



Stop seeing what you know—Start knowing what you see!

Select Referenced Key Documents for Living the Purge – Not Loving It

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NOTE: All documents and more are also linked within the footnotes of the main report, *Living the Purge*.

1. Memorandum for Director, Joint Staff from Jose S. Mayorga, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, October 14, 2011. Labeled as the “Staff Package” and included Spencer Ackerman’s article [**PDF page 4**]
<https://unconstrainedanalytics.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/STAFF-ACTION-Package-October-14-2011-Violent-Extremist-Briefers-ASD-Mayorga-OSD-SACCP-JS-JSAP-TAB-A-r-.pdf>
2. Preliminary Inquiry Memo for Director, Joint Force Development, from Joint Staff Investigating Officer Major General Frederick S. Rudesheim, USA, May 17, 2012, regarding Joint Forces Staff College course “Perspectives on Islam and Islamic Radicalism” [**PDF page 15**]
<https://unconstrainedanalytics.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Preliminary-Inquiry-MG-Rudesheim-of-JFSC-and-LTC-Dooley-May-17-2012-r.pdf>
3. Spencer Ackerman innuendo in new evidence—refuted by his own source. “America at the Crossroad” presentation by Stephen Coughlin, September 23, 2011 [**PDF page 34**]
<https://unconstrainedanalytics.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Ackerman-innuendo-in-New-Evidence-Sept-23-2011-Refuted-by-his-own-Source-America-at-Crossroads-plus-r.pdf>
4. Complexification from imposing Islamic law. JSFC presentation by Stephen Coughlin, March 14, 2011 [**PDF page 39**]
<https://unconstrainedanalytics.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Complexification-from-Imposing-Islamic-Law-JSFC-March-14-2011-posted-on-WIRED-r.pdf>
5. “Muslim Pressure” (December 28, 2007) and “Coughlin Backed” (January 11, 2008) by Bill Gertz, Inside the Ring, Washington Times [**PDF page 47**]
<https://gertzfile.com/gertzfile/ring122807.html>
<https://gertzfile.com/gertzfile/ringo11108.html>
6. “Questions for the Pentagon, Who is Hesham Islam?” By Claudia Rosett, National Review, January 25, 2008 [**PDF page 50**]
<https://www.nationalreview.com/2008/01/questions-pentagon-jrinternet/>
7. An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America, Muslim Brotherhood, May 22, 1991 [**PDF page 56; skip to PDF page 71 for English translation**]
<https://unconstrainedanalytics.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/HLF-Evidence-Explanatory-Memorandum-seachable-Muslim-Botherhood-NA-1991-r.pdf>
8. Analysis of Muslim Brotherhood’s General Strategic Goals for North America Memorandum, by Stephen Coughlin, September 7, 2007 [**PDF page 88**]
<https://unconstrainedanalytics.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Analysis-MB-Strategic-Goals-Memo-Coughlin.pdf>

9. Abstract of Modeling the Behavior of Violent Extremists: An Evidence-Based Methodology and System for Instruction and Analysis, by Stephen Coughlin, Jorge Scientific Corporation; Mihai Boicu, Dorin Marcu, Gheorghe Tecuci, Learning Agents Center, George Mason University, August 8, 2011 **[PDF page 97]**
<https://unconstrainedanalytics.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/ABSTRACT-Modeling-Violent-Extremists-with-TIACRITIS-GMU-Learning-Agents-Center-September-27-2011-r.pdf>

10. Muslim Advocates Freedom & Justice” Muslim Brotherhood Identifier; is Milestone’s Freedom & Justice **[PDF page 105]**
<https://unconstrainedanalytics.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Muslim-Brotherhood-Freedom-Justice-is-Milestones-F-and-J-r.pdf>

<https://unconstrainedanalytics.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Freedom-Justice-a-Muslim-Brotherhood-Indicator-r.pdf>

<https://unconstrainedanalytics.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Muslim-Advocates-Tagline-Freedom-Justice-for-All-an-MB-Indicator-r.pdf>

11. SLIDES: Al-Jazeera ridicules Accurate Holy Land Foundation documents **[PDF page 109]**
<https://unconstrainedanalytics.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Al-Jazeera-Ridicules-Accurate-HLF-Documents-r-.pdf>

12. SLIDES: Qatar, IUMS, Qaradawi, Muslim Brotherhood **[PDF page 115]**
<http://unconstrainedanalytics.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Qatar-IUMS-Qaradawi-The-Muslim-Brotherhood.pdf>

13. SLIDES: Qatari Royal Family Oversee Translation of Islamic Law Text Promoting Classical Jihad **[PDF page 117]**
<https://unconstrainedanalytics.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Qatari-Royal-Family-Oversee-Translation-of-Islamic-Law-Text-Promoting-Classical-Jihad-r.pdf>

14. SLIDE: Un Resolution 16/18, Secretary of State Clinton commits to foreign powers to use the extra-legal state action against American citizens **[PDF page 120]**
<http://unconstrainedanalytics.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/July-15-2011-Hillary-Clinton-to-OIC-Peer-Pressure-and-Shaming-UN-Resolution-16-18.pdf>

15. SLIDES: Marcuse on the Counter-State, Counter-Revolution and Revolt **[PDF page 121]**
<http://unconstrainedanalytics.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Marcuse-on-Counter-Counter-Revolution-and-Revolt.pdf>



HOMELAND DEFENSE
& AMERICAS' SECURITY AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2600


October 14, 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

SUBJECT: Request for Joint Staff Coordination

Recent media attention on the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) training and DoD lecturers led the National Security Staff (NSS) to request Departments and Agencies to provide their screening process for CVE trainers and speakers (TAB A). Request the Joint Staff task the COCOMs, Services, National Guard Bureau and Components to determine the current processes used to vet CVE trainers. The task should reach out to service academies and major academic centers (e.g., Joint Special Operations University, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, and National Defense Intelligence College). The intent is to determine the criteria used to establish professional qualifications for teachers and lecturers providing instruction on countering violent Islamic extremism; with particular focus on Military Information Support Operations, Information Operations, and Military Intelligence curriculum. In addition, the vetting of curriculum development for cultural awareness pre-deployment training for Iraq and Afghanistan should be included.

Please provide the current process of vetting CVE trainers by October 31, 2011. Our point of contact for this task is LTC Matthew Whitehead, (571) 256-8365 or Ms. Kate Morse (571) 256-9172.


José S. Mayorga

Attachment:
TAB A: Spencer Ackerman's Wired.com Article



Action Summary - SACCP

5:31 Oct 15 NOV 2011



UNCLASSIFIED Search Actions

Recent Actions USP011580-11

A SYSTEM ALERT HAS BEEN ISSUED. [CLICK HERE TO SEE THE MESSAGE](#)

USP011580-11



Subject: Request for Joint Staff Co-ordination

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Status: OPEN

Priority: NORMAL

Action Details

| | | | |
|--------------------------|---|-------------------------|--------------------|
| Originator(s): | Kate Morse | Recipient(s): | DASD HDS&FP |
| Request Type: | All other items | Reply Type: | Informational Only |
| Original Suspende Date: | 31 Oct 2011 | Date of Correspondence: | 14 Oct 2011 |
| Current Suspende Date: | 31 Oct 2011 | Date of Receipt: | 14 Oct 2011 |
| Initiated By: | Katherine Morse (HD-S&FP-DIR-P&P) (14 Oct 2011 - 13:54) | Package Holder: | |
| Last Modified: | | Package Logged In: | |
| Closed On: | | Package Logged Out: | |
| Tags: | None. | References: | None. |
| Public / Private Action: | Public | | |

Task Assigned to Correspondence and Control Office JCS (JCS-CCO) - Assigned by Katherine Morse(HD-S&FP-DIR-P&P)



| Date Assigned | Route | Status | Suspende Date | Instructions |
|---------------------|-------|---------|--------------------|---|
| 17 Oct 2011 - 12:12 | AD | WORKING | <i>15 NOV 2011</i> | Task should go to J5 TRP for action, they have the lead for Countering Violent Extremism. |

Tasks Assigned By Katherine Morse(HD-S&FP-DIR-P&P) Route Status Suspende Date Date Assigned Date Read Date Completed
 No tasks assigned

Attachments



| Date Attached | Title | Tab | Attached By | Type |
|---------------------|----------------------------------|------|-----------------------------------|------|
| 17 Oct 2011 - 12:07 | Joint Staff Coordination Request | None | Katherine Morse (HD-S&FP-DIR-P&P) | PDF |

Notes



| Date | From | Note |
|-------------------------------------|------|------|
| You have not received any messages. | | |

SACCP || Repository || Reports || Preferences || Logout
 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
 AND INFORMATION SENSITIVE BY AGGREGATION

Unclassified

| SECRETARY, JOINT STAFF ACTION DIRECTIVE | |
|--|---|
| SJS 11-04328 | SUSPENSE DATE: 11/15/2011 |
| DATE: 10/25/2011 | RED TAG: NO |
| SUBJECT: /O/ Screening Process for Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Trainers and Speakers | |
| ASSIGNED TO: J-5 | APPROVAL AUTHORITY / HOW REFERRED: DIRECT REPLY |
| <p><u>Coordination Requirements</u></p> <p>OCJCS/LC, J-2, J-3, J-7, the Services, COCOMS, and USD/I</p> | |
| <p><u>Special Instructions/Guidance</u></p> <p>Initial review of this action indicates the response should be a J-Directorate Reply for Director or Vice Director signature. Please add a copy of the response and a completion note to the JSAP folder before returning to SJS/ACB for closure.</p> | |
| <p><u>Research Assistance</u></p> <p>Consult the (JSINT/JWICS) Enterprise Content Management (ECM) Repository, the JSIN-S ECM Repository and/or the JS Quick Search research/tracking tools within JSAP-M to determine what other offices, organizations, and/or recommendations should coordinate/collaborate. Action packages will be screened for comprehensive collaboration/coordination by office/directorate leadership.</p> <p>IMD guidance for AO metadata tagging requirement is available at: http://sdseecm.dse.jss.js.smil.mil/rma/dri/objectId/090176c9800dbad5</p> <p>See EAPB website for approved JS Template examples: http://sdseportal.js.smil.mil/portal/site/jsportal/eapb</p> | |
| <p><u>Notes</u></p> <p>Contact external POC (if applicable) and/or the SJS-ACB 695-4550, regarding suspense extensions to this action. Interim replies are required prior to consideration of suspense extension requests for "5C" actions, IAW JSI 5711.01C.</p> | |

Unclassified

Justice Department Official: Muslim 'Juries' Threaten 'Our Values'

- By [Spencer Ackerman](#) 
- October 5, 2011
- FBI intelligence analysts weren't the only ones teaching their colleagues that the U.S. is at war with the Islamic religion. Justice Department officials — and even teachers at the Army's top intellectual center — are delivering similar messages.
- Danger Room has acquired a [2010 PowerPoint presentation](#) compiled by an intelligence analyst working for the U.S. Attorney in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Reminiscent of [FBI training materials exposed by Danger Room in September](#), the PowerPoint warns of a "Civilizational Jihad" stretching back from the dawn of Islam and waged today in the U.S. by "civilians, juries, lawyers, media, academia and charities" who threaten "our values." The goal of that war: "Replacement of American Judeo-Christian and Western liberal social, political and religious foundations by Islam."
- When Danger Room questioned the Justice Department about the briefing, it issued a statement pledging to join the FBI in scrubbing its counterterrorism training for signs of material that equate average Muslims with terrorists.
- "To ensure that Justice Department standards are upheld," the statement reads, "the Department has today instructed all components and U.S. Attorney's Offices to review all training materials and presentations provided by Justice Department personnel to ensure that any material presented is consistent with the Department's standards, goals and instructions."
- But the Justice Department is hardly alone in hosting bigoted and counterproductive counterterrorism training. Even if federal prosecutors and FBI agents no longer go through such instruction, Danger Room has learned that anti-Islam training material has spread into the military. Some of the Islamophobic presenters hired by the FBI also lecture at premiere schools for military intelligence; at an online university favored by students seeking jobs in U.S. intelligence agencies and with affiliated contractors; and even at the Army's intellectual center, Fort Leavenworth.
- In other words, what the FBI once told Danger Room was an isolated incident — occurring one time in one lecture session — has spread throughout numerous government agencies over the years.
- And in addition to being dubious as a matter of civil rights, experts say that the training places U.S. counterterrorism efforts at risk. "Boneheaded is a generous way to describe this training," says counterterrorism analyst Jarret Brachman, author of [Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice](#). "I'd lean more towards hateful, paranoid and completely counterproductive."
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- Another slide from a 2010 PowerPoint prepared by Justice Department intelligence analyst John Marsh
- The presentation in question is the work of John Marsh, a self-described "intelligence specialist" working for the U.S. Attorney's office in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Titled "21st Century Terrorism: History, Perspective, Development" and dated May 19, 2010, it was apparently delivered to a Defense Department hazardous-materials conference.
- Marsh's presentation, which claims to be "one analyst's view" and not that of the U.S. government, paints a harsh view of Islam. "Internal Islamic Failures/Collapse," it advises, "Did NOT Start on 9/11," but instead date back "~1400 years" — that is, to the birth of Islam itself and the death of the Prophet Muhammad. (Other slides take a meandering tour through world history, and specifically the very pre-Islamic Roman Empire.) "2 Inescapable facts" about contemporary terrorists, Marsh presented, are "1. All Say they are Muslims. 2. All believe they are acting as followers of the true Islam." Oddly, Marsh doesn't mention the 2009 shooting spree at the U.S. Holocaust Museum or the 2010 attack on an Austin, Texas IRS office; both strikes were clearly acts of terror, but neither perpetrator was Muslim.
- Still, Marsh provides "disclaimers" that Muslims "can separate politics [from] religion." He acknowledges distinctions between Shiites and Sunnis, and between average

"Muslims" and hardcore "Islamists." Some slides list "positive contributions" from Muslims, particularly in the fields of medicine, art and architecture. "Many Muslims do desire peace," Marsh allows.

- But several of Marsh's other slides blur those distinctions. They describe Islam as operating along a "broad Muslim belief spectrum," spanning from average "Muslim" to "Jihadi supporters/terrorists." (The "Two 'Faces' of Islam," in Marsh's telling.) The briefing contends, "No Major Muslim group has ever renounced the doctrines of jihad of the sword." Underscoring his point, a picture of the burning Twin Towers is paired with two minarets. Over them reads a quote: "The West never remembers and the East never forgets."
- Those aren't the only quotes Marsh uncritically presents. A famous line borrowed from Samuel Huntington's influential book *The Clash of Civilizations* — also the title of one of Marsh's briefing slides — reads, "Islam is CONVINCED of the superiority of its CULTURE; and OBSESSED with the inferiority of its POWER." Marsh also presents a quote from the son of the founder of Hamas, a convert to Christianity: "What matters is not whether my father is a fanatic or not, he's doing the will of a fanatic God. It doesn't matter if he's a terrorist or a traditional Muslim. At the end of the day a traditional Muslim is doing the will of a fanatic, fundamentalist, terrorist God." And bookending his presentation is a quote from Princeton's Bernard Lewis that seems to anticipate the objections to Marsh's own briefing: "Self censorship and political correctness will destroy our ability to discuss issues critical to our survival."
- If that sounds reminiscent of William Gawthrop, the FBI intelligence analyst who compared Islam to the Death Star, it may not be an accident. One of Marsh's slides cites a briefing of Gawthrop's, titled "The Sources and Patterns of Terrorism in Islamic Law," which presents straight-line arrows leading from "Islam" to "Hostile Islamic Groups," "Hostile or Facilitating Islamic Nations" and ultimately an "Insurgency Environment." The countries Gawthrop lists as afflicted by Islamic insurgencies include Iraq — but also the Netherlands, England, France and even the United States.
- "Ironically, this briefing could have been delivered by Osama bin Laden himself," says Brachman. "The fact that it's getting airtime is a disaster for our government and the American Muslim community alike."
- Marsh refused to speak to Danger Room about his presentation. Both he and his boss, U.S. Attorney Peter J. Smith, referred Danger Room to the Justice Department for comment. The Justice Department promptly disavowed Marsh's briefing — and pledged to join the FBI in reforming its counterterrorism curriculum.
- "The presentation in question does not reflect the views of the Justice Department, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Middle District of Pennsylvania or the FBI. The presentation represented 'one analyst's view,' as stated in the slides, and the opinions expressed were only those of the presenter," reads a statement prepared for Danger Room.
- Nevertheless, the Department statement continues:
- To ensure that Justice Department standards are upheld, the Department has today instructed all components and U.S. Attorney's Offices to review all training materials and presentations provided by Justice Department personnel to ensure that any material presented is consistent with the Department's standards, goals and instructions. This is particularly important with regard to training related to


terrorism, countering violent extremism and other training that may relate to ongoing community outreach efforts.

- Marsh, it turns out, does a fair amount of speaking on the perceived Islamic threat. In March 2011, he spoke to a Harrisburg community college's homeland security conference on the subject of "Stealth Jihad: A Long-Term Threat to America?" (.pdf) Back in 2008, Marsh was invited to speak at the annual convention of the National Institute of Justice, the Justice Department's R&D agency. The subject of his panel? (.pdf) "Hotbeds of Radicalization in Contemporary American Society."



- But the Justice Department is hardly the only government agency playing host to briefings that take a skeptical view of Islam. At least 10 times since 2007, Stephen Coughlin, a former consultant on Islamic law for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has lectured at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the Army's intellectual nerve center.
- Coughlin has given presentations before conservative audiences that claimed Muslim nations have a "ten year plan" to make criticism of Islam illegal under international law. He has criticized ex-President George W. Bush's assurances that the U.S. is not at war with Islam for having a "chilling effect" on intelligence analysis. Now a visiting fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center in Washington, Coughlin gave a January talk to the FBI's D.C. field office allegedly claiming Islamic law was incompatible with the U.S. Constitution.
- "I brief the FBI, brief the Department of Defense," Coughlin told Danger Room during a short telephone conversation.
- Danger Room has confirmed that Coughlin regularly lectures before a class at the Army's Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth. The course is known as FA30, an "Information Operations" course, which instructs mid-career Army officers how to get the military's message out.
- When Danger Room initially called the course's supervisor, an Army civilian named John Warner, to ask about Coughlin's lectures, Warner abruptly ended the conversation, saying, "There's really not a need for you guys to know this."

- Coughlin would not discuss the content of his briefings: "There's a degree of confidentiality. If they want to talk, that's their decision." Before ending the conversation, he added, "I think you're doing a hit and run and it's pretty sleazy."
- Later, Army Col. Mike Dominique, who is in charge of training Army information operations officers at the Combined Arms Center, decided he did want to talk about Coughlin's briefings. Dominique elaborates that his own "focus is the extremist groups" — the ones that the majors who take the FA30 course have to confront. And that is why Coughlin will continue to be invited to lecture at Leavenworth. "What Mr. Coughlin brings is a certain level of expertise on these extremist groups. He brings a perspective to the audience," Dominique says.
- But Coughlin also discussed Islam itself in the Leavenworth class. "Does he draw parallels between religion and the extremist groups? That can be seen. He uses that as an example," Dominique says. "His only area of expertise is Islamic law. I can tell you this — and I'd like to really focus on this — my teaching point is not on the Islamic religion. That's something we are very careful about. Who are the folks we have to deal with? We have IO [Information Operations] officers and American soldiers who are of the Muslim faith. We don't focus on the religion aspect, but on the extremist aspect."
- A spokesman for the Combined Arms Center, Army Lt. Col. Steve Leonard, acknowledges that "in other venues, [Coughlin] may have created a negative message." But Leonard says that even when Coughlin discusses Islam at Fort Leavenworth, he does not cross a line into anti-Islam sentiment.
- "He helps the students develop a mental model of extremist groups and the process they use to influence moderate Muslims," Leonard tells Danger Room. "He explains how extremists use the Quran and Sharia law to build a jihadist narrative that creates significant influence within a moderate population."



- In 2007, as Stephen Coughlin began lecturing on Islam at Fort Leavenworth, William Gawthrop began delivering a similar message at the premiere school for U.S. military intelligence. The class was catalogued as NFI 533, "Intelligence and Homeland Security." It took place at the National Defense Intelligence College, the professional education institution run by the Defense Intelligence Agency.
- According to a 2007 email Gawthrop sent to colleagues, obtained by Danger Room, Gawthrop saw his pedagogic activities as part of a self-initiated effort to build a "knowledge bank" of analysts "whose interests include Islamic Law and its impacts on Homeland Security." The "informal" group would study Islamic Law's influence on such issues as "immigration, birth rates and demographics," "aggressive civil suits," "Sharia Economics," "Academia, Information Operations, and Parallel Structures."
- A spokeswoman for the DIA, Susan Strednansky, confirms to Danger Room that Gawthrop taught the 2007 course. The previous fall, he also taught a course called "Intelligence and National Security Policy Structure and Process." Strednansky did not explain why Gawthrop's lecturing ended.
- That was not the only venue Gawthrop had to instruct U.S. intelligence analysts.
- Gawthrop remains on the faculty of American Military University, an online higher-learning institution that caters primarily to military veterans and students interested in entering the security field. Gawthrop teaches classes on intelligence.
- AMU is an 20-year old university — first a correspondence school, later exclusively online — that offers a variety of bachelor's and master's programs to its 97,000 students. About two-thirds of its students are active-duty troops or reservists. And it's attractive to them because AMU accepts academic course credits that troops can earn in on-base education centers, so they don't have to start their education from scratch when they finish their service. Most military and intelligence contractors require a college degree for their highest-paying jobs — and accordingly, many of AMU's alumni are in "public safety or first-responder careers," says AMU spokesman Brian Muys.
- Gawthrop has taught at AMU since August 2007, to a "variety" of courses, each averaging about 14 students per class. "As a matter of university policy, his personal views expressed in any public forums — like those of all our other faculty — do not necessarily represent those of AMU itself," says Muys. "Similarly, his appearance at public forums outside of our classroom environment does not otherwise imply any AMU endorsement of, or involvement in, such events."
- But American Military University recommended Gawthrop as a lecturer on Islam to the New York chapter of Infragard, a partnership organization between the FBI and the private sector, according to chapter president Joseph Concannon. On June 8, 2011, Gawthrop lectured to the group, instructing that al-Qaida was "irrelevant" compared to the threat of Islam itself. (Muys said he was unable to comment on the matter.)
- The FBI explains that several of its employees have second jobs. It refused to comment on Gawthrop specifically. And as it has since the beginning of Danger Room's expose, the FBI refused to make him available for an interview or explain why it continues to employ him.
- The FBI's parent agency, the Department of Justice, may not be taking any action to fire Gawthrop or Marsh. But in announcing its new vetting for anti-Islamophobic material in its training session, it emphasized that it views American Muslims as partners, rather than targets of the mass suspicion portrayed in the briefings.

- “The Justice Department is fundamentally committed to upholding the civil rights of all Americans and is responsible for bringing to justice those who violate civil liberties,” the statement issued to Danger Room reads. “The Department’s commitment to protecting the rights of the Muslim and Arab-American communities has never been stronger, and its outreach to these communities continues daily around the country. Members of the Muslim community are indispensable partners in a shared effort to combat national security threats.”
- The FBI and the Justice Department both are now reviewing their counterterrorism training for anti-Islam messages. Will the U.S. military follow suit?

Morris, Deirdre R CTR JCS DOM SJS AD ACB

From: saccp@whs.mil
Sent: Monday, October 17, 2011 12:13 PM
To: Joint Secretariat
Subject: SACCP: You've been assigned a new task with control number USP011580-11

Katherine Morse(HD-S&FP-DIR-P&P) has assigned the following task to you:

Control Number: USP011580-11
Subject: Request for Joint Staff Coordination

You are accessing a U.S. Government (USG) Information System (IS) that is provided for USG-authorized use only.

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**THE JOINT STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC**



Reply ZIP Code:
20318-0300

17 May 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR, JOINT FORCE DEVELOPMENT

SUBJECT: Preliminary Inquiry

1. In response to reference (a), Attachments (1) through (42) are forwarded. As directed, I have conducted a preliminary inquiry into the syllabus, curriculum, and course review/approval process for the "Perspectives on Islam and Islamic Radicalism" course (Elective 5812) taught at the Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC). All reasonably available evidence has been collected and all directives set forth in reference (a) have been satisfied.

2. Executive Summary. Due to an institutional failure to provide effective oversight of elective courses generally and a series of misjudgments by individuals, the JFSC's "Perspectives on Islam and Islamic Radicalism" course (Elective 5812) did not include necessary course content on U.S. counterterrorism strategy, including U.S. policy on countering violent extremism (CVE); relied almost exclusively on outside guest lecturers, several of whom provided a negative perspective on various aspects of Islam; and did not include an academically rigorous metric or assessment tool to evaluate student learning. In an effort to remedy the lack of an effective assessment tool, the Elective Lead, LTC Dooley, developed and inserted into the "Perspectives" elective a highly flawed "Counter-Jihad Operational Design Model" brief which contained deliberately extreme hypotheticals intended to provoke student analysis and debate. The extreme hypotheticals used in the model were contrary to U.S./DoD policy, and, taken at face value, propose a position that is contrary to both the course objectives and our professional values. The model is not academically sound and should not be used again in any form. JFSC did take appropriate action to review and respond to complaints about the "Perspectives" elective that were raised by a student in March 2012, but lacked a sufficient sense of urgency in initiating corrective actions given the sensitivity of the subject matter. I recommend that the "Perspectives" elective not be offered again until it is significantly re-designed and greater oversight is provided to ensure accomplishment of course objectives.

