



in a struggle, analysis must be unconstrained by preconceptions

Burning Down the House:

A Strategic Overview of the Threat, the CVE, and Strategic Incomprehension in the War on Terror

Stephen Coughlin, ESQ, MSSJ
February 4, 2016

My people are destroyed for lack of knowledge.
—Hosea 4:6

This strategic overview argues for how the War on Terror should be visualized alongside the processes that seek to obscure it and reflects analyses undertaken over the years to explain the nature of the threat in light of emerging Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) protocols, how the enemy envisions the war, and how he understands victory. The metaphor is a house engulfed in a crucible of flames. Where the people burning in the house see three players, it is long overdue to understand them as one. Where people see civilization jihad disassociated from assaults from the left, it is time to recognize alliance. The enemy believes he has enjoyed success in the war and, indeed, believes he is winning. This view has merit.

The strategic picture painted by this overview is based on the enemy's self-identified threat doctrine when mapped against the authorities he relies on to legitimize his activities and guide his operations. For this analysis, a decision was made to exclude all bureaucratic programmatics and academic models. It is based on who the enemy in the War on Terror says he is, not on how others define him. The enemy states repeatedly that he fights jihad to impose Islamic law (shariah) and to re-establish the Caliphate. He does not say he fights jihad to force conversion of non-Muslims to Islam. He never states that he fights in furtherance of "root" or "underlying" causes.

From a legal perspective, the threat's stated fidelity to shariah as the law of the land suggests that the threat does not raise First Amendment issues so much as it raises concerns regarding Article VI of the Constitution ("This Constitution shall be ... the supreme law of the land"). It turns out that Islamic law, with unsettling precision, supports "violent extremists" to a degree that true moderates cannot match and that faux moderates seek to suppress. This explains why "moderates" of all stripes avoid talking about Islamic law when discussing Islamic terrorism. This overview does not delve into defining doctrines when

The strategic picture painted by this overview is based on the enemy's self-identified threat doctrine when mapped against the authorities he relies on to legitimize his activities and guide his operations.

discussing the threat's strategic reality.¹ However, it is hoped that the concepts identified here, viewed as a whole, will offer clarity and shed important light on the most serious threat facing the United States today.

While all elements of U.S. national power are engaged in kinetic operations against “violent extremists” in places like Afghanistan and Iraq, the primary threat actually defines itself as mujahids, views kinetic operations as a support activity tasked with either sustaining strategic distractions or supporting narratives, and seeks victory against the United States through ideological subversion directed against senior leadership and media elites. This analysis challenges the current conceptual and operational framework and calls for its dramatic reconsideration.

A diagram [see page 3] is used to illustrate the three lines of operation along which the United States has come under sustained assault in the War on Terror in much the way that a house can be engulfed in flames. All of these lines of operation, only one of which is kinetic, will be associated with a real-world entity to show how it orients on the objective.


This strategic overview is the product of extensive research that in recent years has informed and supported numerous papers, presentations, a thesis [*To Our Great Detriment: Ignoring What Extremists Say about Jihad*], and the book *Catastrophic Failure: Blindfolding America in the Face of Jihad*. Its purpose is to explain how the enemy understands and orients to his universe. A further objective is to advocate a return to true intelligence analysis and urge the abandonment of current analytical processes that sustain the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) narrative at the expense of a real threat-focused fact-based analysis.

¹ For an explanation of the role of shariah in the enemy's decisionmaking, see *To Our Great Detriment*, a thesis accepted by the Joint Military Intelligence College (now the National Intelligence College) (<http://unconstrainedanalytics.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Stephen-Coughlin-Thesis-Our-Great-Detriment.pdf>). For an extensive explanation of that doctrine and the players putting it in motion, see *Catastrophic Failure: Blindfolding America in the Face of Jihad* (http://www.amazon.com/Catastrophic-Failure-Blindfolding-America-Jihad/dp/1511617500/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1451677871&sr=1-1&keywords=stephen+coughlin).

The primary threat:

- **defines itself as mujahids**
- **views kinetic operations as a support activity tasked with either sustaining strategic distractions or supporting narratives**
- **seeks victory against the United States through ideological subversion directed against senior leadership and media elites**

The Original Model



On a break during a briefing on Islamic law, jihad and terrorism, a question was raised: If the facts in the presentation turned out to be true and the scenarios valid, what are the consequences? If true and valid, so the question went, what is the enemy's strategy, and how does it work?

