletin on CVE Training, which provides additional guidance to state, local, and tribal entities that regularly leverage federal grants to fund CVE-related trainings."


NOTE: Workplace violence raised 17 times in the document in the context of its being the cause of the Fort Hood shooting.


William Braniff, William McCants listed, CTC Alumni, Combating Terrorism Center, undated, URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/about/ctc-alumni


The Atlantic article, 18.


Reidar Visser, “Sistani, the United States and Politics in Iraq: From Quietism to Machiavellianism?,” [700] Paper, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2006, URL: http://historiae.org/documents/Sistani.pdf. STATES: “One of the two prevailing interpretations of Sistani renders him as “quietist”. By this label is meant roughly that Sistani has no interest in politics, that he has a religious justification for this position ready at hand, and that he is particularly anxious to avoid any kind of convergence between the new Iraq and the Islamic republic of Iran, where the Shiite clergy are tightly integrated in the state structure.”


The Atlantic article, 6. A part of a different discussion, there are real concerns about using Christian terms in reference to Islamic concepts that fix a negative connotation of those Christian terms that are then used in downstream information campaigns to attack Christians for holding to them. For example, the Atlantic article equates the Christian concept of excommunication with the Wahhabi practice of takfirism. Excommunication removes a person from the church community for a period of time. When a Wahhabi designates a person takfir, it gives rise to the duty to kill him.


Keller, Reliance of the Traveller, Book A “Sacred Knowledge,” beginning at page 1.

Keller, Reliance of the Traveller, Book B “The Validity of Following Qualified Scholarship,” beginning at page 15.

Keller, Reliance of the Traveller, b7.3, 24.

Keller, Reliance of the Traveller, p40.2, 680.


Letter to Lisa O. Monaco, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counter-terrorism and Deputy National Security Advisor, Office of the Homeland Security Advisor, signed by, among others, numerous organizations known to be associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, PDF document dated 18 December 2014, 6, 7. For example: Muslim Advocates, Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), Islamic Circle of North America (MAS), Muslim American Society (MAS).

Letter to Lisa O. Monaco, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counter-terrorism and Deputy National Security Advisor, Office of the Homeland Security Advisor, signed by, among others, numerous organizations known to be associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, PDF document dated 18 December 2014, 4, 5.

Gertz, “Constitutional Religious Clause.”

Gertz, “Constitutional Religious Clause.”
68 What staff judge advocate [SJA] allowed such a novel First Amendment doctrine, tailored to check the constitutional duty to support and defend, to influence the national security decision-support processes?

69 Gertz, “Constitutional Religious Clause.”

70 For an explanation of UN Resolution 16/18, see Part 6, Catastrophic Failure: Blindfolding America in the Face of Jihad, Center for Security Policy Press, Washington, D.C., June 2015, 301 - 310.

71 Steven Emerson, John Rossomando, and Dave Yonkman, Four Part Series: Brookings Sells Soul to Qatar’s Terror Agenda,” 28, 29, 30 & 31 October 2014, IPT News, Investigative Project on Terrorism [IPT] –


74 H H Sheikh Mohammed @HHShkMohd, Twitter [verified account], 20 July 2015, URL: https://twitter.com/hhshkmohd/status/623051664161947648

75 H H Sheikh Mohammed @HHShkMohd, Twitter [verified account], 20 July 2015, URL: https://twitter.com/hhshkmohd/status/623051664161947648

76 H H Sheikh Mohammed @HHShkMohd, Twitter [verified account], 20 July 2015, URL: https://twitter.com/hhshkmohd/status/623051664161947648


78 “UAE Issues Law against Hate Crimes and Discrimination,” WAM (Emirates News Agency), 20 July 2015, URL: http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emesratis/1395283489477.html. States: “The law condemns actions that would comprise hate speech or the promotion of discrimination or violence against others using any form of media, including online, print, radio or visual media. Strict action will be taken against any form of expressions of hatred or incitement to hate crimes spread in the form of speech and published media.”


82 From the “Explanatory Memorandum: On the Strategic Goal for the Group,” the Muslim Brotherhood in America’s statement of strategic intent states:
The process of settlement is a “Civilization-Jihadist Process” with all the means. The Ikhwan [Muslim Brotherhood] must understand that their work in America is a kind of grand jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and “sabotaging” its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and Allah’s religion is made victorious over all other religions. ... It is a Muslim’s destiny to perform jihad and work wherever he is [...] The “Explanatory Memorandum” was written in 1990 by Muhammed Akram, was found in a 2004 FBI raid of the subbasement of another Muslim Brotherhood leader in 2004, was admitted into evidence in the Holy Land Foundation case, and has prevailed in appeal numerous times. Elbarasse Search-3, Explanatory Memorandum: On the General Strategic Goal for the Group,” Mohamed Akram, May 22, 1991, Government Exhibit 003-0085/3:04-CR-240-G U.S. v. HLF. et al., United States District Court, Northern District of Texas, URL: http://www.txnd.uscourts.gov/judges/hlf2/09-25-08/Elbarasse%20Search%203.pdf, 7.


84 Taimur Khan, “Abu Dhabi Counter-Terrorism Centre to Battle ISIL’s Online Lies,” The National (UAE), 7 July 2015, URL: http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/abu-dhabi-counter-terrorism-centre-to-battle-isils-online-lies#full


88 Taimur Khan, “Abu Dhabi Counter-Terrorism Centre to Battle ISIL’s Online Lies,” The National (UAE), 7 July 2015, URL: http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/abu-dhabi-counter-terrorism-centre-to-battle-isils-online-lies#full


90 “Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications,” U.S. Department of State, undated, URL: http://www.state.gov/r/csccl/

91 “Appointment of Rashad Hussain as United States Special Envoy and Coordinator for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications,” Office of the Spokesperson, U.S. Department of State, 18 February 2015, URL: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/02/237585.htm

92 “Appointment of Rashad Hussain as United States Special Envoy and Coordinator for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications,” Office of the Spokesperson, U.S. Department of State, 18 February 2015, URL: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/02/237585.htm


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96 Background, Hedayah Fact Sheet, Hedayah, URL: http://www.hedayah.ae/pdf/hedayah-factsheet.pdf

97 aimur Khan, "Abu Dhabi Counter-Terrorism Centre to Battle ISIL's Online Lies," The National [UAE], 7 July 2015, URL: http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/abu-dhabi-counter-terrorism-centre-to-battle-isils-online-lies#full


99 Background, Hedayah Fact Sheet, Hedayah, URL: http://www.hedayah.ae/pdf/hedayah-factsheet.pdf


104 The Atlantic article, 30.

105 The Atlantic article, 24.


107 The Atlantic article, 28.

108 The Atlantic article, 29.

109 The Atlantic article, 29.

110 The Atlantic article, 29.

111 The Atlantic article, 30.

112 Abdullah Pocius [IbnAllan] on Twitter, https://twitter.com/ibnallan. NOTE: When non-Wahhabi Muslims get tired of jihadi terrorism, they often blame the Wahhabis. When Wahhabis flinch from jihadi violence, they blame the Khawarij.

113 The Atlantic article, 24-25.

114 The Atlantic article, 26-27.

115 The Atlantic article, 26.

116 The Atlantic article, 27.

117 The Atlantic article, 27.

118 The Atlantic article, 27.

119 The Atlantic article, 27.