3. Findings. Based on my assessment of all the evidence set forth in attachments (2) through (42), I make the following findings:

a. JFSC Response to the November 2011 Joint Staff Action. A miscommunication between the National Defense University (NDU) and JFSC regarding the scope of the action and a lack of effective coordination by the JFSC's Dean, Directorate of Academic Affairs (D,DAA) resulted in JFSC not conducting an internal review of the "Perspectives on Islam and Islamic Radicalism" elective (#5812) (hereinafter "Perspectives" elective) in response to the November 2011 Joint Staff action number SJS 11-04328, "/O/ Screening Process for Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Trainers and Speakers". Although the National Defense University's (NDU's) Deputy Vice President for Academic Affairs, Dr. Brenda Roth, forwarded the Joint Staff action (with attachments) to the JFSC's D,DAA, Dr. Linda McCluney, on 17 November 2011 (Attachments 11, 21), Dr. Roth's forwarding e-mail stated that the action was already overdue and that "a few bullets on how each component vets speakers and chooses materials and presentations is all that I need". Upon receiving Dr. Roth's e-mail, Dr. McCluney delegated the task of responding for JFSC to Dr. Ken Pisel, JFSC's Chief of Educational Technology (Attachments 12-13). Dr. McCluney gave verbal guidance to Dr. Pisel to respond to the action by informing NDU of the JFSC's general process for obtaining outside guest speakers, but she did not forward the documents contained in the Joint Staff action to Dr. Pisel or to the JFSC's Office of the Commandant (Attachments 6-7, 13). Based on the verbal guidance from Dr. McCluney, Dr. Pisel provided NDU with a very brief JFSC response on 18 November 2011 which was limited solely to JFSC's general process for obtaining outside guest speakers (Attachments 13, 22). Dr. Pisel did not know that the Joint Staff action was actually focused on CVE training when he submitted the response to NDU (Attachment 13). According to both the JFSC Chief of Staff (COS) and the Curriculum Director of the JFSC's Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS), they also did not receive the documents within the November 2011 Joint Staff action, which highlighted recent negative media attention received by the FBI's CVE training program and requested a specific review of current processes used to vet CVE trainers and guest speakers (Attachments 6-7). I find that the lack of effective communication between NDU and JFSC regarding the scope of the action and the lack of effective coordination of the Joint Staff action by the JFSC's D,DAA, Dr. McCluney, contributed JFSC's lack of oversight of the "Perspectives" elective during the late fall of 2011 and early 2012. If the JFSC's Office of the Commandant and/or the Director, JCWS had seen the actual documents within the Joint Staff tasker, they might have been alerted to the problems the FBI had had with using Mr. Stephen Coughlin and Mr. John Guandolo as guest lecturers in their CVE training program, and an effective review could also have led JFSC to examine the October 2011 guidance and best practices on CVE training issued by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (Attachment 36). This failure of internal coordination resulted in a missed opportunity to alert the JFSC's Office of the Commandant and Director,

JCWS to these issues, and is the reason why the JFSC failed to conduct a timely review of the "Perspectives" elective in November 2011.

b. Intent of Course at Inception. For historical context, from 2004 through the 2006 syllabus, the course content of the JFSC's "Perspectives" elective was consistent with the CJCS's 2005 Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Special Areas of Emphasis (SAE) guidance on Countering Ideological Support to Terrorism (CIST) (which later became known as Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)) (Attachments 14, 17, 41). The 2006 syllabus for the "Perspectives" elective included specific lessons on the history of Islam; guest lectures by Regent University's Dr. Joe Kickasola on "Rationales for Moderation or Violence in Islamic Politics", and by the Pew Forum's Dr. Pauletta Otis on "Violence in Religion and Women in Islam"; and a final, four hour, faculty-guided discussion on both the content of the previous guest lectures and on student research papers that had been assigned as part of the course (Attachment 14, reference (f)). This 2006 syllabus set forth a balanced academic approach to meet the 2005 JPME SAE guidance on CIST, which was to provide JPME students with "an awareness of the culture, customs, language and philosophy" adhered to by violent Islamic extremists in order to more effectively counter their extremist ideology (Attachment 41).

c. Revised CJCS Special Area of Emphasis (SAE) Guidance. From 2007 to 2010, the "Perspectives" elective maintained essentially the same course syllabus and lesson objectives and came to rely entirely on outside guest lecturers to present the course material (Attachments 4-8, 14). However, by 2010 the CJCS's SAE guidance on CVE had evolved to become more extensive than the 2005 SAE guidance on CIST. In addition to providing JPME students with the "history and basic elements of militant Islamic ideology", the 2010 SAE guidance states that JPME students should "have an understanding of the principal framework of U.S. Government counterterrorism (CT) strategy, including CVE"; should be challenged to "investigate the five elements of the DoD's role in CVE (security, information operations, humanitarian assistance, military-to-military contacts, and conduct of operations)"; and should be familiar with the National Implementation Plan (NIP) for U.S. CT strategy, with its four pillars (protect and defend the homeland, attack terrorist capabilities, CVE, and prevent terrorist acquisition of WMD) (Attachments 33-35, 42). I find that the JFSC's "Perspectives" elective did not incorporate this additional, updated SAE guidance on CVE in 2011-2012. Although the March 2012 syllabus for the "Perspectives" elective does contain a quote from the June 2011 U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Attachment 16), the lessons described in the syllabus (introduction and history of Islam, Islamic culture, Islamic Jihad, Islamic Law, the voice of moderate Islam, and configuring an operational approach to the problem) do not include specific content on the U.S. CT strategy, including U.S. CVE policy (Attachment 2);

the five elements of DoD's role in CVE; or the NIP for U.S. CT strategy. Such fundamental content on U.S. CT and CVE policy must be included in any CVE-driven course like the "Perspectives" elective.

d. Use of Outside Guest Lecturers. By 2010, the elective faculty responsible for the JFSC's "Perspectives" elective had come to rely almost exclusively on outside guest lecturers- especially guest lecturers that had been used by JFSC in the past and were reliably available- in order to cover the course content (Attachments 4-8, 14). Reasons for this over-reliance on guest lecturers included the lack of academic expertise on Islam within the resident JFSC faculty; the "tyranny of the schedule", i.e., the perceived need to offer the "Perspectives" elective at JFSC four times per year without interruption; and the fact that any new guest lecturers were required to be "vetted" first by speaking to JFSC faculty at a JFSC faculty development session, thereby increasing the time required to add them to the course lineup. In my opinion, an over-reliance on outside guest speakers is not a sound academic approach, because it leaves coverage of course objectives essentially to chance (outside speakers will say whatever they want and are not bound to cover course objectives), and because it is difficult to measure or assess student learning in a course that is simply a "guest lecture series". Additionally, it appears that with the exception of Dr. David Fautua, the outside guest lecturers used in the "Perspectives" elective during 2011-2012 (Mr. Stephen Coughlin, Mr. John Guandolo, Dr. Shireen Burki, and Mr. Vern Liebl), who accounted for at least five of the eight total course lessons, all presented a largely negative perspective regarding various aspects of Islam (Attachments 3-8, 14). As noted above, this significant imbalance in perspective offered by the guest lecturers resulted in a failure to present SAE-required material on U.S. CT strategy and CVE policy that is essential to any professional DoD course on CVE. In essence, the "Perspectives" elective course content stayed right where the outside guest instructors led it, and the selection and use of guest instructors drove the course content, which contributed to the failure to incorporate essential SAE-required material. To their credit, the 2011-2012 faculty for the "Perspectives" elective did recognize that the lineup of already-vetted guest lecturers (which they had inherited from their predecessors when they took over the course) was out of balance, and they attempted to address this imbalance by adding Dr. Zuhdi Jasser to the lineup as a more "moderate" perspective on Islam; unfortunately, they were unsuccessful in getting Dr. Jasser to speak (Attachments 4-8, 14). Even if they had gotten Dr. Jasser, in my view the "Perspectives" elective still needed specific, faculty-facilitated discussions immediately following each guest lecture to allow students to analyze and debate the material in the context of U.S. and DoD policy, as well as a metric/student assessment tool (such as a research paper) at the end of the course to allow instructors to evaluate student learning.

e. The "Counter-Jihad Operational Design Model". The 2011-2012 Elective Lead and Lesson Developer for the "Perspectives" elective, LTC Matthew A. Dooley, U.S. Army, recognized in late 2010 that the course lacked a metric/assessment tool for evaluation of student learning, and in response, LTC Dooley developed a new, final lesson for the course that he called a "Counter-Jihad Operational Design Model" (hereinafter "the model") (Attachments 4-8, 14). The model was presented in a series of powerpoint slides that LTC Dooley intended to be provocative and extreme, in order to stimulate student discussion and analysis of all previous course lessons (Attachments 4-8, 14). A significant weakness in this academic approach was that the slides LTC Dooley developed to explain the model, particularly in the initial version 11 of the model dated July 2011 (Attachment 18), failed to include any content on U.S. CT strategy or U.S. CVE policy, and did include a number of deliberately extreme hypotheticals that were contrary to U.S. CVE policy, contrary to U.S./DoD core values, and negative toward Islam (Attachments 28-30). While I find that LTC Dooley did not intend to imply any actual U.S./DoD support for these extreme hypotheticals, which were intended solely to provoke student discussion (see especially LTC Dooley's instructor's notes at Attachment 19), in my view it was very poor judgment to include such extreme hypotheticals within the course, to place these extreme hypotheticals on powerpoint slides, and to distribute such slides to the students on a CD-DVD without a much stronger and more explicit written disclaimer that the model was intentionally extreme, was contrary to U.S./DoD policy, and was intended solely to stimulate in-class discussion, and without including specific content on U.S. and DoD CT and CVE policy. In response to course critiques submitted by "Perspectives" elective students during 2011, LTC Dooley did modify the initial version 11 model several times, and by JCWS Class 12-1 some of the most extreme hypotheticals had been or were being deleted from the model, prior to the complaint raised by Col Cade in February-March 2012 (Attachments 2, 4-8, 14, 20). Nevertheless, when viewed in conjunction with the "Perspectives" elective's imbalance in outside guest lecturers, most of whom offered a negative perspective on various aspects of Islam, the "Counter-Jihad Operational Design Model" appears to put the course well outside the CJCS's JPME SAE guidance on CVE and can easily be taken out of context to imply a message that is contrary to both the course objectives and our professional values. I do not believe that this model is academically sound or effective as a metric/assessment tool and it should not be continued in any form.

f. Distribution of Course Materials on CD-DVDs. I find that LTC Dooley and LtCol Lawrence McKnelly, U.S. Marine Corps, who was also an elective faculty team member for the "Perspectives" elective, exercised poor judgment in November 2011 when they failed to personally review all the briefs, articles, and other electronic files stored on the course's archive faculty portal site before downloading all the archived course materials to

CD-DVDs and mass distributing CD-DVDs to students in Classes 11-4 and 12-1 (Attachments 4-5). While I believe that LTC Dooley and LtCol McKnelly's intent was simply to provide students with read-aheads, and that the archived electronic files consisted almost entirely of legacy materials that had been previously provided to the "Perspectives" faculty by outside guest lecturers, some of the materials were clearly inappropriate for use or distribution, such as a video clip entitled "Watch Before This is Banned" which was contained in a sub-folder associated with materials provided by a guest lecturer, Mr. John Guandolo (Attachment 15). I accept the statements of both LTC Dooley and LtCol McKnelly (Attachments 4-5) that they never used the "Watch Before This is Banned" file in the classroom and that they did not even know it was on the CD-DVD; however, it was their responsibility to screen any such electronic files carefully before providing them to students on CD-DVDs, particularly when the CD-DVDs are marked with the NDU and JFSC logos. The CD-DVDs distributed to students in Classes 11-4 and 12-1 also contained the outdated initial version 11 of LTC Dooley's "Counter-Jihad Operational Design Model" (Attachments 15, 18), even though the model had since been modified to delete some of the extreme hypotheticals. In my opinion, creation of such CD-DVDs with extensive historical files/data from outside guest lecturers does not contribute to student learning- any required readings for the "Perspectives" elective should have been on U.S. CT strategy and CVE policy to offer a counterpoint to the perspectives offered by the outside guest lecturers. The JFSC Commandant has already addressed the issue of distribution of course materials on CD-DVDs by issuing JFSC Policy Memorandum 12-04, "Distribution of Curriculum CDs or DVDs" dated 27 April 2012, which states that JFSC faculty may only produce and distribute course reference CD-DVDs with "approved reading materials and lesson guides for student use" and may only do so with the specific permission of their School Directors (Attachment 32). I believe this will be sufficient to prevent recurrence of this issue.

g. Academic Freedom and Non-attribution Policies. I find that LTC Dooley misunderstood current policies on academic freedom and non-attribution, and that this misunderstanding contributed to his decision to include deliberately extreme hypotheticals that were contrary to U.S./DoD policy and core values within the initial version 11 of his "Counter-Jihad Operational Design Model". CJCS Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) defines academic freedom broadly as "freedom to pursue and teach relevant knowledge and to discuss it freely . . . without interference, as from school or public officials" (Attachment 14, reference (i)), and NDU's 2008 Faculty Handbook states that academic freedom means faculty must be free to discuss subjects from all viewpoints in their classrooms; that no subject or issue is considered taboo; and that developing, updating, or adjusting course content is the responsibility of teachers, completely free from "political interference" by elected or

appointed officials (Attachment 37). NDU's 2008 Faculty Handbook also states that academic freedom is enhanced by an accompanying policy of non-attribution, which means that presentations offered and discussions held "are conducted in strict confidence", and that NDU "assures that nothing will be attributed to speakers directly or indirectly without their express permission" (Attachment 37). I find that LTC Dooley understood these broad policy statements to mean that his use of extreme hypotheticals in the initial version 11 of his "Counter-Jihad Operational Design Model" was "within academic freedom", and that "non-attribution" applied to him as a JFSC faculty member, just as it did to outside guest lecturers (Attachment 4). In fact, however, LTC Dooley's understanding of these policies was both incomplete and incorrect. While OPMEP and NDU policies on academic freedom do afford faculty wide latitude to present course materials in the classroom as they see fit, NDU's policy also properly recognizes that academic freedom is not divorced from responsibility (Attachment 37). Responsibility means that faculty members must exercise sound judgment, objectivity, and professionalism in their use and transmission of knowledge, and that military faculty members must adhere to the unique requirements of their status as commissioned officers, such as adherence to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and to U.S./DoD core values (Attachments 37-39). Responsibility also means that faculty members must present students with the essential content of a subject matter that professional standards would require to be presented (Attachments 37-40). As the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) stated in a 2007 report on "Freedom in the Classroom", within a particular subject matter there are certain ". . . facts, theories, and models . . . that are so intrinsically intertwined with the current state of a discipline that it would be unprofessional to slight or ignore them. One cannot now teach biology without reference to evolution [and] one cannot teach particle physics without reference to quantum theory" (Attachment 40). In this case, LTC Dooley failed in his responsibility to ensure that the "Perspectives" elective included essential content on CVE, i.e., U.S. CT strategy, including CVE; the five elements of DoD's role in CVE; and the NIP for U.S. CT strategy, and without such essential content the "Perspectives" elective was neither objective nor professional. I also find that NDU's current policy on non-attribution is intended to allow outside guest lecturers the freedom to speak candidly, and to allow students and faculty to present and debate their personal opinions in the classroom without fear that such personal opinions will be attributed to them. Non-attribution does not mean, as LTC Dooley believed, that faculty presentations of basic course content, particularly powerpoint slides that are released to students on a CD-DVD, are somehow immune from curriculum oversight; if it did, then the entire JPME II core curriculum at the JFSC would arguably be under a non-attribution "cone of silence", which is simply not correct. In view of LTC Dooley's misunderstanding of these policies, re-training of the entire JFSC military faculty is warranted to ensure they have a complete

and correct understanding of both academic freedom and non-attribution and their own responsibilities under these policies.

h. Course Oversight. I find that there was insufficient oversight by the Director, JCWS and the JCWS Curriculum Director of the "Perspectives" elective's course content during late 2010 to early 2012. Although the syllabus and course content for the "Perspectives" elective were reviewed and approved by the JFSC Academic Board when the course first began in 2004 (Attachments 12, 14), it appears that following initial approval, the "Perspectives" elective was left to run on auto-pilot and all subsequent modifications to course presentations and content were left to the discretion of the elective faculty (Attachments 6-8, 14). Reasons for this lack of oversight include:

1. JFSC's curriculum development policy (PD-8) allows elective faculty to modify elective course curricula provided that the modification is minor and does not alter the intent of the lesson (Attachment 14, reference (b)). LTC Dooley relied on this JFSC policy when he developed and inserted the "Counter-Jihad Operational Design Model" into the "Perspectives" elective, because he did not believe that adding this new lesson altered the intent of the course (Attachment 4). In retrospect, however, I believe that the insertion of a model with such extreme hypotheticals was a significant course change that should have been reviewed and approved, at a minimum, by the JCWS Curriculum Director and the Director, JCWS. Indeed, given the sensitivities involved in teaching CVE, course materials and presentations for the "Perspectives" elective should be reviewed and approved by the JFSC Commandant;

2. The JFSC's main focus is, of necessity, the development and execution of the JPME II core curriculum, which consists of approximately 271 hours of instruction (Attachments 6-8, 14). JFSC senior leaders acknowledged that since execution of the core curriculum four times per year is "more than a full time job", they simply do not devote as much oversight to the 42 different elective courses offered at JFSC (Attachments 6-8, 14);

3. The fact that based on internal JFSC review of student post-course critiques, the vast majority (80-90%) of student feedback on the "Perspectives" elective was deemed to be positive convinced both the elective faculty and the JFSC senior leaders that the course content and presentations were on target (Attachments 4-8, 14). However, my own review of the "positive" student comments (Attachment 14, reference (h)) caused me to be concerned that some students may actually have taken the wrong message from the "Perspectives" elective. For example, one "positive" comment from JCWS Class 11-3 stated that the student liked

the "variety of speakers that independently confirmed and complimented each other's factual data about the true intent of Islam", and one "positive" comment from JCWS 11-4 stated that the student liked the fact that the "Perspectives" elective provided "blunt, unflinching truth, not worried about political correctness" (Attachment 14, reference (h)). In my view, such "positive" comments may indicate that students actually bought into the negative view of Islam presented by outside guest lecturers and that students may have come away believing that Islam itself is the problem vice the distortion of Islam by violent extremists. Rather than course vindication, such comments may indicate that the "Perspectives" elective actually failed to meet the CJCS's objectives as set forth in the SAE guidance on CVE, and validates the need for additional faculty-led discussions with students following outside guest lectures to ensure that course content is adequately analyzed and debated; and

4. The JFSC experienced substantial turmoil in its senior leadership positions during 2010 to early 2012, including the unplanned loss of a JFSC Chief of Staff (COS) and the departure of the JFSC Dean of Academic Affairs (Attachments 6-7, 14). This personnel turbulence, particularly the need to replace the COS from within JFSC's senior staff, resulted in a "daisy chain" in which four different individuals served as Interim or Acting Director, JCWS within one year (Attachments 6-7, 14). This does not excuse the lack of oversight of the "Perspectives" elective, but it does help explain why oversight of an individual elective course was not a top priority for the JFSC senior leadership during this period.

i. JFSC Response to Student Complaint. I find that there were no specific student complaints in 2011 about course content in the "Perspectives" elective other than general comments submitted by some students in post-course critiques. A March 2012 assessment by the JFSC's Institutional Research, Accreditation and Assessment Division (IRAAD) of student post-course critiques from the four "Perspectives" elective classes offered in 2011 showed that the majority of students felt that the elective met course objectives and supported the JFSC's mission, and that student comments reflected the controversial nature of the course, with many students saying the elective was a huge success and others identifying the course as being too one-sided (Attachment 14, reference (h)). This student feedback failed to raise any "red flags" and in fact convinced the elective faculty and JFSC senior leaders that the course content was probably about right (Attachments 4-8, 14). I find that the first specific student complaint about course content in the "Perspectives" elective was the complaint raised by Col David Cade, U.S. Air Force in early March 2012 during JCWS Class 12-1 (Attachments 3-9, 14). Col Cade raised specific concerns to the JFSC senior leadership- including the COS, D,DAA, and Director, JCWS- about

using outside guest lecturers like Mr. Stephen Coughlin and Mr. John Guandolo in the "Perspectives" elective, especially in light of the negative media attention that Coughlin/Guandolo had received in the fall of 2011 due to training they gave to the FBI (Attachments 3, 6-8, 14, 24, 26). Col Cade also raised specific concerns regarding the extreme hypotheticals used by LTC Dooley in the initial version 11 of his "Counter-Jihad Operational Design Model" dated July 2011, and about the fact that this model had been distributed to students on a CD-DVD (Attachments 3, 6-8, 12, 14, 24, 26). I find that JFSC did take appropriate actions to review and re-assess the "Perspectives" elective after receiving Col Cade's complaint, but that the JFSC's response, while appropriate, lacked a sufficient sense of urgency. Appropriate responsive actions taken by JFSC included directing the elective faculty to re-assess both the course content and the balance of outside guest lecturers (JFSC senior leaders were informed by the elective faculty that the "Counter-Jihad Operational Design Model" had already been modified several times to remove extreme hypotheticals and that more moderate guest lecturers were actively being sought to add to the lineup); directing IRAAD to re-assess the elective by reviewing all student post-course critiques from calendar year 2011; directing the Acting Director, JCWS to review the course content again with a view toward re-evaluating the course at a future JFSC Academic Board; and finally by briefing the JFSC Commandant on 17 April 2012, which resulted in the Commandant directing a review of the academic credentials of all outside guest lecturers, further removal of inflammatory material from the "Counter-Jihad Operational Design Model", evaluation of Imam Bashar as a potential moderate guest lecturer, and attendance by the Commandant and/or the Director, JCWS at all class sessions for the elective (Attachments 4-8, 12, 14, 24-26). These JFSC responsive actions were ongoing when the decision was made to suspend the elective pending the results of this preliminary inquiry. While I find that these JFSC actions were appropriate, I believe that they should have been carried out with a greater sense of urgency given the sensitivity of the subject and the fact that the model and other course materials had been distributed on CD-DVDs. I believe JFSC's more deliberate response was due in part to the fact that "Perspectives" was only a single elective within a much larger curriculum, and that JFSC senior leaders were not yet fully aware of either the past controversy surrounding Coughlin/Guandolo or the risk that CD-DVDs might go public despite any non-attribution policy.

4. Recommendations. In view of the foregoing findings regarding the JFSC's Perspectives on Islam and Islamic Radicalism course, I recommend:

a. That the "Perspectives on Islam and Islamic Radicalism" elective (#5812) not be offered again until it is significantly re-designed and greater oversight is provided to ensure accomplishment of course objectives. I believe that the course should be retained within the JFSC curriculum,

because senior military leaders still need to develop an understanding of the principal framework of U.S. CT strategy, including CVE, as they continue to combat Al-Qaida and its affiliates. However, the course should not be offered again without re-design and oversight. Specific recommendations for course re-design and greater oversight are as follows:

1. That specific course content be added to cover the principal framework of U.S. CT strategy, including CVE; the five elements of the DoD's role in CVE (security, information operations, humanitarian assistance, military-to-military contacts, and conduct of operations); and the National Implementation Plan (NIP) for U.S. CT strategy, with its four pillars (protect and defend the homeland, attack terrorist capabilities, CVE, and prevent terrorist acquisition of WMD);
 2. That reliance on outside guest lecturers be reduced as much as possible; that all outside guest lecturers for the course be re-vetted by the Director, JCWS for approval by the JFSC Commandant to ensure that they have appropriate credentials/subject matter expertise relevant to U.S. CT strategy and CVE; that the lineup of guest lecturers be balanced so as not to offer solely a negative view of various aspects of Islam; and that all guest lectures be followed immediately by robust, faculty-facilitated discussions to allow students to analyze and debate the material using an established baseline of knowledge of U.S. and DoD policy;
 3. That use of the "Counter-Jihad Operational Design Model" be discontinued, and that a different metric/student assessment tool (such as a research paper) be added to the course to allow instructors to evaluate student learning; and
 4. That regular oversight of course content and execution be provided by the JFSC Commandant; COS; Director, JCWS; and JCWS Curriculum Director to ensure accomplishment of course objectives. Annual reviews of the CJCS SAE guidance on CVE should also be conducted by the Director, JCWS and reported to the JFSC Commandant to ensure course content is and remains consistent with that guidance. While normally the faculty team is responsible for reviewing course content for consistency with CJCS SAE guidance, the "Perspectives" elective requires additional oversight by JFSC senior leaders due to the unique sensitivity of the subject matter.
- b. That JFSC's curriculum development policy (PD-8) be revised to provide greater clarity regarding authority to make specified levels of curriculum changes and the permitted scope of those curriculum changes or modifications. The current PD-8 guidance which states that Lesson Developers may make curriculum changes "that do not alter the intent of

the lesson", and that modifications that "are not considered major by the School Director" need not go to the JFSC Academic Board for review are subject to misinterpretation, since PD-8 contains no criteria on what constitutes "altering the intent of the lesson" or what types of curriculum changes are considered to be "major". The need for greater clarity on authority to make curriculum changes is especially true for elective courses, since JFSC considers elective faculty to be Course Directors and Lesson Developers as well.


c. That the Joint Staff Director, Joint Force Development (DJ7) consider recommending to CJCS that the OPMEP definition of academic freedom (CJCSI 1800.01D, Glossary) be revised to include language on the obligation of faculty members to practice responsible academic freedom, and that JFSC conduct re-training on current NDU and JFSC academic freedom policies to ensure that all military faculty members understand the concept of responsible academic freedom (i.e., that faculty members must exercise sound judgment, objectivity, and professionalism in their use and transmission of knowledge; that military faculty members must adhere to the unique requirements of their status as commissioned officers, such as adherence to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and to U.S./DoD core values; and that faculty members must present students with the essential content of a subject matter that professional standards would require to be presented). In addition, I recommend that JFSC conduct re-training on non-attribution to ensure that all military faculty members understand that JFSC faculty presentations of required course content on powerpoint slides are indeed attributable to the JFSC.

d. That JFSC improve its oversight of all elective courses, including elective course content and procedures for vetting/approval of outside guest lecturers. Recommend JFSC consider establishment of a specific "Curriculum Director-Electives" position to oversee the curriculum development of all elective courses, rather than dual-hatting the JCWS Curriculum Director with this responsibility.

e. That JFSC establish formal guidance for internal coordination of all Joint Staff actions received, to ensure that such actions will be coordinated with all appropriate JFSC offices with equities in the action. For example, any Joint Staff actions received by the JFSC's Dean of Academic Affairs directly from NDU should be routed to the JFSC Commandant's Office to ensure appropriate internal coordination in developing the JFSC response.

f. That LTC Dooley be removed as the Elective Lead and Lesson Developer for the "Perspectives" elective, and that he be assigned to other duties within JFSC until his PCS transfer to his next operational assignment (LTC Dooley will have served 22 months at JFSC in August 2012). I further recommend that LTC Dooley receive a formal counseling from the

Commandant of the JFSC. LTC Dooley admitted to using very poor judgment in his decision to use extreme hypotheticals in his "Counter-Jihad Operational Design Model" that were contrary to U.S. and DoD policy and values. LTC Dooley's stated intent was to use the extreme hypotheticals as a teaching tool to get students to analyze and debate the model. I believe LTC Dooley's statements that he did not in any way advocate or imply a personal or U.S./DoD advocacy of those extreme positions. LTC Dooley's intent was to improve the quality of instruction by inserting an assessment tool (albeit one he now understands was extremely flawed) into an elective course that was otherwise simply a guest lecture series. LTC Dooley then committed a second error in judgment by failing to personally review all electronic files that LtCol McKnelly downloaded from the archive portal site before these files were distributed to students on a CD-DVD. In contrast to these two lapses in judgment, LTC Dooley's performance has otherwise been superb: he is one of the most highly regarded military instructors within the JPME II core curriculum at JFSC, and as a combat-experienced armored cavalry officer LTC Dooley has been selected as an unslated principal on the command list. I have also considered that LTC Dooley reported to the JFSC as an instructor only four weeks after finishing JPME II himself (and having taken the same CVE elective as a student), and as an elective instructor was given little oversight, direction and guidance from his JCWS and JFSC senior leaders. I believe that LTC Dooley fully understands the judgment errors he made, and, if allowed, would continue to serve honorably having learned some very hard lessons.


FREDERICK S. RUDESHEIM
Major General, U.S. Army
Investigating Officer

References:

- a. DJ7 Memo, "Preliminary Inquiry" dated 23 April 2012

Attachments:

1. Appointing Order
2. Additional Findings of Fact
3. Summary of Interview with Col David Cade
4. Summary of Interview with LTC Matthew Dooley

5. Summary of Interview with LtCol Lawrence McKnelly
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10. Summary of Interview with CAPT Tony Califano
11. Summary of Interview with Dr. Brenda Roth
12. Summary of Interview with Dr. Linda McCluney
13. Summary of Interview with Dr. Kenneth Pisel
14. JFSC Self-Assessment: Perspectives on Islam and Islamic Radicalism Elective 5812 (with references (a)-(m))
15. JFSC DVD Containing Archived Electronic Files for Perspectives on Islam and Islamic Radicalism Elective 5812
16. March 2012 Syllabus and Lesson Guide for Perspectives on Islam and Islamic Radicalism Elective 5812
17. 2004-2012 Rosters for Perspectives on Islam and Islamic Radicalism Elective 5812
18. Version 11 of LTC Dooley's Counter-Jihad Operational Design Brief (July 2011) (with notes pages)
19. LTC Dooley's Instructor's Notes to Accompany the Counter-Jihad Operational Design Brief
20. Version 16 of LTC Dooley's Counter-Jihad Operational Design Brief (April 2012)
21. E-mail from Dr. Brenda Roth (NDU) dated 17 November 2011 (with JSAP attachment)
22. E-mail from Dr. Kenneth Pisel (JFSC) dated 18 November 2011
23. National Defense University's 2 December 2011 Response to Joint Staff Action # SJS 11-04328

24. E-mails between Col Cade and Mr. Fred Kienle (JFSC) dated 8, 13, and 14 March 2012
25. E-mails between Mr. David Diorio (JFSC) and Mr. Fred Kienle (JFSC) dated 16 April 2012
26. E-mails between Col Cade and JFSC Senior Leaders dated 13 March and 16 and 18 April 2012
27. E-mails between Col Cade and LTC Whitehead (OUSD(P)) dated 19 April 2012
28. LTC Whitehead (OUSD(P)) Info Memo dated 20 April 2012
29. Joint Staff J7 Info Paper dated 23 April 2012
30. Joint Staff Public Affairs Guidance for Suspension of the Elective Course on Islam at JFSC and Review of Professional Military Education (PME) Courses dated 23 April 2012
31. CJCS Memo CM-0098-12, "Review of Military Education and Training Curriculum" dated 24 April 2012
32. Commandant, JFSC Memo, "Policy Memorandum 12-04, Distribution of Curriculum CDs or DVDs" dated 27 April 2012
33. U.S. National Strategy for Counterterrorism dated June 2011
34. U.S. National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the U.S. dated August 2011
35. Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the U.S. dated December 2011
36. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Training Guidance and Best Practices" dated October 2011
37. National Defense University Policy on Academic Freedom (NDU Faculty Handbook) dated 19 November 2008
38. Middle States Commission on Higher Education, Accreditation Requirement on Academic Freedom (2006)
39. Excerpt on Academic Freedom from U.S. House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Armed Services Report dated April 2010

40. American Association of University Professors (AAUP) Article, "Freedom in the Classroom" (2007)

41. Excerpt on Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism (CIST) from 2005 Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Special Areas of Emphasis (SAEs)

42. Excerpt on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) from 2010 Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Special Areas of Emphasis (SAEs)

PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO THE JFSC'S PERSPECTIVES ON ISLAM AND ISLAMIC RADICALISM COURSE

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SPENCER ACKERMAN SECURITY 89.23.11

New Evidence of Anti-Islam Bias Underscores Deep Challenges for FBI’s Reform Pledge



A montage of some of the books at the FBI library at Quantico.