The question was rhetorical, suggesting there could be no answer. In quick response, a three-pronged envelopment diagram was sketched on a napkin to explain that if Islamic law on dawah and jihad are the criteria when groups like al-Qaeda attack, the terrorists must have already assessed, correctly or not, that the dawah mission achieved its objectives and that the ummah (the Muslim community) is in line with those objectives.

Further, the three entities (the ummah, dawah and jihadi) do not have to act along formal chains of command to interoperate successfully. This is because they each execute according to their own functional orientation to Islam that reconciles through a common understanding of Islamic law. The response caught the questioner by surprise—not only because an answer was given, but because the explanation could be supported by published doctrine and real-world examples reaching back centuries and as current as the most recent ISIS missives.

This overview explains the strategic framework and how a coherent strategy can be built based on it. To appreciate the strategy, it should be visualized along the lines of the starfish rather than the spider: Cut an appendage from a starfish, and the severed part can grow into a fully functional starfish. Cut off a spider's head, and all appendages become useless.

In terms of command relationships, we in the West tend to think like spiders. While the Soviet Union was a spider; the Islamic Movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Qaeda and ISIS are starfish. Moreover, this strategy conforms to Islamic notions of war identified as jihad, which comprehensively accounts for the full range of activities arrayed against the United States in the War on Terror. Because the jihad-centric construct accounts for real world actors, activities, doctrines and events, it is far more relevant and useful than the “violent extremism” model, which accounts for none of it. In fact, “violent extremism” is an imposed foreign* shariah compliant** construct that purposefully renders analysis irrelevant to the real counterterror environment.

When addressing War on Terror issues from an Islamic context, it is necessary to explain the functional areas that comprise the three lines of operation:


- the jihadi line of operation, kinetic warfare, here represented by groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS;
- the dawah line of operation, subversion in the preparation stage, here associated with groups like the Muslim Brotherhood; and
- the ummah line of operation, the Muslim community, here represented by organizations like the Organization of Islamic Cooperation [OIC] or the leadership elements among its Member States.

It should be noted that the three lines of operation are functional, and that individual players have some ability to move from line to line based on one's own perceived roles, responsibilities, affiliations and affinities. In such a construct, it is possible to become ISIS by simply identifying with it when choosing to act in furtherance of its objectives.

***Foreign:** The OIC effort regarding the CVE goes back at least 20 years, long before the term appeared in American counterterror lexicon. “Key Meeting Set for Tuesday,” Bahrain News Agency, 9 August 2015, <http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/681103>.

****Shariah Compliant:** The 1999 OIC Convention on Combatting International Terrorism expressly subordinates OIC counterterror policy to shariah. As stated in the 1991 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, the OIC defines human rights as shariah. “Convention of the OIC on Combatting International Terrorism,” http://www.oic-oci.org/english/convention/terrorism_convention.htm, “The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam,” the OIC, OIC Webpage at <http://www.oic-oci.org/english/article/human.htm>.

“Violent extremism” is an imposed construct that purposefully renders analysis irrelevant to the real counterterror environment.



Mohammad Javad Zarif Khonsari is the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs and former Permanent Representative of Iran to the United Nations.

Exhibit 1 shows how a targeted group, in this case the burning house representing the U.S. and the West, becomes centripetally engulfed by the three lines of operation designed to overwhelm and consume it in a sustained soft-power subversion campaign goaded on by timely (and sometimes untimely) acts of terror. Of course, all engulfing fires need large volumes of oxygen to effectively consume its victim. This needs to be recognized as well.

Strategic Overview Based on Orientation to Islam



Islamic law is at the center of the strategic understanding of the threat in the War on Terror. It permeates, defines and controls all activity along the planning and execution cycle. There is no understanding the War on Terror outside Islamic law, which is the framework that the enemy himself says drives all aspects of his mission focus.

For example, the book *The Quranic Concept of War* was written by Pakistani Brigadier S. K. Malik in 1979.² In the foreword, the Chief of Staff of the Pakistani Army, General Zia ul-Haq, who later became the head of state, endorsed the monograph and designated it as doctrine. The future Advocate General of Pakistan likewise wrote a favorable introduction suggesting it to be a “Restatement”³ of the law. In the monograph, Brigadier Malik argues a Quranic concept

Islamic law is at the center of the strategic understanding of the threat in the War on Terror.

² *The Quranic Concept of War* by Brigadier S.K. Malik, [Lahore, Pakistan: Wajid Al's Ltd.], 1979.