Following months of denials, the FBI is now promising a “comprehensive review of all training and reference materials” after Danger Room revealed a series of Bureau presentations that tarred average Muslims as “radical” and “violent.”





On January 11, the FBI’s Washington, D.C. Field Office held a seminar on Islamic extremism. In the conference room of its Judiciary Square offices, about 60 of the Field Office’s agents and intelligence analysts spent the morning hearing two presentations — one from terrorism expert Sebastian Gorka, a fellow with the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, and another from a self-identified expert on Islamic law, Stephen Coughlin, a former consultant to the military’s Joint Staff. The takeaway of Coughlin’s presentation, according to an attendee: Islam is out to take over the world and there is no such thing as a loyal American Muslim.

In this September 23, 2011 article, “New Evidence of Anti-Islam Bias Underscores Deep Challenge for FBI’s Reform Pledge,” in WIRED Magazine, Spencer Ackerman included a video of a presentation I gave, titled America at the Crossroads – 2010 to the CPAC related forum “Jihad and Islam for Freedom Defense Initiative.” It is presumed, therefore, that Ackerman reviewed the video. Yet, Ackerman characterized key briefing points as if they were conflated opinions or conspiracy theory based. For example;

- But Coughlin **allegedly** told the agents that Muslims believe Islamic law to be all-encompassing, preventing an either/or choice to U.S. Muslims: either reject the U.S. Constitution or fall into apostasy.
- He **explored an obscure** Islamic concept known as “abrogation,” the supposition that some Koranic verses supersede others, to argue that the Koran’s non-violent passages are overtaken in Muslim eyes by commands to wage war against “non-believers.”
- It’s a line Coughlin has **long pushed**. During a presentation at the Conservative Political Action Conference in 2010
- Coughlin **asserted** that the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the geopolitical organization of Muslim nations, has a “ten-year plan” to make “defamation of Islam a crime” worldwide.

From the very presentation Ackerman included in his article, the following slides demonstrate both an aversion to opinion based analysis and the factual basis for the positions briefed.





- But Coughlin *allegedly* told . . .
- It's a line Coughlin has *long pushed* . . .
- Coughlin *asserted* that . . .



A remnant of some of the books at the FBI library at Quantico.

Following months of denials the FBI is now promising a "comprehensive review of all training and reference materials" after Danger Room revealed a series of Bureau presentations that tarred average Muslims as "radical" and "violent."

Actually, I plead with professionals to undertake their own fact-based Analysis



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Slide 2

Not asking you to believe this presentation –

Rather just pointing that this is an issue of fact that can be resolved by way of direct analysis of peer reviewed and authoritatively approved English language translations of authoritative treatments on Islamic law!

There is the matter of the professional duty to know!

What is clear – even if this understanding of Islamic law is in error, it is still in error in EXACTLY the way the enemy in the WOT got it wrong and, hence, is still an accurate reflection of the enemy's stated threat doctrine

How about a return to fact driven analysis!

AMERICA
**** At Crossroad/2010 ****

Stephen Coughlin
Washington, DC
19 February 2010

- He explored an obscure Islamic concept known as “abrogation,” the supposition that some Koranic verses supersede others, to argue that the Koran’s non-violent passages are overtaken in Muslim eyes by commands to wage war against “non-believers.”




Slide 5

Abrogation Defined

- “The law was laid down in the period of the Prophet (peace be unto him) **gradually and in stages**. The aim was to bring a society steeped in immorality to observe the highest standards of morality. This could not be done abruptly. It was **done in stages**, and doing so necessitated **repeal** and **abrogation** of certain laws.”

Cited published Islamic Law



Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee
Islamic Jurisprudence



A montage of some of the books at the FBI library at Quantico. Following months of denials, the FBI is now promising a “comprehensive review of all training and reference materials” after Danger Room revealed a series of Bureau presentations that tarred average Muslims as “radical” and “violent.”




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Slide 6




**Abrogation and the
 “Extremist” Narrative Aligned**

- The **Qur'an** did not come down all at once; rather it came down according to the needs of the Islamic society in facing new problems, ...

It is a Qur'an which We have divided into parts from time to time, in order that though mightiest recite it to men at intervals: We have Revealed it by stages. 2317 (Qur'an 17:106)

Qutb, Milestones, 11.




That the Muslim Brotherhood expressly adopted

SPENCER ACKERMAN SECURITY 89.23.11

New Evidence of Anti-Islam Bias Underscores Deep Challenges for FBI's Reform Pledge

A montage of some of the books in the FBI library at Quantico.

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
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Slide 8

Quranic Basis to Abrogation

- *It is a Qur’an which We have divided into parts from time to time, in order that though mightiest recite it to men at intervals: We have Revealed it by stages.* ²³¹⁷ (Qur’an 17:106)

2317. [Qur’an Commentator different times and in different consistently as they do. A were also progressive. history. Man’s mind do prepared him for. Allah’s rev

That was the basis of Major Hasan’s Fort Hood Shooting


Hasan on Islam

Koran

- Koran was revealed 1400 hundred years ago(early 7th century AD)- the word of God.
- Progressive revelation: verses were revealed as situations/events presented
- Hadiths/Sira/Asbab nasool: aids in context and order.
- Rule of abrogation




16



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Slide 20

The Third Extraordinary Session of the Islamic Summit
 La Troisième Session Extraordinaire du Sommet Islamique
 Makka AlMukarama 7-8 December 2005

<http://www.oic-oci.org/ex-summit/english/10-years-plan.htm>

TEN-YEAR PROGRAMME OF ACTION
 TO MEET THE CHALLENGES FACING THE MUSLIM UMMAH
 IN THE 21ST CENTURY

THIRD EXTRAORDINARY SESSION OF
 THE ISLAMIC SUMMIT CONFERENCE

Makkah al Mukarramah - Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
 5-6 dhul qa'dah 1426 h, 7-8 December 2005

VII. Combating Islamophobia

1. Emphasize the responsibility of the international community, including all governments, to ensure respect for all religions and combat their defamation.
2. Affirm the need to counter **Islamophobia**, through the establishment of an observatory at the OIC General Secretariat to monitor all forms of Islamophobia,

That was briefed from the OIC's official document

Islamophobia.

3. Endeavor to have the **United Nations** adopt an international resolution to counter **Islamophobia**, and call upon all States to enact laws to counter it, including deterrent punishments.

U.S. Military Taught Officers: Use 'Hiroshima' Tactics for 'Total War' on Islam



In this September 23, 2011 article, "New Evidence of Anti-Islam Bias Underscored Deep Challenge for FBI's Reform Pledge," in WIRED Magazine, Spencer Ackerman included a video of a presentation I gave, titled America at the Crossroads – 2010 to the CPAC related forum "Jihad and Islam for Freedom Defense Initiative." A review of that video refuted all but one -

- "But Coughlin *allegedly* told the agents that Muslims believe Islamic law to be all-encompassing, preventing an either/or choice to U.S. Muslims: either reject the U.S. Constitution or fall into apostasy."

It turns out that on May 10, 2012, Ackerman posted another of my presentations that was stolen from the Joint Forces Staff College titled *Imposing Islamic Law – or – These aren't the Droids You're Looking for!*, JFSC Briefing, March 14, 2011 did address the issue Ackerman implies is conspiratorial.



6 / 8 Stephen Coughlin's presentation to the Joint Staff Forces College on "Imposing Islamic Law" (.pdf) began with a nod to Star Wars.

Imposing Islamic Law - or - These Aren't the Droids You're Looking For!

Stephen Coughlin
Joint Forces Staff College
Norfolk, VA
14 March 2011

Imposing Islamic Law
- or - These Aren't the Droids You're Looking For!

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Cited Published Islamic Law x 1

Slide 36

The “Complete Way of Life” is Governed by Islamic Law

Islam, it is generally acknowledged, is a “complete way of life” and at the core of this code is the law of Islam. This implies that a Muslim through his submission to Islam not only accepts the unity of Allah, the truth of the mission of Muhammad, but also agrees through a contract (*bay'ah*) with the Muslim community that his life be regulated in accordance with the *ahkam* of Allah, and in accordance with these *ahkam* alone. **No other sovereign or authority is acceptable to the Muslim, unless it guarantees the application of these laws in their entirety. Any other legal system, howsoever attractive it may appear on the surface, is alien for Muslims and is not likely to succeed in the solution of their problems; it would be doomed from the start. ... A comprehensive application of these laws, which flow directly or indirectly from the decrees (*ahkam*) of Allah, would mean that they should regulate every area of life, from politics to private transactions, from criminal justice to the laws of traffic, from ritual to international law, and from the laws of taxation and finance to embezzlement and white collar crimes. (50)**

ie; Rejects Democratic Principles

Imposing Islamic Law
- or - These Aren't the Droids You're Looking For!

Stephen Coughlin
 Joint Forces Staff College
 Norfolk, VA
 14 March 2011

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Cited Published Islamic Law x 2 (an American publication)


Slide 37

In other words, what distinguishes the *Shari'ah* from other laws is not that it excludes any aspect of human actions or sources of law, but that it directs humankind to worship God, and having done so, attempts to ensure that the rest of human laws do not conflict with this intent.

57-58-59 Islam, a Sacred Law

58 Islam, a Sacred Law

But justice and equity, and the concepts of right and wrong, can only be an extension of an attachment to God and abiding by His dictates. And since a *Shari'ah* is understood as a law with God at its center, it is not possible in principle to limit the *Shari'ah* to some aspects of human life and leave out others.



Qiblah Books, an imprint of Threshold Books, is committed to publishing works of spiritual significance and high literary quality on Islamic subjects. Threshold Books have sewn bindings and are printed on acid-free paper.

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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 ISBN: 0-899665-70-5
 Library of Congress Cataloging Card: 98-39350

224 p., 8 1/2"
 1. Islamic Law—Popular works
 2. Islam—Handbooks, manuals, etc.
 I. Abdul Rauf, Feisal.
 III. Title.
 PK6481.M48352 1998
 560.57—dc21

And in reading a typical compendium on Islamic law, you will notice that, having discussed the list of credal and specifically religious ritual topics given above, it goes on to deal with family or personal law (i.e., marriage, divorce, paternity, guardianship and succession and inheritance), then with the law of contracts, of civil wrongs and criminal law; followed by the law of evidence and of procedure, and with a multitude of other subjects, to a degree of detail that it covers even the rules of social etiquette, called *adab*. Even “Emily Post” issues are under the umbrella of the *Shari'ah*. The *Shari'ah* thus covers every field of law—public and private, national and international—together with enormous amounts of material that Westerners would not regard as law at all, because the basis of the *Shari'ah* is the worship of, and obedience to, God through good works and moral behavior. Following the Sacred Law thus *defines* the Muslim's belief in God.

Imposing Islamic Law
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The U.S. authored Constitutions (Afghanistan's and Iraq's) declaring that those Constitutions were subordinate to Islamic Law (making them shells)

Slide 39

Iraqi & Afghan Constitutions Refer to It!

Iraq

- **Section One, Article 2:**
 - **First:** Islam is the official religion of the State and it is a basic source of legislation:
 - **No law can be passed that contradicts the undisputed rules of Islam**

Afghanistan

- **Article 2 [Religions].**
 - (1) The religion of the state of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is the sacred religion of Islam
- **Article 3 [Law and Religion].**
 - In Afghanistan, **no law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of the sacred religion of Islam**

39

U.S. Military Taught Officers: Use 'Hiroshima' Tactics for 'Total War' on Islam




In the May 10, 2012 article, “U.S. Military Taught Officers: Use ‘Hiroshima’ Tactics for ‘Total War’ on Islam,” published in WIRED Magazine, Spencer Ackerman included images from a Power Point briefing dated March 14, 2011 titled “Imposing Islamic Law – or – These aren’t the Droids You’re Looking For!” WIRED Magazine also appended a link to a crude PDF version of the briefing. The briefing was stolen from the Joint Forces Staff College. In singling out the humorous “Complexification” slide, in his race to suggest an arrogant conspiracy theory frame of mind, he got it wrong -

- And Coughlin mocked those who didn't see this plot as clearly as he did, accusing them of "complexification."

The ‘Complexification’ slide transitioned the briefing to a concern regarding complexity narratives that hold that because “the world is so complex, all we can do is manage chaos’ and related memes.



6 / 8
Stephen Coughlin's presentation to the Joint Staff Forces College on "Imposing Islamic Law" (.pdf) began with a nod to Star Wars.




**Imposing Islamic Law
- or - These Aren't the Droids You're Looking For!**

Stephen Coughlin
Joint Forces Staff College
Norfolk, VA
14 March 2011

U.S. Military Taught Officers: Use 'Hiroshima' Tactics for 'Total War' on Islam



- And Coughlin mocked those who didn't see this plot as clearly as he did, accusing them of "**complexification.**"



7 / 8
A later slide from [Coughlin's presentation](#) (.pdf) made fun of people who didn't see Islam in the same way he did.

Slide 112

Complexification

(Not a real word but ... but not a professional analytical process either!)



Ohh Shteve! The world is sho **complex**, all I can do is manage **chaos** ...
... or take a **nap!**
... **ohhh!** But I'm just a **dog!**

**Imposing Islamic Law
- or - These Aren't the Droids You're Looking For!**

Stephen Coughlin
Joint Forces Staff College
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


7 / 8
A later slide from Coughlin's presentation (.pdf) made fun of people who didn't see Islam in the same way he did.

Slide 117a

**"Complexity"
You've heard it before!**

"The world is so complex, all we can do is manage the chaos!"



In the past the "world," whether in its physical or intellectual terms, was much smaller, simpler, and more orderly. It inspired credibility. Today everything is so complex as to be incomprehensible. What sense does it make

These are the days when man has his hands on the sublime while he is up to his hips in the muck of madness. ...

... The outcome of the hopelessness and despair is morbidity. There is a feeling of death hanging over the nation.

Imposing Islamic Law
- or - These Aren't the Droids You're Looking For!

Stephen Coughlin
 Joint Forces Staff College
 Norfolk, VA
 14 March 2011

NOAH SHACHTMAN AND SPENCER ACKERMAN SECURITY 05.10.12 1 AM

U.S. Military Taught Officers: Use 'Hiroshima' Tactics for 'Total War' on Islam

- And Coughlin mocked those who didn't see this plot as clearly as he did, accusing them of "**complexification.**"


Complexification
 (Not a real word but ... but not a professional analytical process either!)

7 / 9
 A later slide from Coughlin's presentation (.pdf) made fun of people who didn't see Islam in the same way he did.

Slide 117b

"Complexity"
 You've heard it before!

"The world is so complex, all chaos!"



The object of "complexity" is to move thinkers off the professional standard (legal factual) to one the services narratives ...

... designed to force a sense of hopelessness and despair borne of an ignorance of the very realities one choose not to understand!

Q: Is the bureaucratic obsession with "complexity" and "chaos" and indicator of successful ideological subversion?



Muslim pressure

Pro-Muslim officials at the Pentagon are putting political pressure on one of the U.S. military's most important specialists on Islamist extremism, according to defense officials.

Stephen Coughlin, a specialist on Islamic law on the Joint Staff, met recently with Hasham Islam, Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon R. England's close aide. The officials said Mr. Islam, a Muslim who is leading efforts for the Defense Department's outreach to Muslim groups, sought to convince Mr. Coughlin to take a softer line on Islam and Islamic law elements that promote extremism.

There is also evidence that a whispering campaign is under way to try and discredit Mr. Coughlin as a "Christian extremist with a pen" and force him out of the building, according to the officials.

Mr. Coughlin came under fire from pro-Muslim officials after a memorandum he wrote identified several groups that are being courted by Mr. Islam's community outreach program as front organizations for the pro-extremist Muslim Brotherhood.

Mr. Coughlin based the memorandum on documents released as evidence in a federal terrorism trial that he stated "are beginning to define the structure and outline of domestic jihad threat entities, associated nongovernmental organizations and potential terrorist or insurgent support systems."

Mr. Coughlin noted that the documents identified one of the Muslim Brotherhood front groups as the Islamic Society of North America, whose leaders were hosted by Mr. England in April at the Pentagon, raising concerns that the deputy defense secretary does not understand clearly the nature of the Islamist threat he is working against as the No. 2 official.

Mr. England has been a leading advocate of what critics in the Pentagon say is a misguided attempt to reach out to the wrong Muslims, regardless of their views, in an effort to counter Muslim extremism.

That approach has kept military and civilian officials from conducting much-needed assessments of how Muslim extremists are waging war because doing so would involving analysis of Muslim religious tenets, a politically taboo subject area.

A Pentagon spokesman had no immediate comment on the differences between Mr. Islam and Mr. Coughlin.



Coughlin backed

Some Pentagon and military leaders, along with lots of working-level officials, are quietly rallying to support ousted Joint Staff counterterrorism analyst Stephen Coughlin.

Pentagon officials said a number of generals and admirals who share Mr. Coughlin's well-reasoned assessment of the Islamic law underpinnings of Islamist terror are voicing support for the lawyer and former military intelligence official.

Mr. Coughlin was fired as a Joint Staff contractor after his confrontation with Hasham Islam, a special assistant to Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England, was reported here last month.

Mr. Islam, a Muslim, referred to Mr. Coughlin as a "Christian zealot with a pen" during the meeting several weeks ago, a slur rejected by Mr. Coughlin's supporters.

Critics of Mr. Coughlin are spreading word -- falsely -- that he is being let go because he talked out of school to the press. One official suggested the action was due to budget cuts.

But defense and military officials supportive of Mr. Coughlin said the real reason is that critics, like Mr. Islam, want him sidelined because they oppose his hard-to-refute views on the relationship between Islamic law and Islamist jihad doctrine. Those views have triggered a harsh debate challenging the widespread and politically correct view of Islam as a religion of peace hijacked by extremists.

"Steve Coughlin is the most knowledgeable person in the U.S. government on Islamic law," said retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Thomas McInerney. "The secretary of defense should ensure that he stays at DOD."

Another booster is Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Samuel Helland, commanding general of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Corps, who said in November that Mr. Coughlin's briefing for Marines bound for Iraq "hit the mark in explaining how jihadists use the Koran to justify their actions."

"Your presentation has armed service men and women with more intellectual ammunition to take the fight to the enemy," Gen. Helland said in a letter.

A U.S. Central Command analyst, Neal Harper, stated in an e-mail to friends, that if Mr. Coughlin is allowed to become a casualty in the war of ideas "then I'm deeply concerned about the future course of the war on terrorism."

"Ignoring Steve Coughlin's honest assessments and terminating his contract sets a dangerous and disturbing precedent," Mr. Harper stated. "We struggled for many years to get our heads around radical Islam, and Steve has been a leader in the effort."

Mr. Harper said Mr. Coughlin should be promoted, but instead "Hasham Islam is allowed to insult him publicly."

"How is it that he is allowed to call anyone a Christian zealot?" he asked. "This alone exposes his bias, his poor perception of Christians, and a complete lack of professionalism, at best. Should we instead be asking who is this guy and how did he get inside? Is he representative of those who are leading this Muslim outreach? Does Muslim outreach mean that we are not allowed to question or confront those we are trying to communicate with and the doctrine upon which they stand? When speaking the truth gets one fired, we all should be concerned and at the very least need to ask why."

Army Lt. Col. Joseph C. Myers, commandant's Army adviser at the Air Force Air Command and Staff College in Alabama, said in a letter posted on the Internet that the Joint Staff is losing its only Islamic law scholar if the firing stands.

(continued)

Col. Myers said Mr. Coughlin should continue to educate the military for the war on terrorism. "If we don't understand the war and the enemy we are engaged against, we remain vulnerable and we cannot win," he stated.

Unlike during the Cold War, when Soviet war-fighting doctrine dominated his education at West Point, "can anyone show me where the equivalent of the Soviet threat doctrine series for the global war on terror is published?" he asked. "It has not been done."

Col. Myers said the military is fighting a war that "from doctrinal perspective, we fundamentally do not understand."

Mr. Myers also stated that U.S. counterintelligence failures should lead people to "wonder and question the extent we are in fact penetrated in government and academia by foreign agents of influence, the Muslim Brotherhood, Islamists and those who truly in essence do not share our social compact."

Analysts threatened

The firing of Joint Staff counterterrorism analyst Stephen Coughlin also is having a negative impact throughout the U.S. intelligence and counterterrorism community.

Analysts are watching closely to see if the firing of the Islamic law specialist over his views of the Islamist law basis for extremism will be allowed to stand and thus hamper the production of honest intelligence analysis of terrorist threats throughout the 16-agency community.

Officials critical of Mr. Coughlin's firing, following a verbal confrontation with Hasham Islam, a special assistant to Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England, said he is being punished for telling the truth.

"The analyst now sees two threats to their work: the enemy and the uninformed policy-maker," said one analyst.

Officials said that if the situation had been reversed and an analyst who supported politically correct Muslim outreach programs by the U.S. government were fired, the hue and cry would have been loud inside government and within the press.

Instead, Mr. Coughlin, who has questioned whether such outreach programs are legitimizing extremist front groups and their supporters, has received little support from senior Bush administration policy-makers, the Congress, or the liberal news media.

<https://www.nationalreview.com/2008/01/questions-pentagon-jrinternet/>

Questions for the Pentagon

By Claudia Rosett

January 25, 2008 | National Review

Who is Hesham Islam?

In the sorry tradition of shooting the messenger, the Pentagon is cashiering its top expert on Islamist doctrine, Stephen Coughlin. Some members of Congress are now contemplating hearings to ask why. Along with drawing attention to Coughlin's research, now circulating on the Internet, the growing controversy has thrown a spotlight on Coughlin's alleged nemesis at the Pentagon, a top aide named Hesham Islam — whose tale deserves closer attention. Not least, as a reporter for the Armed Forces Press Service observed last year, it would make a great Hollywood blockbuster.

Certainly there are subplots here that seem made for the movies, including tales of Islam, in his youth, living through an air raid in Egypt, a ship sinking in the Arabian Sea, and now, years later, this scuffle under the Pentagon rug over how to deal with the chief threat to America today — Islamic extremism.

Hesham Islam is a native Arabic speaker, a Muslim, born in 1959 in Cairo and schooled in Saddam Hussein's Iraq. In 1980 he immigrated to the U.S. From 1985-2005 he served in the U.S. Navy, rising to the mid-level officer rank of commander. At some point after former defense-industry executive Gordon England joined the Bush administration as secretary of the Navy, in 2001, Islam went to work on his staff. In 2005, when England, after a stint in Homeland Security took over from Paul Wolfowitz in the Defense Department's number two slot of deputy secretary, Islam came with him.

In England's office, Islam's official title is special assistant for international affairs. In that capacity he pops up as a man-about-town in Washington, making the rounds of embassies. But Islam also works as England's point man for Pentagon outreach programs to Muslim groups. These include organizations such as the Islamic Society of North America, or ISNA, with whom Islam and England have forged ties — attending ISNA conventions, and hosting ISNA delegations at Pentagon events, and in England's office.

That's alarming to some, such as terrorism expert Steven Emerson, executive director of the Investigative Project on Terrorism, who, for more than a decade, has been tracking

Islamic extremist networks in the U.S. In a recent appearance on Fox News, Emerson described Hesham Islam as, in his view, "an Islamist with a pro-Muslim Brotherhood bent who has brought in groups to the Pentagon who have been unindicted co-conspirators."

Emerson was apparently referring to ISNA, named last summer by the Department of Justice as a member of the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood and an unindicted co-conspirator in the case of the Holy Land Foundation, an Islamic charity indicted in 2005 in Dallas federal court for allegedly providing millions of dollars to the terrorist group Hamas (itself an outgrowth of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood). ISNA, in a press statement, says it "remains unjustly branded by the government as an unindicted co-conspirator." (The Holy Land Foundation case resulted in a mistrial last fall, and is expected to be re-tried).

But whatever Emerson's worries, Islam's boss, Gordon England, apparently can't praise Hesham Islam and his work enough. In public statements over the past year, England has described Islam as "my personal close confidante," "my interlocutor," a man who "represents me to the international community," and "assists me in my own outreach efforts." Photos taken on the Washington's diplomatic reception circuit show England and Islam side-by-side, chatting up contacts. Last October, England described Islam to a Pentagon in-house reporter as a man with "wonderful friendships and relationships" which allow Islam to "give me extraordinarily good advice in dealing with countries and people." England added, "I take his advice, and I listen to him all the time."

As for the Pentagon's soon-to-be-evicted Stephen Coughlin, who sits well below Islam on the Defense totem pole — he is a lawyer by training, and a major in the U.S. Army Reserve. On contract with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Coughlin made it his mission to set aside the feel-good assumptions about Islam which have been guiding U.S. strategy, and take an unblinkered look at facts.

In a [thesis](#) accepted last year by the National Defense Intelligence College, entitled "To Our Great Detriment: Ignoring What Extremists Say About Jihad," Coughlin came up with heavily documented findings that Islamic law, to a dangerous extent, supports the global spread of Islamic extremism, through both violent and non-violent means. In presentations to the military, based in part on court documents connected to the case of the Holy Land Foundation, Coughlin warned of Muslim Brotherhood plans to subvert the U.S. system via front groups, and "destroy western civilization from within."

And then, Coughlin got the shove. Earlier this month, he was told that his contract with the Joint Chiefs of Staff will not be renewed when it expires in March. Why? According to Bill Gertz of the *Washington Times*, who on Jan. 4 broke the story of Coughlin's ouster,

Coughlin ran afoul of a Pentagon "key aide" named Hesham Islam. Attributing his information to unnamed "officials," Gertz, who in a series of subsequent articles has stood by his story, alleged that Hesham Islam at a Pentagon meeting late last year sought to have Coughlin soften his views, and called him a "Christian zealot or extremist 'with a pen'" — or words to that effect.

Pentagon officials say it never happened. In England's office, the special assistant for public relations, retired Navy Captain Kevin Wensing, says he was at the meeting, but that there was no confrontation, and Islam had nothing to do with Coughlin's ouster. Wensing also forwarded to me a statement put out by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that "Mr. Coughlin will have successfully completed the terms of his contract. Therefore, there was no need to exercise the option to extend or renew the contract."

Who's right? A request to the Defense Department press office to interview Coughlin runs straight into a brick wall. A press officer says that under terms of his not-quite-expired contract, Coughlin is "prohibited from speaking to the media."

Hesham Islam appears to be under no such constraints. He gave an interview last year to ABC News, in which he talked about the hardships of being a Muslim in the military, saying that "Since 9/11, I no longer have a land line. I only work with my cell phone, because I got a lot of hate messages on the phone."

For this article, however, Islam — according to a spokesman — was "not interested in an interview." Nor would England's office provide anyone willing to answer any detailed questions about Hesham Islam for direct attribution. Instead, after some discussion, an arrangement was finally offered in which a "Pentagon spokesman" would field questions, forward them to Islam, and relay any replies.

For more information, the spokesman recommended a [profile](#) of Islam, released October 15, 2007 by the Armed Forces Press Service under the headline: "Senior Advisor to Deputy Secretary Focuses on Relationship Building." Still available on the Defense web site, the article includes an interview with Islam, some of the praise from England quoted above, and a photo of Islam, flashing a tight smile, seated in his shirtsleeves at his Pentagon desk, next to a bulletin board decked with diplomatic invitations.

But this Pentagon-endorsed profile raises more questions than it answers. It begins: "If Hesham Islam's life story was translated into a screenplay — and it's got all the makings of a Hollywood blockbuster — the director would be hard-pressed to come up with a more compelling chain of events landing him as a top adviser to the deputy defense secretary."

As told by Islam to the reporter, "The movie would open with Islam as a young boy growing up in Cairo, Egypt, huddling in terror as Israeli bombs came raining down, demolishing much of the building around him and his family."

There's one problem with this scene. As far as I have been able to discover, Israel during Hesham Islam's entire lifetime has never bombed Cairo. Asked to explain this, the Pentagon spokesman duly conferred with Islam, and relayed to me by phone that Islam says this building-wrecking bombing raid took place during the 1967 Six-Day War. But as for details that might substantiate the when and where in Cairo of this graphic scene, Islam "Doesn't remember. He was seven years old."

It is of course possible that Islam was privy to a piece of history with which expert historians on the region are not acquainted. But if this tale is based solely on the unsubstantiated impressions of Islam as a seven-year-old, then what is it doing on the U.S. Defense Department website? Queries I have made to a number of experts in Tel Aviv, the U.S., and Cairo itself all get the same reply: It didn't happen. According to Michael Oren, author of the extensively researched *Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East*, Israel during the Six-Day War struck the Cairo airport, but "Israel did not bomb any residential areas of Cairo."

The profile continues: "Next would be the scene of the teenager who moves to Iraq when his Egyptian naval officer father is transferred to help establish the Arabian Gulf naval academy Islam would later attend."

That family move to Iraq came as Saddam Hussein was consolidating his Baathist rule, though neither the Pentagon profile nor Hesham Islam's Pentagon biography any makes mention of that context. In answer to questions, the Pentagon spokesman says Islam's father was invited to Iraq by Saddam Hussein, but the spokesman doesn't know when: "It was in 1971-1973 time frame." Surely with Pentagon background checks, more exact information would be easily available? "It's available," says the spokesman, but "I don't have his C.V. kind of thing."

The profile goes on to describe young Hesham Islam as a "merchant mariner adrift for three days in the Arabian Sea after an Iranian torpedo sunk his 16,000-ton cargo ship, drowning all but Islam and four of his crewmates."

That sounds memorable. But after more than a week of my repeated requests made by phone and e-mail, the Pentagon spokesman — despite being presumably in touch with Islam himself — was either unable or unwilling to provide such basic information as the name of the ship, or the date of its sinking. He just kept saying he was "looking into it." But no answers.

Before I began the marathon requests for specific information, the spokesman had speculated earlier, based on conversations with Islam, that the ship might have been called the *Ibn Khaldoon*, which might have been registered to the Iraqi merchant marine, and might have sunk sometime in 1979. A check with the U.K.-based Lloyd's Register turns up two cargo ships registered in Iraq during that time and under that name, but no record that either was ever sunk, either in the 1970s, the 1980s, or beyond. One is still in service; the other was broken up — and not by a torpedo — only a few years ago.

As for records of any incident fitting the generic description of a 16,000-ton cargo ship, under any flag, torpedoed by the Iranians and sunk in the Arabian Sea before Islam immigrated to the U.S. sometime in 1980 (the Pentagon spokesman can't or won't say exactly when in 1980), after searching news archives, shipping records, and consulting a number of naval historians, I have yet to come across anything that corroborates Islam's Iranian-torpedo-in-the-Arabian-Sea story. There were ships sunk by the Iranians in 1980, as the Iran-Iraq war broke out — but that was happening in the Gulf, around the Shatt-al-Arab, on the other side of the Straits of Hormuz, hundreds of miles from the Arabian Sea.

It is of course possible that this torpedoing, ship sinking, and rescue took place exactly as described in the Defense profile. But having showcased the scene for public consumption, why won't Gordon England's office provide basic factual information that could confirm this story? Does Hesham Islam not remember that, either? Does no one at Defense have it on file?

In 1980, according to the profile, Islam immigrated to the U.S. to get married, being suddenly love-smitten after receiving a photo of an American pen pal with whom he had been corresponding sight-unseen for more than three years. For the next five years he worked in what the spokesman describes as the "food services" industry. In 1985 he joined the Navy as an electronics technician in the submarine service. According to his Pentagon biography, he went on to serve on a number of ships, in largely technical and operational posts, before hooking up with Gordon England and finally arriving at his current job in the Pentagon.

So, what qualifies Islam to serve as an adviser to whom Gordon England listens all the time, and whose advice England takes? According to Kevin Wensing, England's public-affairs aide: "Mr. Islam brings 20 years of experience in the U.S. Navy and international relations to his current assignment."

This includes an M.A. in national-security affairs, awarded in 1992 at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif. For this degree, Islam wrote a 139-page thesis about the Middle East, entitled "Roots of Regional Ambition." In it, he devoted dozens of

pages to lambasting Israel, and the influence of American Jews on U.S. politics. He deplored "Israeli activities which have detrimentally affected U.S. objectives but which have continued with impunity." He argued that U.S. support for Israel "has negatively affected the attainment of U.S. objectives in the Middle East." He blamed the influence of American Jews on U.S. policy for a host of ills, ranging from Arab "retaliation" against Americans, to jobs lost overseas, to hampering sales of "defensive arms to friendly Arab states."

Whether Gordon England (or Defense Secretary Robert Gates, for that matter) considers such views a relevant qualification for Islam's current duties is unclear. But what's emerging at the Pentagon is a landscape in which Stephen Coughlin's insistence on crafting doctrine based not on politically correct assumptions, but on facts, is apparently deemed a bridge too far. Meanwhile, from the office of Deputy Secretary England, Hesham Islam continues his bridge building. The question isn't just whom to believe, but who's running this show?

— *Claudia Rosett is a journalist-in-residence with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.*

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ
الحمد لله رب العالمين و الصلاة و السلام على سيد المرسلين

مذكرة تفسيرية

للهدف الإستراتيجي العام للجماعة في أمريكا الشمالية

١٩٩١/٥/٢٢

المحتويات :

- ١- مقدمة في التفسير .
- ٢- مفهوم التوطين .
- ٢- عملية التوطين .
- ٤- مؤسسات التوطين الشاملة .

GOVERNMENT
EXHIBIT
003-0085
3:04-CR-240-G
U.S. v. HLF, et al.

ISE-SW 1B10/ 0000413

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
الحمد لله رب العالمين و العاقبة للمتقين

التاريخ : ٢٢ / ٥ / ١٩٩١

الأخ الحبيب / فضيلة المسؤول العام حفظه الله .

الأخ الحبيب / أمين مجلس الشورى حفظه الله .

الأخوة الاحبة / أعضاء مجلس الشورى حفظهم الله .

السلام عليكم ورحمة الله و بركاته ... و بعد

أتمنى على الله تعالى أن تكونوا و أهليكم و من تحبون ممن حولكم على أحسن حال ترضيه عز و جل .
أتوجه اليكم بخطابي هذا راجيا أن يحظى اهتمامكم و ينال حسن رعايتكم فأنتم أهل المسؤولية و أصحاب
الأمانة . بين أيديكم « مذكرة تفسيرية » اجتهدت في تدوينها حتى لا تبنى حبيسة الصدر و العقل . و لكي
أشارككم جزءاً من المسؤولية الملقاة على عواتقنا في قيادة الجماعة في هذه البلاد .
و لعلّ الذي شجعني على أن أتقدم بالمذكرة في هذا الوقت بالذات هو احساسني « ببارقة أمل » و اشراقه خير
تبشر بأننا بدأنا ندخل مرحلة جديدة من مراحل العمل الاسلامي في هذه القارة .
و الأوراق التي بين أيديكم ليست ترفاً زائداً أو خيالات و هواجس مرّت في مخيلة أحد إخوانكم . و إنما هي
آمال و طموحات و تحديات أرجو أن تشاركونني فيها أو معظمها . و لا أتمنى لها العصاة و الصواب المطلق .
و إنما هي اجتهاد يحتاج منكم الى دراسة و نظر و تفصيل و تأصيل .
و طلبي من إخواني... أن يقرأوا المذكرة و يكتبوا ما شاءوا من تعليقات و تصويبات . مع العلم أن الذي بين
أيديكم ليس غريباً أو طرحاً جديداً منبثقاً لا أصل له . و إنما هو محاولة لتفسير و شرح بعض ما جاء في
الخطبة بعيدة المدى . و التي اعتمدها و أقرناها في مجلسنا و مؤتمرننا عام (١٩٨٧) .
فلا تعجل أخي الكريم بإلقاء هذه الاوراق بعيداً لكثرة انشغالك و همومك .. كل الذي أطلبه منك أن تقرأها و
تعلق عليها . علّنا نستكمل مع بعضنا مشروع خطتنا و عملنا الاسلامي في هذه البقعة من العالم . و لكن
فعلت لأكوننّ لك من الشاكرين الممتنين .
كما و أرجو من أخي الكريم أمين المجلس حفظه الله أن يدرج موضوع المذكرة على جدول أعمال المجلس في
اجتماعه القادم .

و جزاكم الله خيراً و حفظكم ذخراً لدعوته

أخوكم / محمد أكرم

(١)

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
الحمد لله رب العالمين و العاقبة للمتقين

الموضوع : مشروع لمذكرة تفسيرية للهدف الاستراتيجي العام للجماعة في أمريكا الشمالية
الوارد في الخطة بعيدة المدى .

أولاً : تستند هذه المذكرة الى :

- ١- الهدف الاستراتيجي العام للجماعة في أمريكا و المعتمد من قبل مجلس الشورى و المؤتمر التنظيمي لعام [١٩٨٧] و هو « تمكين الاسلام في أمريكا الشمالية أي : ايجاد حركة اسلامية فعالة و مستقرة بقيادة الاخوان المسلمين . تتبنى قضايا المسلمين محليا و عالميا . و تعمل على توسيع القاعدة الاسلامية الملتزمة . و تهدف الى توحيد و توجيه جهود المسلمين . و تطرح الاسلام كبديل حضاري . و تدعم دولة الاسلام العالمية أينما كانت » .
- ٢- الاولوية المعتمدة من قبل مجلس الشورى لعمل الجماعة في دورته الحالية و السابقة و هي: « التوطين » .
- ٣- تطور العلاقة ايجابيا مع الاخوة في السلكة الاسلامية في محاولة الوصول الى الوحدة الاندماجية .
- ٤- الحاجة الدائمة للتفكير و التخطيط المستقبلي و محاولة استشرافه و العمل على « تطويع » الحاضر ليستجيب و يتلائم مع احتياجات و تحديات المستقبل .
- ٥- ورقة الاخ فضيلة المسؤول العام حفظه الله التي أرسلها مؤخراً الى أعضاء المجلس .

ثانياً : مقدمة في مذكرة التفسير :

- لكي نبدأ بالتفسير لابد من « استحضار » السؤال الاتي و - وضعه نصب أعيننا لأن علاقته مهمة و لازمة بالهدف الاستراتيجي و بمشروع التفسير الذي نحن بصدده- . و السؤال هو : « كيف تصب أن ترى حركة الاسلام في أمريكا الشمالية بعد عشرة أعوام ؟ » أو « استصحاب » الجملة التالية -عند التخطيط و العمل- و هي : « العمل الاسلامي في أمريكا الشمالية عام (٢٠٠٠) : رؤية استراتيجية » .
- و لابد -أيضا- من إستحضار و إستصحاب « عناصر » الهدف الاستراتيجي العام للجماعة في أمريكا الشمالية و سأكررها « مرقمة » متعمداً و هي :
- [١- ايجاد حركة اسلامية فعالة و مستقرة بقيادة الاخوان المسلمين .
- ٢- تبني قضايا المسلمين محليا و عالميا .
- ٣- توسيع القاعدة الاسلامية الملتزمة .
- ٤- توحيد و توجيه جهود المسلمين .

(٢)

٥- طرح الاسلام كبديل حضاري .

٦- دعم إقامة دولة الاسلام العالمية أينما كانت [.

- و لابد من التأكيد على أنه أصبح من الواضح و من « المعلوم من الواقع بالضرورة » أن الجميع متفقون على أننا نريد أن « نوطن » أو « نمكّن » الاسلام و حركته في هذه البقعة من الارض .
- فلا بد - إذن - من تبني فهماً مشتركاً لمداول التوطين أو التمكين . نفسّر في سياقه و على أساسه الهدف الاستراتيجي العام - بمناصره الستة - للجماعة في أمريكا الشمالية .

ثالثاً : مفهوم التوطين :

وردت هذه الكلمة في « معجم » و وثائق الجماعة بمصطلحات متعددة . بالرغم من أن الجميع قصد بها أمراً واحداً . و نعتقد أن الفهم في المضمون مشترك . و سنحاول هنا تفسير الكلمة و « مرادفاتها » تفسيراً عملياً ذو دلالة حركية واقعية و ليس تفسيراً لفوياً فلسفياً . مع التأكيد أن تفسيرنا لا يكتمل الا بعد استيعاب تفسيرنا « لعملية » التوطين ذاتها و التي ترد في الفقرة اللاحقة . فنقول بإختصار ما يلي :

التوطين - « ان يكون الاسلام و حركته جزءاً من الوطن الذي يحيا فيه » .
التأسيس - « ان يتحول الاسلام الى مؤسسات ثابتة الاركان تقوم عليها قواعد الحضارة و البناء و الشهود » .
الاستقرار - « ان يكون الاسلام مستقراً في الارض التي يتحرك عليها اهله » .
التمكين - « ان يكون الاسلام متمكناً من نفوس و عقول و حياة اهل البلد الذي يتحرك فيه » .
التأصيل - « ان يكون الاسلام أصيلاً و ليس طارناً أي متأصلاً «متجذراً» في تربة البقعة التي يتحرك عليها و ليس نهبتاً غريباً عنها » .

رابعاً : عملية التوطين :

- و لكي يكون الاسلام و حركته « جزءاً من الوطن » الذي يحيا فيه و « مستقراً » في ارضه و « متأصلاً » في نفوس و عقول أهله و « متمكناً » من حياة مجتمعه و له « مؤسسات » ثابتة الأركان يقوم عليها البناء الاسلامي و يتحقق بها الشهود الحضاري . فلا بد أن تخطط الحركة و تجاهد من أجل امتلاك « مفاتيح » و أدوات هذه العملية لإنجاز المهمة العظيمة كمسؤولية « جهادية حضارية » تقع على عاتق المسلمين و على رأسهم الاخوان المسلمين في هذه البلاد . و من هذه المفاتيح و الأدوات ما يلي :

١- تبني مفهوم التوطين و ادراك دلالاته العملية :

ركّزت المذكرة التفسيرية على البعد الحركي و الواقعي لمفهوم عملية التوطين و على دلالاتها العملية دون الالتفات الى الاختلاف في الفهم بين من هو المقيم و غير المقيم ؟ أو من هو المستوطن أو غير المستوطن؟

(٢)

و نعتقد أن الذي جاء في الخطة بعيدة المدى بهذا الصدد فيه الكفاية .

٢- إحداهن نقلة نوعية في منهجية تفكيرنا و عقليتنا لتتناسب مع تحديات مهمة التوطين : المقصود بأحداث النقلة - و هو تعبير ايجابي - هو الاستجابة للتحديات الكبيرة لمهمة التوطين . و نعتقد أن أية استجابة تغييرية تبدأ بمنهج التفكير و مركزه العقل أولاً . و لكي يتضح ما نقصد بالنقلة التي ننادي بها كمفتاح يؤهلنا لخوض ميدان التوطين . نقول باختصار شديد ...أن يتحقق :

- الانتقال من عقلية التفكير الجزئي الى عقلية التفكير الشمولي .
- الانتقال من عقلية التخطيط الجزئي «المبتور» الى عقلية التخطيط الشمولي «المتواصل» .
- الانتقال من عقلية الحذر و التحفظ الى عقلية المجازفة و التحرر المنضبط .
- الانتقال من عقلية تنظيم النخبة الى عقلية التنظيم الشعبي .
- الانتقال من عقلية الوعظ و الارشاد الى عقلية البناء و الإشهاد .
- الانتقال من عقلية احادية الرأي الى عقلية تعددية الرأي .
- الانتقال من عقلية التصادم الى عقلية الاستيعاب .
- الانتقال من عقلية الفرد الى عقلية الفريق .
- الانتقال من عقلية الترقب الى عقلية المبادرة .
- الانتقال من عقلية التردد الى عقلية الحسم .
- الانتقال من عقلية المبادئ الى عقلية البرامج .
- الانتقال من عقلية الافكار المجردة الى عقلية المؤسسات الحقيقية [و هنا بيت القصيد و لب المذكرة] .

٣- فهم المراحل التاريخية التي مرّ بها العمل الاسلامي الاخواني في هذه البلاد :
يمتد كاتب المذكرة أن فهم و استيعاب المراحل التاريخية للعمل الاسلامي الذي قاده و يقوده الاخوان المسلمين في هذه القارة مفتاح مهم جداً في العمل من أجل التوطين . تلحظ من خلاله الجماعة سيرها و اتجاه حركتها و منحنيات و منعطفات دربها . و سنكتفي هنا بذكر عنوان [العنوان هنا يعبر عن السمة الغالبة للمرحلة] كل مرحلة من هذه المراحل [و لعل التفصيل يكون في دراسة مستقبلية أخرى] . و أغلب الظن أن المراحل هي :

- أ- مرحلة البحث عن الذات و تحديد الهوية .
- ب- مرحلة البناء الداخلي و إحكام التنظيم .
- ج- مرحلة المساجد و المراكز الاسلامية .
- د- مرحلة انشاء المؤسسات الاسلامية -الطور الاول - .
- هـ- مرحلة انشاء المدارس الاسلامية -الطور الاول- .

(٤)

و- مرحلة التفكير في الحركة الاسلامية العلنية -الطور الاول- .
ز- مرحلة الانفتاح على الحركات الاسلامية الاخرى و محاولة الوصول الى صيغة للتعامل معها -الطور الاول-
ح- مرحلة احياء و استكمال انشاء المؤسسات الاسلامية -الطور الثاني- :
نعتقد أن الجماعة على أبواب هذه المرحلة في طورها الثاني فعليها أن تدلف الباب و تدخله كما دخلته أول مرة .

٤- فهم طبيعة دور الاخ المسلم في أمريكا الشمالية :

إنّ عملية التوطين « عملية جهادية حضارية » بما تحمل الكلمة . و لابد أن يستوعب الاخوان أن عملهم في أمريكا هو نوع من أنواع الجهاد العظيم في إزالة و هدم المدنية او الحضارة الغربية من داخلها و «تخريب» بيوتها الشقيّة بأيديهم و أيدي المؤمنين لكي يتم جلاؤهم و يظهر دين الله على الدين كله . و دون هذا المستوى من الاستيعاب ، فاننا دون التحدي و لنا نعدّ أنفسنا للجهاد بعد . فقدر المسلم ان يجاهد و يعمل حيثما كان و حيثما حلّ حتى قيام الساعة و لا مفرّ من هذا القدر الا لمن اختار القعود .. و لكن هل يستوي القاعدون و المجاهدون .

٥- ادراك أننا لانستطيع أن نقوم بمهمة التوطين بمفردنا أو بمعزل عن الناس :

إنّ مهمة بهذه الجسامة و الضخامة كحمة التوطين ، تحتاج الى جهود عظيمة و مضيّة ، و لن يستطيع الاخوان - بإمكاناتهم و مواردهم البشرية و المالية و العملية - أن يقوموا بهذه المهمة بمفردهم أو بمعزل عن الناس ، و الذي يعتقد هذا فهو مخطئ و الله أعلم . أما دور الاخوان فهو المبادرة و الريادة و القيادة و رفع الراية و دفع الناس بهذا الاتجاه . ثم يعملون على توظيف و توجيه و توحيد جهود و قوى المسلمين لهذه العملية . و من أجل ذلك لابد أن يتعمق عندنا فقه « التحالفات » و فن « الاستيعاب » و أدب « التعاون » .

٦- ضرورة تحقيق المزاجية و الاندماجية المتدرجة المتوازنة بين العمل الخاص و العمل العام :

نظن أن ما كُتِب حول هذا الموضوع كثير و فيه الكفاية و لكن يحتاج منا الى تأطير زمني و عملي بحيث يتحقق المطلوب بشكل متدرج و متوازن و متواكب مع متطلبات عملية التوطين .

٧- القناعة بأن نجاح توطين الاسلام و حركته في هذه البلاد هو نجاح للحركة الاسلامية العالمية و اسناد حقيقي للدولة المنشودة بإذن الله تعالى :

هناك فهم - تخالفه هذه المذكرة - و هو أن تركيز عملنا في محاولة توطين الاسلام في هذه البلاد سيؤدي الى تفسيرنا و إخلالنا بدورنا في أداء واجبنا تجاه الحركة الاسلامية العالمية في دعم مشروعها في قيام الدولة . نعتقد أن الاجابة من شقين : الاول - ان نجاح الحركة في أمريكا باقامة قاعدة اسلامية ملتزمة ذات قوة و فعالية و تأثير سيكون خير عون و دعم و اسناد لمشروع الحركة العالمية .

(٥)

و الثاني_ هو أن الحركة العالمية لم تنجح بعد في « توزيع الأدوار » على فروعها فتحدد لهم المطلوب منهم كأحد المشاركين أو المساهمين في مشروع قيام الدولة الإسلامية العالمية . و يوم أن يتم هذا فسيكون لابناء الفرع الاخواني الامريكي أيادٍ و مواقف بيضاء يفخر بها الآباء .

٨- استيعاب المسلمين و كسبهم بكل فئاتهم و ألوانهم في أمريكا و كندا لصالح مشروع التوطين و جعله قضيتهم و مستقبلهم و أساس حياتهم الإسلامية في هذه البقعة من العالم :

هذه المسألة تحتاج منا الى « فقه للتعامل مع الاخرين » . فالناس معادن و الناس كإهل مائة . نحن نحتاج الى اعتماد المبدأ الذي يقول « خذ من كل الناس ..أفضل ما عندهم » ، أفضل ما عندهم من تخصصات و خبرات و فنون و طاقات و كفاءات . و المقصود بالناس هنا من داخل الصف أو خارجه من الافراد و المؤسسات . و سياسة « الأخذ » تكون بما يحقق خدمة الهدف الاستراتيجي و عملية التوطين . و لكن التحدي الكبير الذي أمامنا هو : كيف نربطهم جميعا في « فلك » خطتنا و «دائرة» حركتنا لتحقيق «مناط» مصلحتنا ؟ و ليس لنا خيار - في ظني - الا التحالف و التفاهم مع من يرغب في ملتنا . و يرضى بمذهبنا في العمل . و الساحة الإسلامية الأمريكية مليئة بهؤلاء ينتظرونالرواد .

المهم أن نوصل الناس الى مستوى ادراك التحدي الذي أمامنا كمسلمين في هذا البلد و الاقتناع بمشروعنا في التوطين . و ادراك مصلحة اللقاء و التعاون و التحالف . حينها لو طلبنا المال سيأتي طائلاً ، و لو طلبنا الرجال لجاؤا صفواً . المهم أن تكون خطتنا هي « المعيار و الميزان » في علاقاتنا مع الاخرين . و هنا ينبغي تسهيل نقطتين . الاولى : نحن بحاجة الى ادراك و فهم موازين القوى الإسلامية على الساحة الأمريكية [و لعل هذا يكون مشروع دراسة مستقبلية] . و النقطة الثانية : ان الذي توصلنا اليه مع الاخوة في « اكنا » يعتبر خطوة في الاتجاه الصحيح و بداية الخير و أول الفيت . يحتاج منا إنماءً و ترشيداً .

٩- اعادة النظر في هياكلنا التنظيمية و الادارية و نوعية القيادات و أساليب اختيارها بما يتلائم مع تحديات مهمة التوطين :

ستسكت المذكرة عن التفصيل في هذا البند لحين آخر مع انه أمر بدهي و فيه قول كثير .

١٠- تنمية و تطوير مصادرها و مواردنا و امكانياتنا المالية و البشرية بما يتناسب مع ضخامة المهمة الكبيرة :

لو استعرضنا الموارد البشرية و المالية التي يملكها الاخوان لوحدهم في هذا البلد لشعرنا و شعر غيرنا بالفخر و الاعتزاز . و لو ضمننا اليها موارد أصدقائنا و حلفائنا و من هم في فلكنا يسبحون و لرايتنا ينتظرون . لأدركنا اننا يمكن أن نخوض بحر التوطين و نستعرضه لإعلاء كلمة الله سبحانه .

(٦)

١١- اعتماد المنهج العلمي في التخطيط و التفكير و اعداد الدراسات التي تحتاجها عملية التوطين :

نعم نحتاج الى هذا المنهج . و نحتاج الى العديد من الدراسات التي تعين في هذه العملية الجهادية الحضارية . و لعله نكتفي هنا بذكر بعضها بإيجاز :

- تاريخ الوجود الاسلامي في أمريكا .
- تاريخ العمل الاسلامي الاخواني في أمريكا .
- الحركات و المنظمات و المؤسسات الاسلامية : تحليل و نقد
- ظاهرة المراكز و المدارس الاسلامية : تحديات و احتياجات و احصاءات .
- الاقليات الاسلامية .
- الجاليات الاسلامية و العربية .
- المجتمع الامريكي . تركيبه و سياسة .
- نظرة المجتمع الامريكي الى الاسلام و المسلمين ... و غيرها كثير من الدراسات التي يمكن ان نوجه اليها اخواننا و حلفائنا لاعادتها اما من خلال دراستهم الاكاديمية أو من خلال مراكزهم العلمية أو من خلال تكليفاتهم الحركية . المهم أن تبدأ .

١٢- الاتفاق على « آلية » مرنة و متوازنة و واضحة لتنفيذ عملية التوطين ضمن « اطار زمني » محدد و متدرج و متوازن و متواكب مع متطلبات و تحديات عملية التوطين .

١٣- فهم المجتمع الامريكي من جوانبه المختلفة فهماً « يؤهلنا » من القيام بمهمة توطين دعوتنا في وطنه و « إستراتيجياتها » على أرضه .

١٤- تبني « فقه » مدوّن يتضمن قواعد و مبادئ و سياسات و تفسيرات شرعية و حركية تتلائم مع حاجات و تحديات عملية التوطين .

١٥- الاتفاق على « معايير » و موازين تكون بمثابة « حاسة الاستشعار » أو « برج المراقبة » للتأكد من أن أولوياتنا و خططنا و برامجنا و هيكلنا و قياداتنا و اموالنا و مناشطنا كلها تسير باتجاه عملية التوطين.

١٦- تبني صيغة عملية مرنة يتكامل فيها عملنا المركزي مع عملنا المحلي .
[البنود من ١٢ الى ١٦ سيرد فيها التفصيل لاحقاً] .