³ Restatements of the Law, generically defined in Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed., are “a series of volumes ... that tell what the law in a general area is, how it is changing, and what direction the authors think the change should take.” In the Preface of *The Quranic Concept of War*, Allah Bukhsh K. Brohi writes: “His [Brigadier S.K. Malik] has been a scholarly presentation of what may be considered as an ‘analytic Restatement’ of the Quranic wisdom on the subject of war and peace.”

of war expressly based on terrorism.⁴ Among national security analysts, the typical response to Malik's book is that it was written by a Pakistani who may have stepped over into becoming a "violent extremist" and that, given that the book associates war with Islam, could only be of suspect value because the author has "hijacked" the religion.

Yet, if for no other reason than to recognize the state-actor status of the author and endorsers, there should have been some serious effort to analyze the monograph in the state actor context in which it was written and in accordance with the doctrines it says it follows in the off chance that the author and endorsers were serious. Because the Qur'an is considered the "uncreated word of Allah," the commands arising out of it take on the status of divine mandates for those who perceive it that way. Hence, the title *The Quranic Concept of War* indicates the author is asserting there to be a form of war mandated by Allah.

If true, or at least believed to be true, it means that a divine mandate exists for a form of war endorsed by the Pakistani Army. That a Pakistani Brigadier on the General Staff could write such a book suggests the Government of Pakistan is permissive of such associations. That a Chief of Staff of the Army and an Advocate General endorsed it suggests the monograph has official status. And the fact that this Quranic concept of war has a nuclear-powered state actor endorsing the use of nuclear weapons to impose terror in furtherance of jihad⁵ is—or should be—a matter of deep concern. This is important information that needs to be understood in its own context. To declare it off-limits by fiat is absurd and dangerously inappropriate. Yet in a nutshell, this has been the state of threat analysis in the War on Terror from the beginning.

This section of the overview deals with the role Islamic law plays in ordering and harmonizing the three lines of operation. Islamic law, or shariah, is an extant body of law complete with a defined and recognized lexicon. A clear understanding of Islamic law through a disciplined understanding of the language used to define its concepts allows disparate elements to organize along a com-



Pakistani Brigadier Malik argues a Quranic concept of war expressly based on terrorism.

4 *The Quranic Concept of War*, 59. Brigadier S.K. Malik states: "Terror struck into the hearts of the enemies is not only a means; it is an end in itself. Once a condition of terror into the opponent's heart is obtained, hardly anything is left to be achieved. It is the point where the means and the end meet and merge. Terror is not a means of imposing decision upon the enemy; it is the decision we wish to impose upon him. [...] An army that practices the Quranic philosophy of war in its totality is immune to psychological pressures. When Liddell Hart talks of imposing a direct decision upon the enemy through psychological dislocation alone, he is taking too much for granted."

5 *The Quranic Concept of War*, 60. Brigadier S.K. Malik states: "Whatever the form or type of strategy directed against the enemy, it must, in order to be effective, be capable of striking terror into the hearts of the enemy. A strategy that fails to attain this condition suffers from inherent drawbacks and weaknesses; and should be reviewed and modified. This rule is fully applicable to nuclear as well as conventional wars. It is equally true of the strategy of nuclear deterrence in fashion today. To be credible and effective, the strategy of deterrence must be capable of striking terror into the hearts of the enemy."

monly recognized architecture. Islamic law has a broader meaning than what is commonly understood as law in a western context. For this reason, the term shariah will be used interchangeably with “Islamic law and doctrine” to capture the full range of applicability. The enemy’s center of gravity in the War on Terror is his orientation to shariah, specifically its reliance on the laws and doctrines regarding dawah and jihad in what the Muslim Brotherhood calls “civilization jihad.”

To say the threat arises out of Islam is to say that it emanates from shariah. Hence, the arrow in the diagram reflects the recognition that the three lines of operation emanate from Islam through a common understanding of shariah.

For this reason, shariah also provides a common reference point based on Islamic legal concepts recognized as settled. This doctrinal framework is commonly understood and easily communicated in the Islamic world. For this observation to be valid, one does not have to prove that the underlying Islamic law reflects “true Islam,” or even that most Muslims agree with it. One has to prove only that it is the commonly held understanding of shariah by those seeking to execute the three lines of operation.