١٧- ادراك دور و طبيعة عمل « المركز الاسلامي » في كل مدينة بما يحقق عملية التوطين :

إن المركز الذي نسمى له هو الذي : يُمثل « محور » حركتنا و « محيط » دائرة عملنا و « نقطة » ارتكازنا و « قاعدة » انطلاقنا و « دار أرقمنا » لتربيتنا و اعدادنا و إنفاذ سرايانا بالاضافة الى انه « محراب » عبادتنا .

(V)

حتى يتحول المركز الاسلامي - بالفعل - لا بالقول الى نواة « لمجتمع اسلامي » صغير يكون انعكاساً و مرآة لمؤسساتنا المركزية . ينبغي أن يتحول المركز الى « خلية نحل » يُخرج شهداً حلو المذاق . فيتحول بذلك المركز الاسلامي الى مكان الدرس و الاسرة و الكتيبة و الدورة و الندوة و الزيارة و الرياضة و المدرسة و النادي الاجتماعي و ملتقى المرأة و محضن الناشئة و الناشئات و مكتب صنع القرار السياسي المحلي و مركز توزيع صحفنا و مجلاتنا و كتبنا و أشرطتنا السمعية و المرئية .

باختصار نقول : أننا نريد أن يصبح المركز الاسلامي « دار الدعوة » و « المركز العام » بالمضمون أولاً قبل الاسم ، و على قدر امتلاكنا و توجيهنا لهذه المراكز على مستوى القارة .. على قدر ما يمكننا القول أننا نسير بنجاح نحو توطين الدعوة في هذه البلاد .

أي أن يكون دور « المركز » كدور « المسجد » على عهد رسول الله صلى الله عليه و سلم عندما انطلق يباشر « توطين » الدعوة في عهدها الاول في المدينة المنورة، و من المسجد إستأنف الحياة الاسلامية و قدم للعالم أروع و أبهى حضارة عرفتها الإنسانية .

و هذا يحتم أن تتحول - بعد حين - المنطقة و الشعبة و الأسرة الى « غرف عمليات » للتخطيط و التوجيه و المراقبة و القيادة للمركز الاسلامي ليكون مثلاً و نموذجاً يحتذى .

١٨- اعتماد نظام يؤكد على ان « فرز » العاملين و « توزيع الادوار و « تقليد » المناصب و المسؤوليات يكون على أساس التخصص و الرغبة و الحاجة و بما يحقق عملية التوطين و يسهم في إنجاحها .

١٩- تحويل مبدأ التفرغ لمسئولي المواقع الرئيسية في الجماعة الى قاعدة و أساس و سياسة في العمل ، و بدونه قد تتعطل عملية التوطين [و الكلام حول هذا الموضوع يحتاج الى تفصيل و تأصيل] .

٢٠- ادراك أهمية النقلة « المؤسساتية » في عملنا الحركي . و الجهاد من أجل تحقيقها على أرض الواقع بما يخدم عملية التوطين و يعجل نتائجها بأذن الله عزّ و جلّ :

إنّ سبب تأخير هذا البند على أهميته القصوى هو لأنه يمثل سر و لب هذه المذكرة . و يمثل أيضاً المظهر العملي و المعيار الحقيقي لنجاحنا أو إخفاقنا في سيرنا نحو هدف التوطين . و الحديث عن المؤسسات العقلية أو الظاهرة « المؤسساتية » لا يحتاج منا الى تفصيل كثير . و يكفيننا أن نقول أن أول رائد لهذه الظاهرة كان نبينا محمد صلى الله عليه و سلم إذ انه وضع الأساس لأول مؤسسة حضارية و هي المسجد فكانت بحق « المؤسسة الشاملة » . ثم هكذا كان فعل رائد الدعوة الاسلامية المعاصرة الامام الشهيد حسن البنا رحمه الله عندما أحسنّ هو و إخوانه بضرورة إعادة « تأسيس » الاسلام و حركته من جديد . فأقام المؤسسات بكل أنواعها : الاقتصادية و الاجتماعية و الاعلامية و الكشفية و المهنية و حتى العسكرية . و يجدر القول أننا في بلد لا يفهم الالفة المؤسسات و لا يحترم و يحسب وزناً لأي مجموعة بدون مؤسسات فاعلة و مؤثرة و قوية .

(A)

و من حسن الطالع أن بيننا من إخواننا من سبقونا بالقول والعمل من عنده هذه «النزعة» أو العقلية أو الميل لإنشاء المؤسسات . مما يدفعنا الى القول بشجاعة و مراحة - كما قالها ذات مرة السادات في مصر «نحن نريد أن نقيم دولة المؤسسات» - كلمة حق أراد بها الباطل . و أنا أقول لاخواني دعونا نرفع شعار الحق لإقامة الحق « نحن نريد أن نقيم جماعة المؤسسات » . إذ ان بدونها لن نضع أقدامنا على الطريق الصحيح .

- و من أجل أن تتم عملية التوطين لابد أن نخطط و نعمل من الآن على تهيئة و اعداد أنفسنا و إخواننا و أجهزتنا و أقسامنا و لجاننا لكي تتحول الى مؤسسات شاملة بشكل متدرج و متوازن و متواكب مع الحاجة و الواقع . و الذي يشجعنا على ذلك - بالاضافة الى الذي ذكر سابقاً - هو أننا نملك « أنوية » لكل مؤسسة من المؤسسات التي ننادي بوجودها . [انظر الى الملحق رقم (١)] .

-كل الذي نحتاجه هو أن نُحْكِم ربطهم و نُتَسَّق عملهم و نَجْمَع عناصرهم و نوَحِّد جهودهم مع غيرهم ثم نصلهم بالخطة الشاملة التي نسمى لها .

فعلى سبيل المثال :

عندنا نواة لمؤسسة « اعلامية و فنية شاملة » : نملك مطبعة + جهاز صف حروف متطور + مركز سمعيات و بصريات + مكتب اخراج فني + مجلات و صحف بالعربية و الانكليزية [الافاق و الامل و السياسي و الى فلسطين و المقتطفات الصحفية و الزيتونة و الراصد الفلسطيني و مجلة العلوم الاجتماعية ...] + فرقة فنية + مصورين + مخرجين + مقدمي برامج + محررين + بالاضافة الى خبرات اعلامية و فنية اخرى .

مثال آخر :

عندنا نواة لمؤسسة « دعوية تربوية شاملة » : عندنا قسم الدعوة الاسلامية في الاسنا + مؤسسة الدكتور جمال بدوي + المركز الذي يديره الاخ حامد الفزالي + مركز الدعوة الذي تسعى له لجنة الدعوة الآن و الاخ شاكرا السيد + بالاضافة الى جهود دعوية هنا و هناك ... » .

و هكذا يمكن أن نقيس على جميع المؤسسات التي ننادي بايجادها .

-التحدي الكبير الذي أمامنا هو أننا كيف نجعل من هذه الأنوية أو العناصر « المبعثرة » مؤسسات شاملة مستقرة « متوطنة » مرتبطة بحركتنا و تدور في فلك خطتنا و تأتمر بتوجيهنا . و لا يمنع - بل ينبغي - أن يكون لكل مؤسسة مركزية فروعها المحلية و لكن ارتباطها بالمركز الاسلامي في المدينة شرط .

-المطلوب : أن نسمى لتهيئة الأجواء و السبل لتحقيق « الاندماج » بحيث تكون الاقسام و اللجان و المناطق و الشعب و الاسر هي لب و جوهر المؤسسات - بعد حين - .

أي أن تحصل النقلة و التحول كما يلي :

(٩)

- | | |
|--|--|
| ١- قسم التنظيم + قسم الامانة | = المؤسسة التنظيمية و الادارية - المركز العام |
| ٢- قسم التربية + لجنة الدعوة | = المؤسسة الدعوية و التربوية |
| ٢- قسم الاخوات | = المؤسسة النسوية |
| ٤- قسم المال + لجنة الاستثمار + الوقف | = المؤسسة الاقتصادية |
| ٥- قسم الناشئة + قسم المنظمات الشبابية | = المؤسسة الشبابية |
| ٦- اللجنة الاجتماعية + لجنة الزواج + م. الرحمة | = المؤسسة الاجتماعية |
| ٧- اللجنة الامنية | = المؤسسة الامنية |
| ٨- القسم السياسي + لجنة فلسطين | = المؤسسة السياسية |
| ٩- محكمة الجماعة + اللجنة القانونية | = المؤسسة القضائية |
| ١٠- قسم العمل المحلي | = تتوزع أعماله على بقية المؤسسات |
| ١١- مجلاتنا + المطبعة + فرقنا الفنية | = المؤسسة الاعلامية و الفنية |
| ١٢- مؤسسة الدراسات + دار النشر + دار الكتاب | = المؤسسة الفكرية و الثقافية |
| ١٢- الجمعيات العلمية و الطبية | = المؤسسة العلمية و التعليمية و المهنية |
| ١٤- المؤتمر التنظيمي | = المؤتمر التأسيسي الاسلامي الامريكي |
| ١٥- مجلس الشورى + لجنة التخطيط | = مجلس شورى الحركة الاسلامية الامريكية . |
| ١٦- المكتب التنفيذي | = المكتب التنفيذي للحركة الاسلامية الامريكية |
| ١٧- المسئول العام | = رئيس الحركة الاسلامية و الناطق الرسمي لها . |
| ١٨- المناطق + الشعب + الاسر | = القيادات الميدانية للمؤسسات و المراكز الاسلامية. |

خامساً : مؤسسات التوطين الشاملة :

- ثم نسمى و نجاهد من أجل أن تصبح كل مؤسسة من هذه المؤسسات المذكورة أعلاه « مؤسسة شاملة » على مدى الايام و السنين و ما نُؤدّر لنا أن نكون في هذه الديار ..المهم يكفيننا اعتزازاً أننا وضعنا اللبنة و يأتي من بعدنا أقوام و أجيال تكمل المسيرة و الطريق و لكن بهدي سابق واضح المعالم .
و لكي يتضح القول بمقصدنا من المؤسسة الشاملة المتخصصة . نذكر هنا ملامح و مظاهر كل مؤسسة من المؤسسات « الراجعة » :

١- دعوية و تربوية [المؤسسة الدعوية و التربوية] : بحيث تشمل على :

- مؤسسة نشر الدعوة (مركزية و فروع محلية) .
- معهد لتخريج الدعاة و المربين .
- علماء و دعاة و مربين و مبشرين و مقدمي برامج .
- فنون و تقنية الاتصال و التبليغ و الدعوة .

(١٠)

- محطة تلفزيونية .
- مجلة دعوية متخصصة .
- محطة اذاعية .
- المجلس الاسلامي الاعلى للدعاة و المربين .
- المجلس الاعلى للمساجد و المراكز الاسلامية .
- جمعيات الصداقة مع الاديان الاخرى ... و ماشابه ذلك .

٢- سياسيا [المؤسسة السياسية] : بحيث تشمل على :

- حزب سياسي مركزي .
- مكاتب سياسية محلية .
- رموز سياسية .
- علاقات و تحالفات .
- المنظمة الامريكية للعمل السياسي الاسلامي .
- مراكز معلومات متطورة ... و ماشابه ذلك .

٢- اعلاميا [المؤسسة الاعلامية و الفنية] : بحيث تشمل على :

- جريدة يومية .
- مجلات اسبوعية شهرية و فصلية .
- اذاعات .
- برامج تلفزيونية .
- مركز سمعيات و بصريات .
- مجلة للطفل المسلم
- مجلة للمرأة المسلمة
- مطبعة و أجهزة صف حروف .
- مكتب اخراج .
- استديو تصوير و تسجيل .
- فرق فنية للتمثيل و الانشاد و المسرح .
- مكتب تسويق و انتاج فني ... و ماشابه ذلك .

(١١)

٤- اقتصاديا [المؤسسة الاقتصادية] : بحيث تشمل على :

- بنك اسلامي مركزي .
- اوقاف اسلامية .
- مشاريع استثمارية .
- مؤسسة للقروض الحسنة ... و ماشابه ذلك .

٥- علميا و مهنيا [المؤسسة العلمية و التعليمية و المهنية] : بحيث تشمل على :

- مراكز بحث علمي .
- معاهد تقنية و تدريب مهني .
- جامعة اسلامية .
- مدارس اسلامية .
- مجلس للتعليم و البحث العلمي .
- مراكز لتدريب المعلمين .
- جمعيات علمية في المدارس .
- مكتب للتوجيه الاكاديمي .
- جهاز للتأليف و المناهج الاسلامية ... و ماشابه ذلك .

٦- ثقافيا و فكريا [المؤسسة الثقافية و الفكرية] : بحيث تشمل على :

- مراكز للدراسات و البحوث .
- منظمات ثقافية و فكرية مثال : [جمعية العلماء الاجتماعيين - جمعية العلماء و المهندسين ...] .
- معهد للفكر و الثقافة الاسلامية .
- دار نشر و ترجمة و توزيع للكتاب الاسلامي .
- مكتب للتدوين و التأريخ و التوثيق .
- مشروع ترجمة القرآن الكريم و الحديث الشريف ... و ماشابه ذلك .

٧- اجتماعيا [المؤسسة الاجتماعية الخيرية] : بحيث تشمل على :

- نوادي اجتماعية للشباب و ابناء و بنات الجاليات .
- جمعيات محلية للرعاية الاجتماعية و الخدمات مرتبطة بالمراكز الاسلامية .
- المنظمة الاسلامية لمكافحة الامراض الاجتماعية للمجتمع الامريكي .
- مشاريع المساكن الاسلامية .
- مكاتب الزواج و القضايا العائلية ... و ماشابه ذلك .

(١٢)

٨- شبابيا [المؤسسة الشبابية] : بحيث تشمل على :

- منظمات شبابية مركزية و محلية .
- فرق و نوادي رياضية .
- فرق كشفية ... و ماشابه ذلك .

٩- نسويا [المؤسسة النسوية] : بحيث تشمل على :

- جمعيات نسوية مركزية و محلية .
- معاهد التدريب و التشغيل الفني و التدبير المنزلي .
- معهد لتدريب الداعيات .
- دور الحضانة الاسلامية ... و ماشابه ذلك .

١٠- تنظيميا و اداريا [المؤسسة الادارية و التنظيمية] : بحيث تشمل على :

- معهد للتدريب و التنمية و التطوير و التخطيط .
- خبراء بارزين في هذا المجال .
- أنظمة عمل و لوائح و دساتير تصلح لادارة ايجاد الاجهزة و المؤسسات .
- مجلة دورية في التنمية و الادارة الاسلامية .
- امتلاك مخيمات و قاعات للانشطة المختلفة .
- بنك للمعلومات و الحصر و الاحصاء البشري .
- شبكة اتصالات متطورة .
- آرشيف متطور لتراثنا و انتاجنا ... و ما شابه ذلك .

١١- أمنيا : [المؤسسة الامنية] : بحيث تشمل على :

- نوادي للتدريب و تعلم وسائل الدفاع عن النفس .
- مركز يعنى بالشؤون الامنية [فنيا و فكريا و تقنيا و بشريا] ... و ماشابه ذلك .

١٢- قانونيا : [المؤسسة القانونية] : بحيث تشمل على :

- مجلس فقهي مركزي .
- محكمة اسلامية مركزية .
- جمعية المحامين المسلمين .
- المنظمة الاسلامية للدفاع عن حقوق المسلمين ... و ما شابه ذلك .

و الله ولي التوفيق

الملحق رقم (١) :

**قائمة بمؤسساتنا و مؤسسات أصدقائنا
[تخيل لو أنها كلها تدير وفق خطة واحدة !!!]**

- 1- ISNA = ISLAMIC SOCIETY OF NORTH AMERICA
- 2- MSA = MUSLIM STUDENTS' ASSOCIATION
- 3- MCA = THE MUSLIM COMMUNITIES ASSOCIATION
- 4- AMSS = THE ASSOCIATION OF MUSLIM SOCIAL SCIENTISTS
- 5- AMSE = THE ASSOCIATION OF MUSLIM SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS
- 6- IMA = ISLAMIC MEDICAL ASSOCIATION

- 7- ITC = ISLAMIC TEACHING CENTER
- 8- NAIT = NORTH AMERICAN ISLAMIC TRUST
- 9- FID = FOUNDATION FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
- 10-IHC = ISLAMIC HOUSING COOPERATIVE
- 11-ICD = ISLAMIC CENTERS DIVISION
- 12-ATP = AMERICAN TRUST PUBLICATIONS
- 13-AVC = AUDIO-VISUAL CENTER
- 14-IBS = ISLAMIC BOOK SERVICE
- 15-MBA = MUSLIM BUSINESSMEN ASSOCIATION
- 16-MYNA = MUSLIM YOUTH OF NORTH AMERICA
- 17-IFC = ISNA FIQH COMMITTEE
- 18-IPAC = ISNA POLITICAL AWARENESS COMMITTEE
- 19-IED = ISLAMIC EDUCATION DEPARTMENT

- 20-MAYA = MUSLIM ARAB YOUTH ASSOCIATION
- 21-MISG = MALASIAN ISLAMIC STUDY GROUP
- 22-IAP = ISLAMIC ASSOCIATION FOR PALESTINE
- 23-UASR = UNITED ASSOCIATION FOR STUDIES AND RESEARCH
- 24-OLF = OCCUPIED LAND FUND
- 25-MIA = MERCEY INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION

- 26-ICNA = ISLAMIC CIRCLE OF NORTH AMERICA
- 27-BMI = BAITUL MAL INC
- 28-IIIT = INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR ISLAMIC THOUGHT
- 29-IIC = ISLAMIC INFORMATION CENTER

ISE-SW 1B10/ 0000427

Bate #ISE-SW/ 1B10/ 0000413

In the name of God, the Beneficent, the Merciful
Thanks be to God, Lord of the Two Worlds,
Prayers and peace be upon the master of the Messengers

An Explanatory Memorandum
On the General Strategic Goal for the Group
In North America
5/22/1991

Contents:

- 1- An introduction in explanation
- 2- The Concept of Settlement
- 3- The Process of Settlement
- 4- Comprehensive Settlement Organizations

Bate #ISE-SW/ 1B10/ 0000414

In the name of God, the Beneficent, the Merciful
Thanks be to God, Lord of the Two Worlds
And Blessed are the Pious

5/22/1991

The beloved brother/The General Masul, may God keep him
The beloved brother/Secretary of the Shura Council, may God keep him
The beloved brothers/Members of the Shura Council, may God keep them
God's peace, mercy and blessings be upon you.... To proceed,

I ask Almighty God that you, your families and those whom you love around you are in the best of conditions, pleasing to God, glorified His name be.

I send this letter of mine to you hoping that it would seize your attention and receive your good care as you are the people of responsibility and those to whom trust is given. Between your hands is an "Explanatory Memorandum" which I put effort in writing down so that it is not locked in the chest and the mind, and so that I can share with you a portion of the responsibility in leading the Group in this country.

What might have encouraged me to submit the memorandum in this time in particular is my feeling of a "glimpse of hope" and the beginning of good tidings which bring the good news that we have embarked on a new stage of Islamic activism stages in this continent.

The papers which are between your hands are not abundant extravagance, imaginations or hallucinations which passed in the mind of one of your brothers, but they are rather hopes, ambitions and challenges that I hope that you share some or most of which with me. I do not claim their infallibility or absolute correctness, but they are an attempt which requires study, outlook, detailing and rooting from you.

My request to my brothers is to read the memorandum and to write what they wanted of comments and corrections, keeping in mind that what is between your hands is not strange or a new submission without a root, but rather an attempt to interpret and explain some of what came in the long-term plan which we approved and adopted in our council and our conference in the year (1987).

So, my honorable brother, do not rush to throw these papers away due to your many occupations and worries. All what I'm asking of you is to read them and to comment on them hoping that we might continue together the project of our plan and our Islamic work in this part of the world. Should you do that, I would be thankful and grateful to you.

I also ask my honorable brother, the Secretary of the Council, to add the subject of the memorandum on the Council agenda in its coming meeting.

May God reward you good and keep you for His Daw'a

Your brother/Mohamed Akram

Bate #ISE-SW/ 1B10/ 0000415

(1)

In the name of God, the Beneficent, the Merciful
Thanks be to God, Lord of the Two Worlds
And Blessed are the Pious

Subject: A project for an explanatory memorandum for the General Strategic goal for the Group in North America mentioned in the long-term plan

One: The Memorandum is derived from:

- 1- The general strategic goal of the Group in America which was approved by the Shura Council and the Organizational Conference for the year [1987] is "Enablement of Islam in North America, meaning: establishing an effective and a stable Islamic Movement led by the Muslim Brotherhood which adopts Muslims' causes domestically and globally, and which works to expand the observant Muslim base, aims at unifying and directing Muslims' efforts, presents Islam as a civilization alternative, and supports the global Islamic State wherever it is".
- 2- The priority that is approved by the Shura Council for the work of the Group in its current and former session which is "Settlement".
- 3- The positive development with the brothers in the Islamic Circle in an attempt to reach a unity of merger.
- 4- The constant need for thinking and future planning, an attempt to read it and working to "shape" the present to comply and suit the needs and challenges of the future.
- 5- The paper of his eminence, the General Masul, may God keep him, which he recently sent to the members of the Council.

Two: An Introduction to the Explanatory Memorandum:

- In order to begin with the explanation, we must "summon" the following question and place it in front of our eyes as its relationship is important and necessary with the strategic goal and the explanation project we are embarking on. The question we are facing is: "How do you like to see the Islam Movement in North America in ten years?", or "taking along" the following sentence when planning and working, "Islamic Work in North America in the year (2000): A Strategic Vision".

Also, we must summon and take along "elements" of the general strategic goal of the Group in North America and I will intentionally repeat them in numbers. They are:

- [1- Establishing an effective and stable Islamic Movement led by the Muslim Brotherhood.
- 2- Adopting Muslims' causes domestically and globally.
- 3- Expanding the observant Muslim base.
- 4- Unifying and directing Muslims' efforts.

Bate #ISE-SW 1B10/ 0000416

(2)

5- Presenting Islam as a civilization alternative

6- Supporting the establishment of the global Islamic State wherever it is].

- It must be stressed that it has become clear and emphatically known that all is in agreement that we must "settle" or "enable" Islam and its Movement in this part of the world.

- Therefore, a joint understanding of the meaning of settlement or enablement must be adopted, through which and on whose basis we explain the general strategic goal with its six elements for the Group in North America.

Three: The Concept of Settlement:

This term was mentioned in the Group's "dictionary" and documents with various meanings in spite of the fact that everyone meant one thing with it. We believe that the understanding of the essence is the same and we will attempt here to give the word and its "meanings" a practical explanation with a practical Movement tone, and not a philosophical linguistic explanation, while stressing that this explanation of ours is not complete until our explanation of "the process" of settlement itself is understood which is mentioned in the following paragraph. We briefly say the following:

Settlement: "That Islam and its Movement become a part of the homeland it lives in".

Establishment: "That Islam turns into firmly-rooted organizations on whose bases civilization, structure and testimony are built".

Stability: "That Islam is stable in the land on which its people move".

Enablement: "That Islam is enabled within the souls, minds and the lives of the people of the country in which it moves".

Rooting: "That Islam is resident and not a passing thing, or rooted "entrenched" in the soil of the spot where it moves and not a strange plant to it".

Four: The Process of Settlement:

- In order for Islam and its Movement to become "a part of the homeland" in which it lives, "stable" in its land, "rooted" in the spirits and minds of its people, "enabled" in the live of its society and has firmly-established "organizations" on which the Islamic structure is built and with which the testimony of civilization is achieved, the Movement must plan and struggle to obtain "the keys" and the tools of this process in carry out this grand mission as a "Civilization Jihadist" responsibility which lies on the shoulders of Muslims and - on top of them - the Muslim Brotherhood in this country. Among these keys and tools are the following:

1- Adopting the concept of settlement and understanding its practical meanings:

The Explanatory Memorandum focused on the Movement and the realistic dimension of the process of settlement and its practical meanings without paying attention to the difference in understanding between the resident and the non-resident, or who is the settled and the non-settled

Bate #ISE-SW 1B10/ 0000417

(3)

and we believe that what was mentioned in the long-term plan in that regards suffices.

2- Making a fundamental shift in our thinking and mentality in order to suit the challenges of the settlement mission.

What is meant with the shift - which is a positive expression - is responding to the grand challenges of the settlement issues. We believe that any transforming response begins with the method of thinking and its center, the brain, first. In order to clarify what is meant with the shift as a key to qualify us to enter the field of settlement, we say very briefly that the following must be accomplished:

- A shift from the partial thinking mentality to the comprehensive thinking mentality.
- A shift from the "amputated" partial thinking mentality to the "continuous" comprehensive mentality.
- A shift from the mentality of caution and reservation to the mentality of risk and controlled liberation.
- A shift from the mentality of the elite Movement to the mentality of the popular Movement.
- A shift from the mentality of preaching and guidance to the mentality of building and testimony
- A shift from the single opinion mentality to the multiple opinion mentality.
- A shift from the collision mentality to the absorption mentality.
- A shift from the individual mentality to the team mentality.
- A shift from the anticipation mentality to the initiative mentality.
- A shift from the hesitation mentality to the decisiveness mentality.
- A shift from the principles mentality to the programs mentality.
- A shift from the abstract ideas mentality the true organizations mentality [This is the core point and the essence of the memorandum].

3- Understanding the historical stages in which the Islamic Ikhwani activism went through in this country:

The writer of the memorandum believes that understanding and comprehending the historical stages of the Islamic activism which was led and being led by the Muslim Brotherhood in this continent is a very important key in working towards settlement, through which the Group observes its march, the direction of its movement and the curves and turns of its road. We will suffice here with mentioning the title for each of these stages [The title expresses the prevalent characteristic of the stage] [Details maybe mentioned in another future study]. Most likely, the stages are:

- A- The stage of searching for self and determining the identity.
- B- The stage of inner build-up and tightening the organization.
- C- The stage of mosques and the Islamic centers.
- D- The stage of building the Islamic organizations - the first phase.
- E- The stage of building the Islamic schools - the first phase.

Bate #ISE-SW 1B10/ 0000418

(4)

F- The stage of thinking about the overt Islamic Movement - the first phase.

G- The stage of openness to the other Islamic movements and attempting to reach a formula for dealing with them - the first phase.

H- The stage of reviving and establishing the Islamic organizations - the second phase.

We believe that the Group is embarking on this stage in its second phase as it has to open the door and enter as it did the first time.

4- Understanding the role of the Muslim Brother in North America:

The process of settlement is a "Civilization-Jihadist Process" with all the word means. The Ikhwan must understand that their work in America is a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and "sabotaging" its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and God's religion is made victorious over all other religions. Without this level of understanding, we are not up to this challenge and have not prepared ourselves for Jihad yet. It is a Muslim's destiny to perform Jihad and work wherever he is and wherever he lands until the final hour comes, and there is no escape from that destiny except for those who chose to slack. But, would the slackers and the Mujahedeen be equal.

5- Understanding that we cannot perform the settlement mission by ourselves or away from people:

A mission as significant and as huge as the settlement mission needs magnificent and exhausting efforts. With their capabilities, human, financial and scientific resources, the Ikhwan will not be able to carry out this mission alone or away from people and he who believes that is wrong, and God knows best. As for the role of the Ikhwan, it is the initiative, pioneering, leadership, raising the banner and pushing people in that direction. They are then to work to employ, direct and unify Muslims' efforts and powers for this process. In order to do that, we must possess a mastery of the art of "coalitions", the art of "absorption" and the principles of "cooperation".

6- The necessity of achieving a union and balanced gradual merger between private work and public work:

We believe that what was written about this subject is many and is enough. But, it needs a time and a practical frame so that what is needed is achieved in a gradual and a balanced way that is compatible with the process of settlement.

Bate #ISE-SW 1B10/ 0000418 (Cont'd)

7- The conviction that the success of the settlement of Islam and its Movement in this country is a success to the global Islamic Movement and a true support for the sought-after state, God willing:

There is a conviction - with which this memorandum disagrees - that our focus in attempting to settle Islam in this country will lead to negligence in our duty towards the global Islamic Movement in supporting its project to establish the state. We believe that the reply is in two segments: One - The success of the Movement in America in establishing an observant Islamic base with power and effectiveness will be the best support and aid to the global Movement project.

Bate #ISE-SW 1B10/ 0000419

(5)

And the second - is the global Movement has not succeeded yet in "distributing roles" to its branches, stating what is needed from them as one of the participants or contributors to the project to establish the global Islamic state. The day this happens, the children of the American Ikhwani branch will have far-reaching impact and positions that make the ancestors proud.

8- Absorbing Muslims and winning them with all of their factions and colors in America and Canada for the settlement project, and making it their cause, future and the basis of their Islamic life in this part of the world:

This issues requires from us to learn "the art of dealing with the others", as people are different and people in many colors. We need to adopt the principle which says, "Take from people... the best they have", their best specializations, experiences, arts, energies and abilities. By people here we mean those within or without the ranks of individuals and organizations. The policy of "taking" should be with what achieves the strategic goal and the settlement process. But the big challenge in front of us is: how to connect them all in "the orbit" of our plan and "the circle" of our Movement in order to achieve "the core" of our interest. To me, there is no choice for us other than alliance and mutual understanding of those who desire from our religion and those who agree from our belief in work. And the U.S. Islamic arena is full of those waiting...., the pioneers.

What matters is bringing people to the level of comprehension of the challenge that is facing us as Muslims in this country, conviction of our settlement project, and understanding the benefit of agreement, cooperation and alliance. At that time, if we ask for money, a lot of it would come, and if we ask for men, they would come in lines. What matters is that our plan is "the criterion and the balance" in our relationship with others.

Here, two points must be noted; the first one: we need to comprehend and understand the balance of the Islamic powers in the U.S. arena [and this might be the subject of a future study]. The second point: what we reached with the brothers in "ICNA" is considered a step in the right direction, the beginning of good and the first drop that requires growing and guidance.

Bate #ISE-SW 1B10/ 0000419 (Cont'd)

9- Re-examining our organizational and administrative bodies, the type of leadership and the method of selecting it with what suits the challenges of the settlement mission:

The memorandum will be silent about details regarding this item even though it is logical and there is a lot to be said about it.

10- Growing and developing our resources and capabilities, our financial and human resources with what suits the magnitude of the grand mission:

If we examined the human and the financial resources the Ikhwan alone own in this country, we and others would feel proud and glorious. And if we add to them the resources of our friends and allies, those who circle in our orbit and those waiting on our banner, we would realize that we are able to open the door to settlement and walk through it seeking to make Almighty God's word the highest.

Bate #ISE-SW 1B10/ 0000420

(6)

11- Utilizing the scientific method in planning, thinking and preparation of studies needed for the process of settlement:

Yes, we need this method, and we need many studies which aid in this civilization Jihadist operation. We will mention some of them briefly:

- The history of the Islamic presence in America.
- The history of the Islamic Ikhwani presence in America.
- Islamic movements, organizations and organizations: analysis and criticism.
- The phenomenon of the Islamic centers and schools: challenges, needs and statistics.
- Islamic minorities.
- Muslim and Arab communities.
- The U.S. society: make-up and politics.
- The U.S. society's view of Islam and Muslims... And many other studies which we can direct our brothers and allies to prepare, either through their academic studies or through their educational centers or organizational tasking. What is important is that we start.

12- Agreeing on a flexible, balanced and a clear "mechanism" to implement the process of settlement within a specific, gradual and balanced "time frame" that is in-line with the demands and challenges of the process of settlement.

13- Understanding the U.S. society from its different aspects an understanding that "qualifies" us to perform the mission of settling our Dawa' in its country "and growing it" on its land.

14- Adopting a written "jurisprudence" that includes legal and movement bases, principles, policies and interpretations which are suitable for the needs and challenges of the process of settlement.

15- Agreeing on "criteria" and balances to be a sort of "antennas" or "the watch tower" in order to make sure that all of our priorities, plans, programs, bodies, leadership, monies and activities march towards the process of the settlement.

16- Adopting a practical, flexible formula through which our central work complements our domestic work.

[Items 12 through 16 will be detailed later].

17- Understanding the role and the nature of work of "The Islamic Center" in every city with what achieves the goal of the process of settlement:

The center we seek is the one which constitutes the "axis" of our Movement, the "perimeter" of the circle of our work, our "balance center", the "base" for our rise and our "Dar al-Arqam" to educate us, prepare us and supply our battalions in addition to being the "niche" of our prayers.

Bate #ISE-SW 1B10/ 0000421

(7)

This is in order for the Islamic center to turn - in action not in words - into a seed "for a small Islamic society" which is a reflection and a mirror to our central organizations. The center ought to turn into a "beehive" which produces sweet honey. Thus, the Islamic center would turn into a place for study, family, battalion, course, seminar, visit, sport, school, social club, women gathering, kindergarten for male and female youngsters, the office of the domestic political resolution, and the center for distributing our newspapers, magazines, books and our audio and visual tapes.

In brief we say: we would like for the Islamic center to become "The House of Dawah" and "the general center" in deeds first before name. As much as we own and direct these centers at the continent level, we can say we are marching successfully towards the settlement of Dawah' in this country.

Meaning that the "center's" role should be the same as the "mosque's" role during the time of God's prophet, God's prayers and peace be upon him, when he marched to "settle" the Dawah' in its first generation in Madina. from the mosque, he drew the Islamic life and provided to the world the most magnificent and fabulous civilization humanity knew.

This mandates that, eventually, the region, the branch and the Usrah turn into "operations rooms" for planning, direction, monitoring and leadership for the Islamic center in order to be a role model to be followed.

18- Adopting a system that is based on "selecting" workers, "role distribution" and "assigning" positions and responsibilities is based on specialization, desire and need with what achieves the process of settlement and contributes to its success.

19- Turning the principle of dedication for the Muslims of main positions within the Group into a rule, a basis and a policy in work. Without it, the process of settlement might be stalled [Talking about this point requires more details and discussion].

20- Understanding the importance of the "Organizational" shift in our Movement work, and doing Jihad in order to achieve it in the real world with what serves the process of settlement and expedites its results, God Almighty's willing:

The reason this paragraph was delayed is to stress its utmost importance as it constitutes the heart and the core of this memorandum. It also constitutes the practical aspect and the true measure of our success or failure in our march towards settlement. The talk about the organizations and the "organizational" mentality or phenomenon does not require much details. It suffices to say that the first pioneer of this phenomenon was our prophet Mohamed, God's peace, mercy and blessings be upon him, as he placed the foundation for the first civilized organization which is the mosque, which truly became "the comprehensive organization". And this was done by the pioneer of the contemporary Islamic Dawah', Imam martyr Hasan al-Banna, may God have mercy on him, when he and his brothers felt the need to "re-establish" Islam and its movement anew, leading him to establish organizations with all their kinds: economic, social, media, scouting,

Bate #ISE-SW 1B10/ 0000421 (Cont'd)

professional and even the military ones. We must say that we are in a country which understands no language other than the language of the organizations, and one which does not respect or give weight to any group without effective, functional and strong organizations.

Bate #ISE-SW 1B10/ 0000422

(8)

It is good fortune that there are brothers among us who have this "trend", mentality or inclination to build the organizations who have beat us by action and words which leads us to dare say honestly what Sadat in Egypt once said, "We want to build a country of organizations" - a word of right he meant wrong with. I say to my brothers, let us raise the banner of truth to establish right "We want to establish the Group of organizations", as without it we will not able to put our feet on the true path.

- And in order for the process of settlement to be completed, we must plan and work from now to equip and prepare ourselves, our brothers, our apparatuses, our sections and our committees in order to turn into comprehensive organizations in a gradual and balanced way that is suitable with the need and the reality. What encourages us to do that - in addition to the aforementioned - is that we possess "seeds" for each organization from the organization we call for [See attachment number (1)].

- All we need is to tweak them, coordinate their work, collect their elements and merge their efforts with others and then connect them with the comprehensive plan we seek.

For instance,

We have a seed for a "comprehensive media and art" organization: we own a print + advanced typesetting machine + audio and visual center + art production office + magazines in Arabic and English [The Horizons, The Hope, The Politicians, Ila Falastine, Press Clips, al-Zaytouna, Palestine Monitor, Social Sciences Magazines...] + art band + photographers + producers + programs anchors + journalists + in addition to other media and art experiences".

Another example:

We have a seed for a "comprehensive Dawa' educational" organization: We have the Daw'a section in ISNA + Dr. Jamal Badawi Foundation + the center run by brother Hamed al-Ghazali + the Dawa' center the Dawa' Committee and brother Shaker al-Sayyed are seeking to establish now + in addition to other Daw'a efforts here and there...".

And this applies to all the organizations we call on establishing.

- The big challenge that is ahead of us is how to turn these seeds or "scattered" elements into comprehensive, stable, "settled" organizations that are connected with our Movement and which fly in our orbit and take orders from our guidance. This does not prevent - but calls for - each central organization to have its local branches but its connection with the Islamic center in the city is a must.

Bate #ISE-SW 1B10/ 0000422 (Cont`d)

- What is needed is to seek to prepare the atmosphere and the means to achieve "the merger" so that the sections, the committees, the regions, the branches and the Usras are eventually the heart and the core of these organizations.

Or, for the shift and the change to occur as follows:

Bate #ISE-SW 1B10/ 0000423

(9)

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1- The Movement Department + The Secretariat Department | - The Organizational & Administrative Organization - The General Center |
| 2- Education Department + Dawa'a Com. | - Dawa' and Educational Organization |
| 3- Sisters Department | - The Women's Organization |
| 4- The Financial Department + Investment Committee + The Endowment | - The Economic Organization |
| 5- Youth Department + Youths Organizations Department | - Youth Organizations |
| 6- The Social Committee + Matrimony Committee + Mercy Foundation | - The Social Organization |
| 7- The Security Committee | - The Security Organization |
| 8- The Political Depart. + Palestine Com. | - The Political Organization |
| 9- The Group's Court + The Legal Com. | - The Judicial Organization |
| 10- Domestic Work Department | - Its work is to be distributed to the rest of the organizations |
| 11- Our magazines + the print + our art band | - The Media and Art Organization |
| 12- The Studies Association + The Publication House + Dar al-Kitab | - The Intellectual & Cultural Organization |
| 13- Scientific and Medial societies | - Scientific, Educational & Professional Organization |
| 14- The Organizational Conference | - The Islamic-American Founding Conference |
| 15- The Shura Council + Planning Com. | - The Shura Council for the Islamic-American Movement |
| 16- The Executive Office | - The Executive Office of the Islamic-American Movement |
| 17- The General Masul | - Chairman of the Islamic Movement and its official Spokesman |
| 18- The regions, branches & Usras | - Field leaders of organizations & Islamic centers |

Five: Comprehensive Settlement Organization:

- We would then seek and struggle in order to make each one of these above-mentioned organizations a "comprehensive organization" throughout the days and the years, and as long as we are destined to be in this country. What is important is that we put the foundation and we will be followed by peoples and generations that would finish the march and the road but with a clearly-defined guidance.

Bate #ISE-SW 1B10/ 0000423 (Cont'd)

And, in order for us to clarify what we mean with the comprehensive, specialized organization, we mention here the characteristics and traits of each organization of the "promising" organizations.

1- From the Dawa' and educational aspect [The Dawa' and Educational Organization]: to include:

- The Organization to spread the Dawa' (Central and local branches).
- An institute to graduate Callers and Educators.
- Scholars, Callers, Educators, Preachers and Program Anchors.
- Art and communication technology, Conveyance and Dawa'.

Bate #ISE-SW 1B10/ 0000424

(10)

- A television station.
- A specialized Dawa' magazine.
- A radio station.
- The Higher Islamic Council for Callers and Educators.
- The Higher Council for Mosques and Islamic Centers.
- Friendship Societies with the other religions... and things like that.

2- Politically [The Political Organization]: to include:

- A central political party.
- Local political offices.
- Political symbols.
- Relationships and alliances.
- The American Organization for Islamic Political Action
- Advanced Information Centers....and things like that.

3- Media [The Media and Art Organization]: to include:

- A daily newspaper.
- Weekly, monthly and seasonal magazines.
- Radio stations.
- Television programs.
- Audio and visual centers.
- A magazine for the Muslim child.
- A magazine for the Muslim woman.
- A print and typesetting machines.
- A production office.
- A photography and recording studio
- Art bands for acting, chanting and theater.
- A marketing and art production office... and things like that.

Bate #ISE-SW 1B10/ 0000425

(11)

4- Economically [The Economic Organization]: to include:

- An Islamic Central bank.
- Islamic endowments.
- Investment projects.
- An organization for interest-free loans.... and things like that.

5- Scientifically and Professionally [The Scientific, Educational and Professional Organization]: to include:

- Scientific research centers.
- Technical organizations and vocational training.
- An Islamic university.
- Islamic schools.
- A council for education and scientific research.
- Centers to train teachers.
- Scientific societies in schools.
- An office for academic guidance.
- A body for authorship and Islamic curricula.... and things like that.

6- Culturally and Intellectually [The Cultural and Intellectual Organization]: to include:

- A center for studies and research.
- Cultural and intellectual foundations such as [The Social Scientists Society - Scientists and Engineers Society....].
- An organization for Islamic thought and culture.
- A publication, translation and distribution house for Islamic books.
- An office for archiving, history and authentication
- The project to translate the Noble Quran, the Noble Sayings....and things like that.

7- Socially [The Social-Charitable Organization]: to include:

- Social clubs for the youths and the community's sons and daughters
- Local societies for social welfare and the services are tied to the Islamic centers
- The Islamic Organization to Combat the Social Ills of the U.S. Society
- Islamic houses project
- Matrimony and family cases office....and things like that.

Bate #ISE-SW 1B10/ 0000426

(12)

8- Youths [The Youth Organization]: to include:

- Central and local youths foundations.
- Sports teams and clubs
- Scouting teams....and things like that.

9- Women [The Women Organization]: to include:

- Central and local women societies.
- Organizations of training, vocational and housekeeping.
- An organization to train female preachers.
- Islamic kindergartens...and things like that.

10- Organizationally and Administratively [The Administrative and Organizational Organization]: to include:

- An institute for training, growth, development and planning
- Prominent experts in this field
- Work systems, bylaws and charters fit for running the most complicated bodies and organizations
- A periodic magazine in Islamic development and administration.
- Owning camps and halls for the various activities.
- A data, polling and census bank.
- An advanced communication network.
- An advanced archive for our heritage and production....and things like that.

11- Security [The Security Organization]: to include:

- Clubs for training and learning self-defense techniques.
- A center which is concerned with the security issues [Technical, intellectual, technological and human]....and things like that.

12- Legally [The Legal Organization]: to include:

- A Central Jurisprudence Council.
- A Central Islamic Court.
- Muslim Attorneys Society.
- The Islamic Foundation for Defense of Muslims' Rights...and things like that.

And success is by God.

Bate #ISE-SW 1B10/ 0000427

Attachment number (1)

A list of our organizations and the organizations of our friends
[Imagine if t they all march according to one plan!!!]

- 1- ISNA = ISLAMIC SOCIETY OF NORTH AMERICA
- 2- MSA = MUSLIM STUDENTS' ASSOCIATION
- 3- MCA = THE MUSLIM COMMUNITIES ASSOCIATION
- 4- AMSS = THE ASSOCIATION OF MUSLIM SOCIAL SCIENTISTS
- 5- AMSE = THE ASSOCIATION OF MUSLIM SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS
- 6- IMA = ISLAMIC MEDICAL ASSOCIATION

- 7- ITC = ISLAMIC TEACHING CENTER
- 8- NAIT = NORTH AMERICAN ISLAMIC TRUST
- 9- FID = FOUNDATION FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
- 10- IHC = ISLAMIC HOUSING COOPERATIVE
- 11- ICD = ISLAMIC CENTERS DIVISION
- 12- ATP = AMERICAN TRUST PUBLICATIONS
- 13- AVC = AUDIO-VISUAL CENTER
- 14- IBS = ISLAMIC BOOK SERVICE
- 15- MBA = MUSLIM BUSINESSMEN ASSOCIATION
- 16- MYNA = MUSLIM YOUTH OF NORTH AMERICA
- 17- IFC = ISNA FIQH COMMITTEE
- 18- IPAC = ISNA POLITICAL AWARENESS COMMITTEE
- 19- IED = ISLAMIC EDUCATION DEPARTMENT

- 20- MAYA = MUSLIM ARAB YOUTH ASSOCIATION
- 21- MISG = MALASIAN [sic] ISLAMIC STUDY GROUP
- 22- IAP = ISLAMIC ASSOCIATION FOR PALESTINE
- 23- UASR = UNITED ASSOCIATION FOR STUDIES AND RESEARCH
- 24- OLF = OCCUPIED LAND FUND
- 25- MIA = MERCY INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION

- 26- ISNA = ISLAMIC CIRCLE OF NORTH AMERICA
- 27- BMI = BAITUL MAL INC
- 28- IIIT = INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR ISLAMIC THOUGHT
- 29- IIC = ISLAMIC INFORMATION CENTER

ANALYSIS OF MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD'S GENERAL STRATEGIC GOALS FOR NORTH AMERICA MEMORANDUM

**Stephen Coughlin
7 September 2007**

INTRODUCTION

The following is a brief analysis of a Muslim Brotherhood document entered into evidence in the *U.S. v Holy Land Foundation* trial (Trial) that the U.S. Justice Department is currently prosecuting in Federal Court. Analysis is based on this document as well as other publicly available documents. (For a broad offering of Trial documents, see <http://www.nefafoundation.org/hlfdocs.html>). The attached documents relate to ISNA and the Trial.

- The first document is a Muslim Brotherhood memorandum that was accepted into evidence in the *U.S. v Holy Land Foundation* (HLF) case. The first 16 pages are in the original Arabic and the second are English language translations of the same. It is dated 22 May 1991 and titled “An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America” (Memorandum). The document includes an Attachment 1 that contains “**a list of our organizations and the organizations of our friends.**”
 - Among those noted in the Attachment are ISNA, MSA, AMSS, AMSE, NAIT, IFC, IPAC, IAP, UASR, ICNA (typo in the second listing) and IIIT. ICNA and ISNA are the only two organizations named in the body of the text. ISNA is additionally represented on the list as IFC (ISNA Fiqh Committee – now the Fiqh Council of North America) and IPAC (ISNA Political Awareness Committee).
- The second document is a signed letter from Members of Congress Pete Hoekstra and Sue Myrick to the Justice Department dated 28 August 2007 formally requesting that Justice stand down from “co-sponsoring” a conference with ISNA due to its very close relationship to the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas. Justice attended anyhow. The Memorandum was admitted into evidence at the same time the Letter was sent addressing Congressional concerns.

DISCUSSION

(A) ACCEPTED AS EVIDENCE.

It should be noted that the Memorandum met evidentiary standards to be admissible as evidence in a Federal Court of law.

(B) THE ENUMERATED ENTITIES ARE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD.

As noted, both ICNA and ISNA are identified and described in the body of the Memorandum in these contexts:

- The positive development with the brothers in the **Islamic Circle** in an attempt to reach a unity of merger.
- We have the seed for a “comprehensive *Dawa*’ educational” organization: We have the *Dawa*’ section in **ISNA**.

The enumerated recognition suggests that ISNA and ICNA, as elements of the entity that drafted the Memorandum, are likewise elements of the Muslim Brotherhood. Additionally, the Memorandum refers to the entities designated in Attachment (1) as currently held possessions:

- What encourages us to do that – in addition to the aforementioned – is that **we possess** “seeds” for each organization from the organization we call for [See attachment (1)].

(C) MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN CHARGE IN NORTH AMERICA.

The Memorandum expressly recognizes the Muslim Brotherhood (*Ikkwan*) as the controlling element. For example, the first authority identified as the basis of the Memorandum is the Muslim Brotherhood:

- The general strategic goal of the Group in America which was approved by the *Shura* Council and the Organizational Conference for the year 1987 in “Enablement of Islam in North America, meaning: establishing the effective and stable Islamic Movement led by the **Muslim Brotherhood** which adopts Muslims’ causes domestically and globally, and which works to expand the observant Muslim base, aims at unifying and directing Muslims’ efforts, presents Islam as a civilization alternative, and supports the global Islamic State wherever it is”.

Next, the Memorandum expressly identifies the Muslim Brotherhood as the leadership element in implementing the strategic goals:

- Also, we must summon and take along “elements” of the general strategic goal of the Group in North America and I will intentionally repeat them in numbers. They are:
 - (1) Establishing an effective and stable **Islamic Movement led by the Muslim Brotherhood**.

The status of the Muslim Brotherhood as being in charge of all Muslim organizations in North America is reinforced in a statement asserting that establishing Islam as a part of America is to be done through a civilization level Jihad:

- In order for Islam and its Movement to become “a part of the homeland” in which it lives, “stable” in the land, “rooted” in the spirits and minds of its people, “enabled” in the lives of its society and has firmly-established “organizations” on which the Islamic structure is built and with which the testimony of the civilization is achieved, the Movement must plan and struggle to obtain “the keys” and the tools of this process in carry out this grand mission as a **“Civilization Jihadist”** responsibility which lies on the shoulders of Muslim and – **on top of them – the Muslim Brotherhood in this country.**

An analysis of the entities designated in Attachment (1) of the Memorandum, along with those entities that can be reasonably assessed to have spun off from them since 1991, should be assessed to see what organizational presence they represent.

(D) CIVILIZATION-JIHAD: THE STRATEGIC GOAL OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD.

Having established its leadership, the Memorandum states the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in North America:

- The process of settlement is a **“Civilization-Jihadist Process”** with all the means. **The Ikhwan must understand that their work in America is a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and “sabotaging” its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and Allah’s religion is made victorious over all other religions.** Without this level of understanding, we are not up to this challenge and have not prepared ourselves for *Jihad* yet. **It is a Muslim’s destiny to perform Jihad** and work wherever he is and wherever he lands until the final hour comes, and there is not escape from that destiny except for those who chose to slack. But, would the slackers and the *Mujahedeen* be equal.
- As part of the process is “[the] conviction that the success of the settlement of Islam and its Movement in this country [America] is a success to the global Islamic Movement and true support for the sought after state [*caliphate*] God willing.”

The first bullet is a clear threat statement of hostile intent while the second speaks to foreign agency to a transnational movement with stated objectives that overlap with al-Qaeda’s. When assessing members who belong to organizations known to be identified with the Muslim Brotherhood, the inference should be that their designated leaders have knowledge of its identified roles and missions. It is not reasonable to do otherwise.

The strategic goal of the Muslim Brotherhood in North America is multifold: the destruction of Western civilization through a long-term civilization-killing *Jihad* from within (“by their [our] hands”) and through sabotage (“the hands of the believers”) and, secondly; to support the global Islamic movement to establish an Islamic super-state, the *caliphate*.

When conducting outreach with organizations identified as being a party to the “strategic goals” identified in the Memorandum, the gain/loss assessment of associating with them should be undertaken in light of their clearly stated hostile intent that includes

the subversion of American institutions through outreach, strategic deception and perception management. To undertake outreach with known identified organizations without knowledge of their objectives is to run the extreme risk of strategic manipulation by declared *Jihad* entities in ways that fulfill stated Muslim Brotherhood objectives as enumerated in the Memorandum.

(E) ENUMERATED MB ORGANIZATIONS AND TRUESPEAK.

As part of a presentation designed to change the lexicon of the GWOT (*hiraba* not *Jihad*), Jim Guirard explains that his proposed terms and definitions come from a group of “moderate” Muslims and other experts. He provides a list of contributors as part of his handout. Cross-referencing the names from his *TrueSpeak* list with the list of organizations provided in Attachment (1) of the Memorandum gives cause for concern:

- For example, along with ICNA and ISNA, Attachment (1) also lists the Association of Muslim Social Scientists (AMSS), the United Association for Studies and Research (UASR), the International Institute for Islamic Thought (IIIT), the Muslim Student Association (MSA) and the North American Islamic Trust (NAIT).

If one were to list all of Guirard’s contributors who are associated with, for example, the **Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy (CSID)**, one might be able to glean a web of Muslim Brotherhood associations. From the *TrueSpeak* list, it turns out that the following CSID members are also members of identified Muslim Brotherhood entities:

- Muqtedar Khan (AMSS, IIIT), Akbar Ahmed (AMSS, IIIT), Anthony Sullivan (AMSS, IIIT), Robert Crane (UASR, IIIT), Asma Afsaruddin (AMSS), and Layla Sein (AMSS, IIIT).
- Other CSID members listed in the *TrueSpeak* brochure are John Esposito and Radwan Masmoudi.

If one accepts the Memorandum statement that “the big challenge ... is how to turn these seeds or ‘scattered’ elements into comprehensive, stable, ‘settled’ organizations that are connected with our movement,” then it appears that the Muslim Brotherhood succeeded in getting CSID to “fly in our orbit and take orders from our guidance.”

Other notables on the *TrueSpeak* list of “moderate” contributors:

- Shaykh Taha Jabir al-Awani. Chairman, North America Fiqh Council (in 1991 the IFC and still an ISNA affiliate) and was a co-founder and President of IIIT. He was also un-indicted coconspirator number 5 in the al-Arian trial.
- Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi. [US designated supporter of terrorism] Co-founder of ISNA’s HQ in Boston along with ISNA founder Alamoudi (convicted and incarcerated for material support to terrorism related offenses).

- Dr. Aboul-Hakin (Sherman Jackson). Trustee of NAIT and the MSA (Muslim Student Association), Board Member of the Fiqh Council of North America (ISNA affiliate)
- Jeremy Henzell. Executive Director AMSS, published by IIIT.
- Sayed Syeed. President of MSA, cofounder ISNA, General Secretary AMSS, Director of Academic Outreach IIIT.

It is worth noting that when Mr. Guirard “cites” to authority for the terms and definitions he uses, it is to these individuals and not to reviewable published authoritative sources. This is hearsay.

Based on the Memorandum, it turns out that many of the individuals that provide *TrueSpeak* with the terms and definitions – that Guirard would have us use to conceptualize and orient to the enemy - are known to be associated with threat entities that believe “their work in America is a kind of grand *Jihad* in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and ‘sabotaging’ its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and Allah’s religion is made victorious over all other religions.” There are sound reasons to question the uncritical adoption of *TrueSpeak*’s uncritically accepted war on terror lexicon.

The primary definition of *Jihad* that Guirard’s “moderates” would have *TrueSpeak* impose on the USG is called “*Jihad al-Kabir*” that they define as “the only one specifically mentioned in the Qur’an, [and] is the spiritual and intellectual jihad to promote knowledge of Divine Revelation through all of Allah’s prophets and to carry out ijihad or intellectual effort in applying both Revelation and natural law to human affairs.”¹ **The very people who have *TrueSpeak* advocating that the USG adopt a definition of *Jihad* based on “*Jihad al-Kabir*” understand their own *Jihad* to be a grand civilization-level activity calling for the elimination and destruction of Western civilization from within and through sabotage.**

(F) THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD FOLLOWS THE *MILESTONES*.

As a Muslim Brotherhood document, it should not surprise that it follows Sayyid Qutb’s *Milestone* formula based on progressive revelation (revelation in stages) as first experienced by Muhammad and the first most perfect generation of Muslims. (For a

¹ From the *Umdat al-Salik*, Islamic law defines jihad as “war against non-Muslims ... signifying warfare to establish the religion.” Qur’an Verse 9:5 is among the most pre-eminent and it states: “*But when the forbidden months are past, then fight and slay the pagans wherever ye find them, and seize them and beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem of war; but if they repent, and establish regular prayers and practice regular charity, then open the way for them.*” Islamic law recognizes no authority except that which comes from Allah (Islam is not just a religion but a complete way of life governed by Islamic law that comes from Allah Who is alone sovereign).

more detailed explanation, see Appendix C [Abrogation and Progressive Revelation] of Thesis) Hence, Part Four, Section 3 “Understanding the historical stages ...” lists 8 stages of development that emphasizes the need for a “gradual and balanced ‘time-frame’” approach that is patterned after the revelation in stages that reflects the “role during the time of Allah’s prophet” who was “the first pioneer of this phenomenon.”

Because the Memorandum is understood to be a Muslim Brotherhood work, the lexicon used to define the terms it uses (for example *jihad*, *dawa*, *dar al-arqam* and *Ustras*) should likewise come from the Muslim Brotherhood dictionary (the “threat vocabulary”).

CONCLUSION

The HLF Trial is turning up primary source threat documentation and information that provides new insights into global jihad organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood.

- These documents are beginning to define the structure and outline of domestic *Jihad* threat entities, associated non-governmental organizations and potential terrorist or insurgent support systems.
- The Memorandum also describes aspects of the global jihad’s strategic information warfare campaign and indications of its structure, reach and activities.
- Consequently, outreach strategies must be adjusted in the face of credible information that seeming Islamic humanitarian or professional non-governmental organizations may be part of the global jihad with potential for being part of the terrorist or insurgent support system.

The Memorandum identifies ISNA as an element of the Muslim Brotherhood that the Justice Department already designated as an unindicted coconspirator that Congress has given formal notice that it has knowledge. Outreach as an end in itself can cause those responsible for its success to so narrowly focus on the outreach relationship that they miss the surrounding events and lose perspective. This could undermine unity of effort in Homeland Security, lead to potential for embarrassment for the USG and legitimize threat organizations by providing them domestic sanctuary. In light of unfolding events, disregarding a Congressional request to suspend attendance at the ISNA conference may result in some uncommonly uncomfortable public testimony.

Modeling the Behavior of Violent Extremists:

An Evidence-Based Methodology and System for Instruction and Analysis

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Abstract—This paper presents an evidence-based methodology and a web-based system for modeling the behavior of violent Sunni extremists. The system can teach and guide its users to assess whether an English translation is an authoritative text in Sunni Sharia, and whether a definition or rule of behavior from an authoritative text is accepted and followed by violent Sunni extremists. More importantly, it can teach and guide its users how to assess complex hypothesized behavior by using evidence and the verified definitions and rules of behavior, helping to investigate, comprehend, and anticipate the behavior of violent extremists.

Behavior modeling; violent extremists; evidence-based reasoning; hypotheses analysis; analytic tool; cognitive assistant

I. INTRODUCTION

This paper presents an evidence-based methodology for modeling the behavior of individuals and groups that follow a set of rules documented in authoritative sources. An example of such a set of rules is any system of law, such as US Constitutional, English Commons, or Sharia. Other examples are published Soviet military doctrine, the US military doctrine, and any other well-documented doctrine.

The paper illustrates the application of this methodology to the modeling of the behavior of violent Sunni extremists who advocate strict adherence to Sunni Sharia.

Coughlin [1, p. 29] made the following observation: “For the WOT (war on terror), ... the relevant enemy doctrine used to drive the IPB (intelligence preparation of the battlefield) and subsequent decision making starts with the stated doctrine of Islamic ‘extremists’ irrespective of our assumptions of correctness. Specifically, ‘extremist’ doctrine calls for a return to Islamic law, Islamic governance, a return of the Caliphate and the willingness to wage *jihad* (which we call terrorism) in furtherance thereof. If these views accurately reflect the core principles of the enemy in the WOT and its followers believe it, act in furtherance of it, and are willing to kill because of it, then this is the idea-based doctrine that represents a threat to the United States, its citizens and allies.”

If it is true that “violent Sunni extremists” advocate strict adherence to Sunni Sharia and act according to its rules, then modeling their ideology, doctrine, goals, and planning has to be based on the strict Sunni Sharia rules that are followed by them. But how can one identify the rules that are important for the WOT, such as the rules of jihad, and make sure that they are indeed followed by the violent Sunni extremists? One can

use evidence-based reasoning with the TIACRITIS system [2-4] to:

- (1) Identify classical Sharia texts that are recognized as authoritative in Sunni Sharia.
- (2) Identify rules of behavior in the authoritative texts, and use evidence to determine whether they are indeed followed by violent Sunni extremists.
- (3) Use the verified rules of behavior and evidence to investigate, comprehend, and anticipate the behavior of violent Sunni extremists.

The rest of the paper illustrates this approach and is structured as follows:

Section II very briefly presents how to perform evidence-based hypothesis analysis with the TIACRITIS web-based system, which is at the basis of the proposed approach.

Section III shows how TIACRITIS teaches and guides its users to assess whether an English translation is an authoritative text in Sunni Sharia.

Section IV presents how TIACRITIS teaches and guides its users to assess whether a definition or rule of behavior from an authoritative text is accepted and followed by violent Sunni extremists. An example of an investigated rule is the following one: “For violent Sunni extremists, lying is permissible for circumventing those forbidding what is the permissible in Sunni Sharia.”

Section V presents how TIACRITIS teaches and guides its users to assess hypothesized behavior of violent Sunni extremists by using evidence and the identified definitions and rules of behavior. Examples of such hypotheses are:

“The burning of the Koran by a Florida pastor creates a serious threat of retaliation against UN and NATO personnel in Afghanistan from violent Sunni extremists.”

“The goal of the Muslim Brotherhood is to take full control of Egypt in order to establish an Islamic state governed by enforced Sharia, and it has adopted a language of freedom and justice as a step in this process, in accordance with its Milestones doctrine which is based on the Sharia principle of progressive revelation and the rule of abrogation.”

“The Muslim Brotherhood will have effective control of the new parliament of Egypt through its direct or indirect influence over key emerging political parties from a seemingly wide political spectrum.”

As will be discussed in Sections IV and V, TIACRITIS may easily be extended with other rules of behavior of violent Sunni extremists, and may be used to analyze any user-formulated hypothesis. Moreover, it learns from such analyses to facilitate the analysis of other hypotheses.

Finally, Section VI ends this paper with the claim that TIACRITIS can become an effective tool for teaching military, intelligence, law enforcement, and government personnel, on a topic which is very important in the war on terror and homeland defense, and can also become an effective analysis tool.

II. HYPOTHESES ANALYSIS WITH TIACRITIS

Assessing the authority of a Sunni Sharia text, assessing whether a certain elementary rule of behavior is followed by violent Sunni extremists, or assessing a more complex hypothesized behavior of violent Sunni extremists are all done by building argumentation structures that link evidence to the hypothesized behavior by evaluating the relevance, believability, and inferential force of evidence, as discussed in the TIACRITIS textbooks [3, 4]. These argumentation structures are developed by employing a general divide and conquer approach through problem reduction and solution synthesis, which is illustrated in Fig. 1.

Consider the problem "Assess hypothesis H_1 " from the top of Fig. 1. We want to solve it by employing various strategies that reduce it to simpler problems.

"Which is an assessment strategy? Assess H_{11} , H_{12} , and H_{13} ."

Therefore we reduce the assessment of the top level hypothesis H_1 to the assessment of three simpler hypotheses: H_{11} , H_{12} , and H_{13} . We continue this reduction process down to the level of elementary hypotheses to be assessed based on evidence.

Let us consider H_{12} as elementary hypothesis. We ask the question: "Which is a relevant item of evidence?" If E_1 is such an item of evidence, then we reduce the assessment of H_{12} to two simpler assessments: "Assess the relevance of E_1 to H_{12} " and "Assess the believability of E_1 " (see the bottom left of Fig. 1).

If E_2 is another relevant item of evidence, then we can also reduce the assessment of H_{12} to two other simpler assessments: "Assess the relevance of E_2 to H_{12} " and "Assess the believability of E_2 " (see the bottom right of Fig. 1).

Now let us assume that we have obtained the solutions of the leaf problems, as shown at the bottom of Fig. 1 (notice that we only show the likelihoods):

"If we assume that E_1 is believable, then H_{12} is *very likely* to be true" and "The believability of E_1 is *likely*."

"If we assume that E_2 is believable, then H_{12} is *certain* to be true" and "The believability of E_2 is *almost certain*."

We now need to combine all these solutions, from bottom-up, to obtain the solution of the top level problem. First we need to combine the relevance of E_1 (*very likely*) with its believability (*likely*) to obtain the inferential force of E_1 on H_{12} , which is the solution associated with the question/answer pair "Which is a relevant item of evidence? E_1 ." We may use various combination functions (e.g., min, max, average, weighted sum) but in the case of these problems it makes sense to use min since only evidence that is both relevant and believable will convince us that a hypothesis is true. We thus obtain "Based on E_1 the hypothesis H_{12} is *likely*." Similarly we obtain the inferential force of E_2 on H_{12} , "Based on E_2 the hypothesis H_{12} is *almost certain*." This is the solution associated with the question/answer pair "Which is a relevant item of evidence? E_2 ."

Next we have to combine the solutions associated with these two question/answer pairs to obtain the inferential force of both items of evidence on H_{12} , which is the evidence-based assessment of H_{12} . While various combination functions may again be used, in this case it makes sense to use max. Thus the obtained solution is: "Based on E_1 and E_2 the hypothesis H_{12} is *almost certain*."

We assess H_{11} and H_{13} in a similar way, obtaining the solutions *likely* and *very likely*, respectively.

Then we have to combine the solutions of H_{11} (*likely*), H_{12} (*almost certain*), and H_{13} (*very likely*), to obtain the solution corresponding to the employed strategy which, in this illustration, is associated with a weighted sum composition function (with the weight "high" for H_{11} , "very high" for H_{12} , and "medium" for H_{13}). This produces a likelihood of *very likely* which is also the likelihood of the top-level hypothesis (because the maximum of a single value is the value itself).




Figure 1. Illustration of the problem reduction / solution synthesis analysis paradigm.

It is through such an evidence-based problem reduction and solution synthesis process that all the hypotheses are assessed, as discussed in the following sections.

III. ANALYZING THE AUTHORITY OF SOURCE MATERIALS

The basis of the developed approach to assessing whether a text is considered authoritative by violent Sunni extremists is to identify a set of criteria and sub-criteria which need to be satisfied by the text. In establishing these criteria, we prefer to be wrong in assessing an authoritative text as non-authoritative, rather than being wrong in assessing a non-authoritative text as authoritative. Thus, our criteria might seem more stringent than necessary. However, this choice is justified by our goal of identifying texts on Sunni Sharia that are undisputably authoritative, and using these texts to extract the behavior rules that appear to be followed by violent Sunni extremists.

With the criteria and sub-criteria established, evaluating the authority of a text follows the problem reduction / solution synthesis approach discussed in the previous section:

- (1) The top-level criteria for text authority are successively reduced to simpler and simpler criteria, down to the level of elementary criteria.
- (2) The elementary criteria are assessed using evidence.
- (3) The results of the assessments of the elementary criteria are composed, from bottom-up, to obtain the overall assessment of text authority.

As Coughlin, we take the position that the Islamic law (Sharia) is a real body of law in the same sense as U.S. Constitutional, English common or European civil law, and hence it will be analyzed accordingly. "Individuals and sources broadly recognized as authorities or as authoritative sources inside the Islamic legal world will be presumed to be correct on the issues of law authoritatively attributed to them." [1, p. 45]

The Sunni Sharia doctrine is documented in classical texts in Arabic which are recognized as authoritative sources by the four orthodox Sunni Sharia schools of law: Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki, and Shafi'i. However, because most of the intended users of TIACRIS are English speakers who do not understand Arabic, we need to identify criteria for authoritative texts on Sharia in English. This should not be an insurmountable problem because most Muslims that follow Sharia do not speak Arabic and thus need to rely on non-Arabic works that convey authority.

Fig. 2 illustrates the identified criteria and subcriteria as they are applied to the evaluation of the authority of *Ibn Naqib 1994*, the 1994 edition of the English language translation of Ahmad ibn Naqib al-Misri's *'Umdat al-Salik (Reliance of the Traveller: A Classic Manual of Islamic Sacred Law)*. The book is "in Arabic with facing English text, commentary, and appendices edited and translated by Nu Ha Mim Keller" [5, book cover].

As shown in Fig.2, there are four top-level criteria: (1) The content that is translated should be authoritative in one of the four Sunni schools; (2) The text should be an accurate translation into English; (3) The text should be reflective of the

current views on Islam of a segment of the Muslim population; and (4) The text should be certified by recognized authority in the corresponding Sunni school.

Each of the first three criteria is further reduced to several elementary criteria, while the fourth criterion is an elementary one. Then each of the elementary criteria is assessed based on evidence. Let us consider the elementary criterion that the text should be certified by recognized authority. As shown at the bottom part of Fig.2, there are four items of favoring evidence and no disfavoring evidence. They correspond to the certifications received from national authorities in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria. Particularly convincing is the endorsement of Cairo's al-Azhar University (the most prestigious and authoritative institute of Islamic higher learning), in Arabic and English, with signature and stamps: "... concerning the examination of the English translation of the book 'Umadat al-salik wa 'uddat al-nasik by Ahmad ibn Naqib in the shafi'i school of jurisprudence, together with appendices by Islamic scholars on matters of Islamic law, tenets of faith, and personal ethics and character: we certify that the above-mentioned translation corresponds to the Arabic original and conforms to the practice and faith of the orthodox Sunni Community" [5, p. xx-xxi]. As a result of this and the other three certifications, it is assessed as being **certain** that *Ibn Naqib 1994* is certified by recognized authority.

After all the other elementary criteria are assessed based on evidence, their assessments are combined, indicating that *Ibn Naqib 1994* is **almost certain** to be an authoritative text in the Shafi'i law.




Figure 2. Evidence-based assessment of a Sunni Sharia text.

IV. ANALYZING DEFINITIONS AND RULES OF BEHAVIOR

Violent Sunni extremists advocate strict adherence to Sharia and “openly declare that they fight *Jihad* in furtherance of Islamic causes” [1, p. 15]. Thus, the first problem is to identify the definitions and rules that have doctrinal basis in Sunni Sharia. Additionally, however, one also needs to show that these definitions or rules are affirmed by contemporary religious authorities, and are actually confirmed by the behavior of violent Sunni extremists. To show that there is doctrinal basis for a statement (definition or rule) one may show that there is ijma-scholarly consensus on that statement among all the four doctrinal schools of Sunni Sharia: Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki, and Shafi’i. Alternatively, one may show that there is doctrinal basis for that statement in any one of these doctrinal schools. This, in turn, requires showing that there is either Koranic basis, or Sahih hadith basis, or classical writing basis in any one of these schools.

Fig. 3 shows an abstract argumentation structure for assessing a specific statement, such as “For violent Sunni extremists, jihad means to wage war against non-Muslims to establish religion.” Other analyzed hypothesized statements are:

For violent Sunni extremists,

- jihad is required until the entire world is brought under Islam.
- fighting jihad is required when non-Muslim forces enter Muslim lands.
- lying is permissible for circumventing those forbidding what is the permissible in Sunni Sharia.
- lying is obligatory when necessary to achieve an obligatory Sunni Sharia goal.
- taqiyya-deception is permitted against non-Muslims in furtherance of Islamic objectives or the protection of Islam.
- ghiba-slander means to mention anything concerning a person that he would dislike.
- ghiba-slander is unlawful.
- namima-talebearing consists of quoting someone’s words to another in a way that worsens relations between them.
- namima-talebearing in unlawful.

The user may hypothesize any statement like the above




Figure 3. Assessing whether, for violent Sunni extremists, jihad means to wage war against non-Muslims to establish religion.

ones, and TIACRITIS will guide her in assessing it based on evidence and the argumentation structure from Fig. 3. Examples of statements to hypothesize are:

For violent Sunni extremists,

- killing of non-Muslims in furtherance of Islam is permissible.
- own death in furtherance of killing non-Muslim forces in Muslim land is allowed.
- shahid-martyrdom means to be killed in jihad.
- martyr is the only person guaranteed paradise in the Koran.
- offensive jihad is required when Muslim forces can defeat non-Muslim forces.
- refraining from engaging in violence is required when non-Muslim forces are too powerful to defeat or when there is a likelihood of non-Muslim forces becoming Muslim.
- truces are understood as the suspension of jihad for a limited period and never just for maintaining the status-quo.
- all land on Earth has been given by Allah to Muslims in perpetuity.
- Muslims are required to regain any territory that was ever claimed for Islam that has since been lost.
- Muslims are required to progressively claim new territory for Islam until the entire world has been claimed.
- peace means submission to Islam.
- world peace comes when the entire world has submitted to Islam.
- abrogation means that the later revealed Koranic verses control or overrule previously revealed verses where there is conflict.
- as law, Sharia represents the end-state of Koranic revelation where conflicting earlier revelations are abrogated or controlled.
- Sharia is the law of the land that governs all aspects of Muslim life individually and collectively and is understood as such.
- freedom means complete servitude to Islam by liberating man from the laws and desires of man.
- justice means justice according to Sharia.
- apostasy denotes the free act of leaving Islam or engaging in acts codified in Sharia as acts that entail leaving Islam.
- voluntarily leaving Islam is apostasy punishable by death.

V. UNDERSTANDING AND PREDICTING BEHAVIOR

TIACRITIS allows its users to:

- Define behavior hypotheses;
- Develop argumentation structures to assess the behavior hypotheses;
- Collect evidence and represent it in the knowledge base of TIACRITIS;
- Associate evidence to elementary hypotheses in the argumentation structure;
- Assess and justify the relevance and the believability of evidence;
- Make assessments and assumptions with respect to certain sub-hypotheses;

- Select the composition functions for determining the inferential force of evidence; and
- Assess the hypothesized behavior.

The hypothesized behavior logic may use the definitions and rules that were assessed as discussed in Section IV. Moreover, TIACRITIS will learn from the analyzed hypotheses to more efficiently support the analysis of new behavior hypotheses.

We will illustrate the above capabilities with an example. Following the Britain’s award of knighthood to author Salman Rushdie, Mohammed Ijaz ul-Haq, Pakistani religious affairs minister, formulated the following threat reported in Washington Times (see Fig. 4):

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan (AP) — Pakistan yesterday condemned Britain's award of a knighthood to author Salman Rushdie, and a Cabinet minister said *the honor provided a justification for suicide attacks*. "This is an occasion for the world's 1.5 billion Muslims to look at the seriousness of this decision," Mohammed Ijaz ul-Haq, religious affairs minister, said in parliament. "The West is accusing Muslims of extremism and terrorism. If someone exploded a bomb on his body, he would be right to do so unless the British government apologizes and withdraws the 'sir' title," Mr. ul-Haq said. ... "The 'sir' title from Britain for blasphemer Salman Rushdie has hurt the sentiments of the Muslims across the world."

Figure 4. Fragment from a Washington Times article [6].

Soon after this declaration, two British doctors of Pakistani origin loaded their cars with explosives which were later found in populated London locations prior to detonation, and two people, one a Pakistani medical student, attacked the Glasgow airport [7].

The question is: Do the above events illustrate a general pattern of behavior of violent Sunni extremists that could be used to understand and predict their future behavior?

Using TIACRITIS, the user formulates the hypothesis analysis problem in English and selects its instances, as shown in Fig. 5. This allows TIACRITIS to learn the following general hypothesis analysis pattern:

"Assess whether the characterization of ?01 as ?02 by ?03 creates a serious threat of retaliation against ?04 from ?05."

Then the user and TIACRITIS reduce the initial problem to simpler and simpler problems, down to the level of elementary hypothesis analysis problems to be assessed based on evidence, as shown in Fig. 6 and discussed in the following.

Notice that each hypothesis analysis problem is followed by a question/answer pair which guides the decomposition of that problem into simpler problems. Thus the top level problem is decomposed into two subproblems. The first one is further decomposed into three simpler problems, while the second one is an elementary hypothesis to be assessed based on evidence.

The reasoning step from the middle-bottom part of Fig.6 is:

Assess whether the **offense to Muslim world** is a serious crime in **Sunni Sharia** requiring mandatory punishment.

Q: What **Sunni Sharia** rule is violated by the **offense to Muslim world**?

A: **ghiba-slander is unlawful**, where **ghiba-slander means to mention anything concerning a person that he would dislike**, and where **penalty for ghiba-slander of the Prophet or Islam can be death**.

Therefore, one may conclude:

It is **certain** that the **offense to Muslim world** is a serious crime in **Sunni Sharia** requiring mandatory punishment.

Notice that the answer of the above question is based on Sunni Sharia definitions and rules of behavior which have been proven by evidence, as discussed in Section IV.

Some of the reasoning steps in Fig. 6 may be suggested by TIACRITIS, if it has encountered similar steps in past analyses. Additionally, at the request of the user (see the “**Reformulate Statement...**” command from the menu at the right of Fig. 6), TIACRITIS may suggest reformulations of a hypothesis analysis problem in order to reuse a previously learned reasoning pattern. For example, by using its natural language processing capabilities, TIACRITIS suggested to reformulate

"Assess whether **Britain** will be punished by **violent Sunni extremists** for its **Sunni Sharia** crime." into

"Assess whether **violent Sunni extremists** will punish **Britain** for a crime requiring mandatory punishment in **Sunni Sharia**."

Because the user accepted this reformulation as a good statement of the problem to solve, TIACRITIS automatically decomposed it, as shown in Fig. 7. Then, after the user assessed as **almost certain** the likelihood of the right-hand side problem "Assess whether **violent Sunni extremists** have capability to punish **Britain** for a crime requiring mandatory punishment in **Sunni Sharia**", TIACRITIS automatically assessed the likelihoods of the other reasoning nodes in the tree from Fig. 7.

The argumentation structure shown in Fig. 6 and in Fig. 7 successively decompose the top-level hypothesis analysis problem from the top of Fig. 6, down to the level of elementary hypotheses or solutions. Next the user may directly assess an elementary hypothesis (as illustrated with the problem from the right-hand side of Fig. 7), or she may do this based on relevant evidence, as discussed below.

The user may associate any number of search criteria with elementary hypotheses which are then used by TIACRITIS to search for evidence in various repositories. This is illustrated in Fig. 8. The top part shows an elementary hypothesis for which there is no evidence in TIACRITIS. The bottom part shows a search criteria defined by the user, to guide TIACRITIS in

Assess whether the characterization of **the award of knighthood to Salman Rushdie by Britain** as **offense to Muslim world** by **Mohammed Ijaz ul-Haq** creates a serious threat of retaliation against **Britain** from **violent Sunni extremists**.

Figure 5. Formulation of a hypothesis analysis problem.




Figure 6. Reduction of a hypothesis analysis problem.

searching for relevant evidence on the Internet with BING, GOOGLE, or YAHOO (or with other search engines and in other repositories).

The user may easily define new items of evidence, and may associate them with the hypotheses they favor or disfavor, as illustrated in Fig. 9. The top part of Fig. 9 is the description of the evidence item EVD-001-ul-Haq, a Washington Times article fragment with a citation from the Associated Press indicating that Mohammed Ijaz ul-Haq is the religious affairs minister of Pakistan. The user has selected the type of EVD-001-ul-Haq as *unequivocal testimonial evidence obtained at second hand* because the source, Washington Times, received the information from another source (Associated Press). Then the user indicated that this item of evidence favors the hypothesis “Mohammed Ijaz ul-Haq is a recognized religious leader in *Sunni Sharia*,” as shown in the bottom part of Fig. 9.

As a result, TIACRITIS automatically generated the corresponding evidence-based analysis, as shown in Fig. 10. Notice that it considered both favoring and disfavoring evidence, and included EVD-001-ul-Haq as favoring evidence for which one needs to assess the relevance and the believability. Because EVD-001-ul-Haq is unequivocal testimonial evidence obtained at second hand, its believability

depends both on the believability of the primary source and on the believability of the secondary source. The believability of each source depends on that source’s competence and credibility. Competence depends on access and understandability, while credibility depends on veracity, objectivity, and observational sensitivity.

The user has assessed the relevance of EVD-001-ul-Haq as *certain*, and its believability as *almost certain*. Then TIACRITIS has combined these assessments into an inferential force of *almost certain*, and has computed the likelihood of the corresponding elementary hypothesis.

Notice that although TIACRITIS has provided a detailed believability analysis, the user may drill down into this analysis at the desired level and, in this case, decided to assess directly the believability of EVD-001-ul-Haq, rather than assessing lower level believability credentials, such as veracity.

After all the elementary hypotheses have been assessed, either based on evidence or by making assumptions, the user has to select the solution composition functions (e.g., min, max, average, weighted sum) to be used by TIACRITIS to determine the likelihoods of all the intermediary hypotheses and of the top level hypothesis, as shown in Fig. 11, and discussed in Section II.




Figure 7. Hypothesis assessment.

TIACRITIS not only supports its user in analyzing such hypotheses, but it also continuously learns from this joint problem solving process, to facilitate the analyses of new hypothesis. Consider, for examples, the following hypothesis analyses problems:

"Assess whether the characterization of the call by Pope Benedict XVI for the repeal of the Pakistan blasphemy law as offense to Muslim world by Liaquat Baloch creates a serious threat of retaliation against Vatican from violent Sunni extremists."

and

"Assess whether the characterization of the burning of the Koran by Florida pastor as offense to Muslim world by Afghani imam creates a serious threat of retaliation against NATO and UN forces in Afghanistan from violent Sunni extremists."

For each of them, TIACRITIS will suggest argumentation structures similar to those shown in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 which the

Hypothesis: Mohammed Ijaz ul-Haq is a recognized religious leader in Sunni Sharia [REASONING]

Favoring evidence (0): No evidence.

Disfavoring evidence (0): No evidence.

Search for relevant evidence:

Search criterion: Mohammed Ijaz ul-Haq is religious leader [EDIT] [DELETE] [NEW]

- Mohammed Ijaz ul-Haq is religious leader

Search with: [BING] [GOOGLE] [YAHOO]

Figure 8. Evidence collection.

Selected item of evidence: EVD-001-ul-Haq [RENAME] [DELETE EVIDENCE]

Description: "ISLAMABAD, Pakistan (AP) — Pakistan yesterday condemned Britain's award of a knighthood to author Salman Rushdie, and a Cabinet minister said the honor provided a justification for suicide attacks. "This is an occasion for the world's 1.5 billion Muslims to look at the seriousness of this decision," Mohammed Ijaz ul-Haq, religious affairs minister, said in parliament." Washington Times, "Sir Salman Slammed," online ed., 19 June 2007, URL: http://www.washingtontimes.com/article/20070619/FOREIGN/106190021&SearchID=73284751953045 [EDIT]

Extracted from: not specified (select a collected information to link with)

Type: unequivocal testimonial evidence obtained at second hand [CHANGE]

By the source: Washington Times [RENAME] [CHANGE]

Who obtained the information from the source: Associated Press [RENAME] [CHANGE]

Favors:

- Mohammed Ijaz ul-Haq is a recognized religious leader in Sunni Sharia [REMOVE] [REASONING] [COLLECTION]

Irrelevant to:

- violent Sunni extremists have the capability to punish Britain for a crime requiring mandatory punishment in Sunni Sharia [FAVORS] [DISFAVORS] [REASONING] [COLLECTION]
- there are previous cases of retaliation for offense to Muslim world by violent Sunni extremists [FAVORS] [DISFAVORS] [REASONING] [COLLECTION]

Figure 9. Evidence representation and use.




Figure 10. Evidence-based assessment of elementary hypotheses.

user can change, if desired.

VI. FINAL REMARKS

We have presented an evidence-based methodology and a web-based system for modeling the behavior of violent Sunni extremists. The system contains numerous case studies for teaching military, intelligence, law enforcement, and government personnel, on a topic which is very important in the war on terror and homeland defense. Its use is supported by a textbook which provides more details on the methodology and more explanations of the case studies [3].

The system can be extended with additional rules of behavior and, as illustrated in the previous sections, supports its users during the entire process of hypothesis formulation, evidence collection, and hypothesis testing, based on the Computational Theory of Intelligence Analysis developed in the Learning Agents Center [2-4]. TIACRITIS has a client-server architecture and is available to government organizations who can run the TIACRITIS client in a web browser. Several such organizations already have TIACRITIS accounts, including the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Counterterrorism Center, the Army War College, and the Joint Forces Staff College.

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


Figure 11. Top part of the hypothesis analysis tree showing the solution composition functions.

FREEDOM & JUSTICE a Muslim Brotherhood Identifier



10 9 2018 Last update 19:14 PM GMT

IKHWANWEB
The Muslim Brotherhood's Official English web site

Monday, February 21, 2011
:: News > FJP News



MB announces establishment of political party: Freedom and Justice
Egypt's largest political opposition the Muslim Brotherhood, has confirmed that it is preparing to establish a political party calling it the Freedom and Justice Party, or Horeya and Adala.

IkhwanWeb

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Loretta Lynch Vows to Prosecute Those Who Use 'Anti-Muslim' Speech That 'Edges Toward Violence'

TRUNews VIDEO: AG Loretta Lynch to Prosecute Anti-Muslim Speech



BY JAMES BARRETT DECEMBER 4, 2015

The day after a horrific shooting spree by what appears to be a **radicalized Muslim man and his partner** in San Bernardino, California, Attorney General Loretta Lynch pledged to a Muslim advocacy and lobbying group that she would take aggressive action against anyone who used "anti-Muslim rhetoric" that "**edges toward violence**."



The Muslim Brotherhood's Official English Website



IKHWANWEB
The Muslim Brotherhood's Official English web site

Monday, February 21, 2011 19:37
Justice Party, or Horeya and Adala.

MB announces establishment of political party: Freedom and Justice




TV NETWORKS RADIO SCHEDULE MYC-SPAN LOGIN

C-SPAN VIDEO LIBRARY | 256,148 hours of content
CREATED BY CABLE IN 1979 QUICK GUIDE Search by keyword, name, etc.

Series v Congress Executive Supreme Court

DECEMBER 3, 2015
Attorney General Loretta Lynch at Muslim Advocates Dinner
Attorney General Loretta Lynch talked about issues facing Muslims in the U.S. in at the annual Muslim Advocates dinner. She expressed... [read more](#)




MUSLIM ADVOCATES ANNUAL DINNER
FOR MORE INFORMATION muslimadvocates.org

C-SPAN
c-span.org

NEXT DEFENSE SEC. CARTER ON WOMEN IN COMBAT 1:25am ET

The Muslim Brotherhood's FREEDOM & JUSTICE



as in -

Justice Freedom and

Monday, February 21, 2011 19:37

MB announces establishment of political party: Freedom and Justice
Egypt's largest political opposition the Muslim Brotherhood, has confirmed that it is preparing to establish a political party calling it the Freedom and Justice Party, or Horeya and Adala.




http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=28077&utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter

Is Milestones' FREEDOM & JUSTICE




as in -

Justice Freedom and



Milestones' FREEDOM



Freedom



- the MB Way!

as in -



The universal **declaration of the freedom** of man on the earth from every authority except that of Allah, and the declaration of sovereignty is Allah's alone and that He is the Lord of the universe. (Chapter 4, p. 105)



Freedom

Freedom and Justice



This religion is not merely a **declaration of the freedom** of the Arabs, nor is its message confined to the Arabs. It addresses itself to the whole of mankind, and its sphere of work is the whole earth. (Chapter 4, p. 10)



Freedom



Islam is a **declaration of the freedom** of men from servitude to other men. Thus it strives from the beginning to abolish all those systems and governments which are based on the rule of man over men and the servitude of one human being to another. (Chapter 4, p. 109)



Freedom

Freedom



Islam is not merely a belief, so that it is enough merely to preach it. Islam, which is a way of life, takes practical steps to organize a **movement for freeing of man**. Other societies do not give it any opportunity to organise its followers according to its own method, and **hence it is the duty of Islam to annihilate all such systems, as they are obstacles in the way of universal freedom**. (Chapter 4, p. 137)



Freedom

Freedom



Freedom




- the MB Way!

as in -



The universal... on the e... Allah, an... alone an... (Chapter...



Freedom

Freedom and



This religion is really a universal declaration of the **freedom of man** from servitude to other men and from servitude to his own desires, which is also a form of human servitude; **it is a declaration that sovereignty belongs to God alone** and that He is the Lord of all the worlds. **It means a challenge to all kinds and forms of systems which are based on the concept of the sovereignty of man; in other words, where man has usurped the Divine attribute.** Any system in which the final decisions are referred to human beings, and in which the sources of all authority are human, deifies human beings by designating others than God as lords over men. This declaration means that the usurped authority of God be returned to Him and the usurpers be thrown out - those who by themselves devise laws for others to follow, thus elevating themselves to the status of lords and reducing others to the status of slaves. **In short, to proclaim the authority and sovereignty of God means to eliminate all human kingship and to announce the rule of the Sustainer of the universe over the entire earth.** (Chapter 4, p. 103)



Freedom



Freedom

Freedom



Freedom

(Chapter 4, p. 137)

Milestones' JUSTICE



Justice

- the MB Way!



as in -

Justice Freedom and



The society was **freed** from all oppression, and the Islamic system was established in which **justice** was **God's justice** and in which weighing was by God's balance. The banner of **social justice** was raised in the name of **One God**, and the name of the banner was Islam. No other name was added to it, and "**La ilaha illa Allah**" was written on it. (Chapter 2, p. 51)



Justice

Justice Freedom and



The society was **freed** from all oppression, and the Islamic system was established in which **justice** was **God's justice** and in which weighing was by God's balance. **Justice** was the name of the name was written



In the Islamic concept, the sovereignty of God means not merely that one should derive all legal injunctions from God and judge according to these injunctions; in Islam the meaning of the '**Shari'ah**' is not limited to mere legal injunctions, but includes the principles of administration, its system and its modes. This narrow meaning (i.e., that the **Shari'ah** is limited to legal injunctions) does not apply to the **Shari'ah** nor does it correspond to the Islamic concept. By 'the **Shari'ah** of God is meant everything legislated by God for ordering man's life; it includes the principles of belief, principles of administration and **justice**, principles of morality and human relationships, and principles of knowledge.



Justice

(Chapter 8, p. 199-200)



Justice Freedom and



The society was **freed** from all oppression, and the Islamic system was established in which **justice** was **God's justice** and in which weighing was by God's balance. **Justice** was the name of the name was written



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"God has sent us to bring anyone who wishes from servitude to men into the service of God alone, from the narrowness of this world into the vastness of this world and the Here- after, and from the tyranny of religions into the **justice of Islam**. God raised a messenger for this purpose to teach His creatures His way. If anyone accepts this way of life, we turn back and give his country back to him, **and we fight with those who rebel** until we are martyred or become victorious" .



Justice

(Chapter 4, p. 128-129)



Brazen Disinformation

The **Al Jazeera** narrative points to the briefing slides suggesting they are the product of **delusional conspiracy theorists** when in fact the reporter specifically points to briefing slides of documents admitted into a **Federal Court of Law** that proved exactly the points being **ridiculed – DELIBERATELY?**



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How Dishonest?

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[Steve Simms, et al. vs. Jerral Wayne Jones, et al.](#)

[USA v. Smadi 3:09-cr-294-M](#)

[USA v. Hill, et al. - Slovacek, Ronald W.](#)

[USA v. Hill, et al. - Rashad, Jibreel A](#)

[USA v. Donald W. Hill, et al.](#)

[Securities and Exchange Commission, et al., v. CRW Management and Ray White, et al.](#)

[USA v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development](#) ←

[Siesta Village Market, LLC, d/b/a Siesta Market, et al. v. Rick Perry, Governor of Texas, et al.](#)

<https://ecf.txnd.uscourts.gov/coop/notable/hlf2.html>

Judges - Notable Cases

USA v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development

Exhibit List

| Date | Government Exhibits | Defense Exhibits |
|----------|--|--|
| 09/23/08 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Map 4 • Map 3 • Map 5 • Demonstrative 12 • Hamas Charter 1 • Hamas Charter 2 • Pictures 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 • Pictures 12, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20 • Demonstrative 9 • Demonstrative 13 • Demonstrative 14 • Demonstrative 17 • Designation 2 • Designation 4 • Designation 5 • Federal Register • GOI 1 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ex 963 • Ex 1052 • Ex 1013 • Ex 910 • Ex 1110 • Ex 87 |
| 09/24/08 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Designation-2 • Mushtaha House 1 • Mushtaha House 2 • Hamas Letter 1 • Hamas Letter 2 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Paragraph 2 of Doc. 1094 • Ex 1054 |
| 09/25/08 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Secretary of State CA-1 • Picture 2 • Picture 3 • Picture 4 • Picture 5 • Picture 6 • Secretary of State CA-2 • HLF Search - 1 • HLF Search - 2 • HLF Search - 3 • Secretary of State CA-3 • Mushtaha Search - 6 • NAIT • Secretary of State TX-3 • Secretary of State TX - 2 • Secretary of State TX - 4 • I/E Marzook Bank Account - 1 • I/E Marzook Bank Account - 2 • I/E Marzook Bank Account - 3 • Elbarasse Search - 1 • Elbarasse Search - 2 • Elbarasse Search - 3 • Elbarasse Search - 5 | |

• Elbarasse Search - 3

GOVERNMENT EXHIBIT
003-0085

3:04-CR-240-G
U.S. v. HLF, et al.

• Elbarasse Search - 5

GOVERNMENT EXHIBIT
Elbarasse Search - 5

3:04-CR-240-G
U.S. v. HLF, et al.

• Elbarasse Search - 3
• Elbarasse Search - 5

USA v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development

**U.S. District Court
Northern District of Texas
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• Elbarasse Search - 3

**GOVERNMENT
EXHIBIT
003-0085
3:04-CR-240-G
U.S. v. HLF, et al.**

Case #ISE-SW-1810-000417

Attachment number (1)

A list of our organizations and the organizations of our friends
(Imagine if they all march according to one plan!!!)

- 1- ISNA = ISLAMIC SOCIETY OF NORTH AMERICA
- 2- MSA = MUSLIM STUDENTS' ASSOCIATION
- 3- MCA = THE MUSLIM COMMUNITIES ASSOCIATION
- 4- AMSS = THE ASSOCIATION OF MUSLIM SOCIAL SCIENTISTS
- 5- AMSE = THE ASSOCIATION OF MUSLIM SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS
- 6- IMA = ISLAMIC MEDICAL ASSOCIATION
- 7- ITC = ISLAMIC TEACHING CENTER
- 8- NAIT = NORTH AMERICAN ISLAMIC TRUST
- 9- FID = FOUNDATION FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
- 10- IHC = ISLAMIC HOUSING COOPERATIVE
- 11- ICD = ISLAMIC CENTERS DIVISION
- 12- ATP = AMERICAN TRUST PUBLICATIONS
- 13- AVC = AUDIO-VISUAL CENTER
- 14- IBS = ISLAMIC BOOK SERVICE
- 15- MDA = MUSLIM BUSINESSMEN ASSOCIATION
- 16- MYNA = MUSLIM YOUTH OF NORTH AMERICA
- 17- IFC = ISNA FIQH COMMITTEE
- 18- IPAC = ISNA POLITICAL AWARENESS COMMITTEE
- 19- IED = ISLAMIC EDUCATION DEPARTMENT
- 20- MAYA = MUSLIM ARAB YOUTH ASSOCIATION
- 21- MINSI = MALAYSIAN (us) ISLAMIC STUDY GROUP
- 22- IAP = ISLAMIC ASSOCIATION FOR PALESTINE
- 23- UASR = UNITED ASSOCIATION FOR STUDIES AND RESEARCH
- 24- OLF = OCCUPIED LAND FUND
- 25- MIA = MEXICO INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION
- 26- ISNA = ISLAMIC CIRCLE OF NORTH AMERICA
- 27- BMI = BAITUL MAL INC
- 28- IIT = INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR ISLAMIC THOUGHT
- 29- IIC = ISLAMIC INFORMATION CENTER

Page 18 of 18

32

Case #ISE-SW-1810-000417

In the name of God, the Beneficent, the Merciful
Thanks be to God, Lord of the Two Worlds,
Prayers and peace be upon the master of the Messengers

An Explanatory Memorandum
On the General Strategic Goal for the Group
In North America
5/22/1991

Contents:

- 1- An Introduction in explanation
- 2- The Concept of Settlements
- 3- The Process of Settlement
- 4- Comprehensive Settlement Organizations

Page 2 of 18

16

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ
الحمد لله رب العالمين و الصلاه و السلام على سيدنا محمد المرسلين

مذكرة تفسيرية
للهدف الاستراتيجي العام للجماعة في أمريكا الشمالية
١٩٩١/٢٢

المحتويات :

- 1- مقدمة في التفسير
- 2- مفهوم التوطن
- 3- عملية التوطن
- 4- مؤسسات التوطن الخاصة

GOVERNMENT
EXHIBIT
003-0085
3:04-CR-240-G
U.S. v. HLF, et al.

**22- IAP = ISLAMIC ASSOCIATION FOR PALESTINE
23- UASR = UNITED ASSOCIATION FOR STUDIES AND RESEARCH
24- OLF = OCCUPIED LAND FUND**

USA v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development

U.S. District Court Northern District of Texas High Profile Case

Elbarasse Search - 3

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Case #ISE-SW-18116-0000417


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- 27- BMI = BAITUL MAL INC
- 28- IIT = INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR ISLAMIC THOUGHT
- 29- IC = ISLAMIC INFORMATION CENTER

Page 18 of 18

32



22- IAP = ISLAMIC ASSOCIATION FOR PALESTINE
23- UASR = UNITED ASSOCIATION FOR STUDIES AND RESEARCH
24- OLF = OCCUPIED LAND FUND


**It's a FACT –
CAIR was formed out of HAMAS**



USA v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development

**U.S. District Court
Northern District of Texas
High Profile Case**



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
USA v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development

**U.S. District Court
Northern District of Texas
High Profile Case**

• Elbarasse Search - 5



Islamic Action for Palestine
- An internal memo -
October - 1992



**GOVERNMENT
EXHIBIT
Elbarasse Search - 5
3:04-CR-240-G
U.S. v. HLF, et al.**

**It's a FACT –
CAIR was formed out of HAMAS**



Qatar, IUMS, Qaradawi, Muslim Brotherhood



An online publication of the **AbuSulayman Center for Global Islamic Studies at George Mason University**

Qatari Support for the Muslim Brotherhood is More Than Just Realpolitik, it has a Long, Personal History

BY [DAVID H. WARREN](#) // JULY 12, 2017

Qatar's support for the Muslim Brotherhood is commonly portrayed as realpolitik, simply part of Gulf power politics. However, the personal history of Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi in Qatar, and his influence on Qatari society, is just one example of how the connection between the country and the social movement has a long history.



Qatar, IUMS, Qaradawi, Muslim Brotherhood



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 Presidential office activities

The International Union of Muslim Scholars Honors the Legacy of Qatari Scholars: A New Headquarters Bearing Timeless Names and Renewed Scholarly Heritage




Support from Qatar's Leadership


The establishment of the new headquarters was made possible through the generous support of **His Highness Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani**, the **Amir of Qatar** with the endorsement of the esteemed Prime Minister.

Commemorating Qatari Scholars

In a move reflecting deep appreciation for the legacy of Qatar's revered scholars, the Union dedicated halls within the new headquarters to honor some of the most notable late scholars who significantly enriched the intellectual and scholarly landscape:

1. **Hall of Sheikh Jassim bin Muhammad Al Thani** (Founder of Qatar).
2. **Hall of Sheikh Yusuf Abdullah Al-Qaradawi** (Renowned Scholar).
3. **Hall of Sheikh Abdullah bin Zaid Al-Mahmoud** (Prominent Jurist).
4. **Hall of Sheikh Ahmed bin Hajar Al-Bu'Tamim Al-Binali** (Esteemed Scholar).
5. **Hall of Sheikh Abdullah bin Ibrahim Al-Ansari** (Respected Preacher).





| | | |
|---|---|-----|
| xviii | CONTENTS OF VOLUME I | xix |
| | X. THE BOOK OF JIHAD | |
| 10.1. Chapter 1: The Elements (<i>Arkān</i>) of War | | 454 |
| 10.1.1. Section 1: Identification of the <i>ḥukm</i> of this activity | | 454 |
| 10.1.2. Section 2: Identification of the persons to be fought | | 455 |
| 10.1.3. Section 3: Identification of the harm permitted to be inflicted upon the enemy | | 456 |
| 10.1.4. Section 4: The condition for the declaration of war | | 461 |
| 10.1.5. Section 5: Identification of the number from whom retreat is not permissible | | 462 |
| 10.1.6. Section 6: The permission for truce | | 463 |
| | 10.1.7. Section 7: Why wage war? | |
| 10.2.1. Section 1: The <i>ḥukm</i> of the fifth of spoils | | 466 |
| 10.2.2. Section 2: The <i>ḥukm</i> of the four-fifths of the spoils | | 468 |
| 10.2.3. Section 3: The <i>ḥukm</i> of <i>anfal</i> (reward) | | 473 |
| 10.2.3.1. Issue 1 | | 473 |
| 10.2.3.2. Issue 2 | | 474 |
| 10.2.3.3. Issue 3 | | 474 |
| 10.2.3.4. Issue 4 | | 475 |
| 10.2.4. Section 4: The <i>ḥukm</i> of the property of Muslims found in the possession of disbelievers | | 476 |
| 10.2.5. Section 5: The <i>ḥukm</i> of land conquered by the Muslims by the use of force (<i>ṣunwatan</i>) | | 480 |
| 10.2.6. Section 6: Division of <i>ḡayb</i> (booty) | | 482 |
| 10.2.7. Section 7: Discussion of <i>ḡizya</i> (poll-tax) | | 483 |
| 10.2.7.1. Issue 1 | | 483 |
| 10.2.7.2. Issue 2 | | 483 |
| 10.2.7.3. Issue 3 | | 484 |
| 10.2.7.4. Issue 4 | | 485 |
| 10.2.7.5. Issue 5 | | 485 |
| 10.2.7.6. Issue 6 | | 487 |

X THE BOOK OF JIHAD


A comprehensive discussion of the principles of this subject is covered in two chapters. The first is about the identification of the elements of war. The second is about the *aḥkām* of the enemy's property when the Muslims come to own it.

10.1. Chapter 1 The Elements (*Arkān*) of War

There are seven sections in this chapter. The first is about the identification of *ḥukm* of this activity and the persons for whom it is binding.. The second is about the identification of persons who are to be fought. The third is about the identification of each category of the enemy on whom harm may be inflicted, and those who are not to be hurt. The fourth is about the lawful conditions of war. The fifth is about the identification of the number (of opponents) from whom retreat is not permissible. The sixth relates to whether truce is permissible. The seventh deals with the question: why wage war?

10.1.1. Section 1: Identification of the *ḥukm* of this activity

With respect to the *ḥukm* of this activity, the jurists agreed unanimously that it is a collective and not a universal obligation, except for 'Abd Allāh Ibn al-Ḥasan who said it is voluntary. The majority of the jurists adopted this view because of the words of the Exalted, "Warfare is ordained for you, though it is hateful unto you, but it may happen that ye hate a thing which is good for you, and it may happen that ye love a thing which is bad for you, Allāh knoweth, ye know not".³⁰⁶ Its imposition as a communal obligation, that is, when some undertake it the rest are absolved of it, is based upon the words of the Exalted, "And the believers should not all go out to fight. Of every troop of them, a party only should go forth, that they (who are left behind) may gain sound knowledge in religion, and that they may warn their folk when they return, so



10.1.7. Section 7: Why wage war?

Section 7: Why wage war?

Why wage war? The Muslim jurists agreed that the purpose of fighting the People of the Book, excluding the (Qurayshite) People of the Book and the Christian Arabs, is one of two things: it is either for their conversion to Islam or the payment of *jizya*. The payment of *jizya* is because of the words of the Exalted, "Fight against such of those who have been given the Scripture as believe not in Allāh or the Last Day, and forbid not that which Allāh and His Messenger hath forbidden, and follow not the religion of truth, until they pay the tribute readily being brought low".³²⁵ The majority of the jurists also argued about the taking of *jizya* from the Magians, because of the saying of the Prophet (God's peace and blessings be upon him), "Establish with them the practice of the People of the Book". They disagreed about the payment of *jizya* from the People of the Book, whether *jizya* is to be accepted from all of them or only from some. Some said that *jizya* is to be charged from all polytheists. Another group exempted from this the Arab polytheists. Abū Thawr, and a group of jurists said that *jizya* is only to be imposed upon the People of the Book and the Magians.

The reason for their disagreement stems from the conflict between the general and the specific implication. The general implication is in the words of the Exalted, "And fight them until persecution is no more, and religion is all for Allāh".³²⁶ And in the saying of the Prophet (God's peace and blessings be upon him), "Establish with them the practice of the People of the Book".

ibn Rushd
d. 1198

Scholarly
Consensus

Why wage war? The Muslim jurists agreed that the purpose of fighting the People of the Book, excluding the (Qurayshite) People of the Book and the Christian Arabs, is one of two things: it is either for their conversion to Islam or the payment of *jizya*. The payment of *jizya* is because of the words of the Exalted "Fight against such of those who have been given the Scripture as believe not in Allāh or the Last Day, and forbid not that which Allāh and His Messenger hath forbidden, and follow not the religion of truth, until they pay the tribute readily being brought low".³²⁵

Qur'an
Verse 9:29

UN Resolution 16/18 - - Secretary of State commits to foreign powers to use the *extra-legal state action* against American citizens

UN Resolution 16/18, Secretary of State Clinton commits to foreign powers to use the extra-legal state action against American citizens



Remarks at the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) High-Level Meeting on Combating Religious Intolerance

Remarks
Hillary Rodham Clinton
Secretary of State
Center for Islamic Arts and History
Istanbul, Turkey
July 15, 2011

"old-fashioned techniques of peer pressure and shaming"




Secretary Clinton Participates in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Conference
By U.S. Department of State ★ Favorite




The Human Rights Council has given us a comprehensive framework for addressing this issue on the international level. But at the same time, we each have to work to do more to promote respect for religious differences in our own countries. In the United States, I will admit, there are people who still feel vulnerable or marginalized as a result of their religious beliefs. And we have seen how the incendiary actions of just a very few people, a handful in a country of nearly 300 million, can create wide ripples of intolerance. We also understand that, for 235 years, freedom of expression has been a universal right at the core of our democracy. So we are focused on promoting interfaith education and collaboration, enforcing antidiscrimination laws, protecting the rights of all people to worship as they choose, and to use some old-fashioned techniques of peer pressure and shaming, so that people don't feel that they have the support to do what we abhor.

Marcuse's notion of democracy replaces one ruling elite with another in an ongoing thesis anti-thesis churn - *Education*


Marcuse on the Counter-State, Counter-Revolution and Revolt



While a "direct democracy" of the majority still remains the form of government or administration for the construction of socialism, "bourgeois democracy" is no longer likely to provide the "field of operations" for the transition to socialism. Nor can it be recaptured where it no longer exists: the totalitarian trend of monopoly capitalism militates against this strategy, and the debunking of its sham-democracy is a part of political countereducation. (53 - 54)



Marcuse on the Counter-State, Counter-Revolution and Revolt



The dominion of this democracy still leaves room for the building of autonomous **local bases**. The increasing **technological-scientific** requirements of production and control make the **universities** into such a **base**: first for the system itself, as training schools for its cadres, but also, on the same grounds, schools for the education of future **counter-cadres**. (54)

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COUNTERREVOLUTION AND REVOLT
THE LEFT UNDER THE COUNTERREVOLUTION


55

The dominion of this democracy still leaves room for the building of autonomous local bases. The increasing technological-scientific requirements of production and control make the universities into such a base: first for the system itself, as training schools for its cadres, but also, on the same grounds, schools for the education of future counter-cadres. It is still imperative to combat the political inferiority complex widespread among the student movement: the notion that the students are "only" intellectuals, a privileged "elite" and thus a subordinate force which can become effective only if it abandons its own position. This notion is offensive to those who have sacrificed their lives, who continue to risk those lives in every demonstration against the powers that be. If, in the Third World, the students are indeed a revolutionary avant-garde, if they are by the thousands the victims of the terror, then their role in the fight for liberation indicates a feature of the global revolution in the making, namely, the decisive force of a radical consciousness. In the Third World, the militant students directly articulate the rebellion of the people; in the advanced capitalist countries, where they do not (yet) have this avant-gardistic function, their privileged position allows (and commits) them to develop such consciousness in theory and practice on their own base—the base of departure for the larger fight.

Ideological association of Marxism with Science

Marxist notions of scientific socialism a metaphysical claim

Marcuse on the Counter-State, Counter-Revolution and Revolt




However, the solution of this conflict will never be the result of the **internal development of science: the new scientific revolution** will be part of the **social revolution.** (55)

THE LEFT UNDER THE COUNTERREVOLUTION

55

Caught up in its fetishism of labor, the student movement is still reluctant (if not simply refusing) to "admit" that, on the campuses, it has its own base in the infrastructure itself. Moreover, this base extends from the campuses to the economic and political *institutions* where "educated labor" is needed. To be sure, within these institutions, the higher placed cadres will be committed to them, will become part of the hierarchy. But their deteriorating position and chances will weaken this commitment and sharpen the conflict within their education ~~between the liberating capabilities and the actual~~ servitude of science and technology. However, the solution of this conflict will never be the result of the internal development of science: the new scientific revolution will be part of the social revolution.

The Long March – Mao’s Long March – built on *counter-institutions* as anti-theses to drive intersectional Lines of Effort (LOEs)




Marcuse on the Counter-State, Counter-Revolution and Revolt

The long march includes the concerted effort to build up counterinstitutions . They have long been an aim of the movement, but the lack of funds was greatly responsible for their weakness and their inferior quality. They must be made competitive. (55)

56 THE LEFT UNDER THE COUNTERREVOLUTION 55
COUNTERREVOLUTION AND REVOLT

To extend the base of the student movement, Rudi Dutschke has proposed the strategy of the *long march through the institutions*: working against the established institutions while working in them, but not simply by “boring from within,” rather by “doing the job,” learning (how to program and read computers, how to teach at all levels of education, how to use the mass media, how to organize production, how to recognize and eschew planned obsolescence, how to design, et cetera), and at the same time preserving one’s own consciousness in working with the others.

The long march includes the concerted effort to build up counterinstitutions. They have long been an aim of the movement, but the lack of funds was greatly responsible for their weakness and their inferior quality. They must be made competitive. This is especially important for the development of radical, “free” media. The fact that the radical Left has no equal access to the great chains of information and indoctrination is largely responsible for its isolation.



Marcuse on the Counter-State, Counter-Revolution and Revolt

The collection of large funds for the operation of effective **counterinstitutions** requires compromises. The time of the wholesale rejection of the “liberals” has passed — or has not yet come. (56)

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
COUNTERREVOLUTION AND REVOLT

Similarly with the development of independent schools and “free universities.” They can be competitive, that is to say, apt to counteract Establishment education only where they fill a vacuum or where their quality is not only different but also superior. The collection of large funds for the operation of effective counter-institutions requires compromises. The time of the wholesale rejection of the “liberals” has passed—or has not yet come. Radicalism has much to gain from the legitimate protest against the war, inflation, and unemployment, from the defense of civil rights—even perhaps from a “lesser evil” in local elections. The ground for the building of a united front is shifting and sometimes dirty—but it is there . . .

I have stressed the key role which the universities play in the present period: they can still function as institutions for the training of counter-cadres. The “restructuring” necessary for the attainment of this goal means more than decisive student participation and nonauthoritarian learning. Making the university “relevant” for today and tomorrow means, instead, presenting the facts and forces that made civilization what it is today and what it could be tomorrow—and that is political education. For history indeed repeats itself; it is this repetition of domination and submission that must be halted, and halting it presupposes knowledge of its genesis and of the ways in which it is reproduced: critical thinking.

The campus the start point and center of the *counter-state* strategy where *counter-cadres* are identified & groomed

Marcuse on the Counter-State, Counter-Revolution and Revolt



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COUNTERREVOLUTION AND REVOLT

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