Because the enemies in the War on Terror identify shariah as a basis of their decisionmaking, it becomes a known element of their doctrinal template. As explained by the “Dexter Standard,”⁶ the validity of a given understanding of shariah as “true Islam” does not affect its status as an element of the threat analysis. Rather, issues of validity are downstream concerns that come into play only at the point where enemy courses of action are developed. Because the enemy in the War on Terror states specific reliance on Islamic law, the inclusion of shariah in the doctrinal template analysis becomes mandatory.

The enemy’s center of gravity in the War on Terror is his orientation to shariah, specifically its reliance on the laws and doctrines regarding dawah and jihad.

6 *Catastrophic Failure*, 34. From *Catastrophic Failure*, the “Dexter Standard” was written to highlight the ridiculousness of the constraints placed on counter-terror efforts to understand the nature of the threat. It argues there should be no controversy regarding analysis of a self-declared enemy’s self-identified warfighting doctrine and explains this through reference to the Showtime series *Dexter*. In the fall 2011 season, the plot revolved around a serial killer who acts in furtherance of an idiosyncratic End-Times scenario based on the New Testament’s Book of Revelation. Upon recognizing this, inspectors used Revelation as an essential analytical tool. The necessity of using Revelation was never questioned even as some inspectors were either nominally religious or non-believers. No one suggested that only Christian inspectors were qualified to investigate. Although these are fictional detectives in a television drama, it is argued that real threat analysts should have the same latitude when following the evidence. Revelation was not analyzed for the purpose of rendering some higher-level judgment on the Bible, Christians, or Christianity; it wasn’t even on the minds of the investigators. Rather, Revelation was analyzed for the limited and necessary purpose of tracking and apprehending a serial killer. There would be no question about the serious malpractice of the detectives if, knowing the relevance of Revelation—and knowing that people were being killed because of its known idiosyncratic application—they nevertheless chose to ignore it.

The reverse is also true: Failure to incorporate shariah into the threat analysis renders that product defective and beyond worthless.⁷


To properly understand Islamic law in the context of the threat, it is important to focus on sources of shariah known to be relied on by relevant members of the Muslim community for their own understanding of Islam. Analysis of any part of the enemy's doctrine rooted in Islamic law should ignore products written for non-Muslims and rely exclusively on works written for a Muslim audience by Muslims who are recognized by Muslims as experts in their subject.

While classic concepts of subordination, chain of command, and command and control have their place, one must bear in mind that command and control among the three lines of operation are not dependent upon such subordination but, instead, are based on each group's functional orientation to Islamic law. What a jihadi entity does (or does not do) is **not** based on orders from the ummah. Rather, its actions are rooted in the entity's functional orientation to Islamic law based on its current posture relative to the other lines of operations (the ummah and dawah).

Failure to incorporate shariah into the threat analysis renders that product defective and beyond worthless.

⁷ This paragraph is purposely stated in terms most favorable to those who do not accept that Islamic law could serve such a purpose. As our doctrine on threat analysis used to maintain, once a threat is known to have made statements of reliance on a doctrine, it must be included in the threat analysis even if the threat's reliance can later be shown to be improper or erroneous. What makes its inclusion mandatory is the known reliance on a doctrine, not the quality or correctness of the doctrine itself. The reverse is also true. Threat analysis that fails/refuses to account for a threat's known reliance on a knowable published doctrine, including the language of that doctrine, necessarily renders that analysis incompetent. It violates the requirement that the analysis be "unconstrained." Whatever such a degraded "analysis" might be, it cannot qualify as threat analysis born of the intelligence cycle. Excluding known relevant facts from the threat analysis process subverts not only threat identification, but also the downstream course of action development and deliberate decisionmaking it is designed to support. In this regard, it should not be left unobserved that the Countering Violent Extremism [CVE] narrative undermines the entire deliberate decisionmaking process by subordinating the intelligence cycle to ideological considerations extraneous to the known threat doctrine and, in so doing, corrupting it in the process.

Jihad: All Focus is on Al-Qaeda and Associated Movements—Sans Islam



On 11 September 2001, elements associated with al-Qaeda attacked the United States. Since then, discussions of terrorism have been couched in terms of al-Qaeda and Associated Movements [AQAM] and, more recently, ISIS and the Islamic State. Because al-Qaeda and ISIS are dangerous jihadi organizations, there is good reason to focus kinetic operations against them. But because even al-Qaeda/ISIS believes the war will play out primarily in the information battlespace, al-Qaeda/ISIS might be better understood as a strategic distraction. Because there is an abundance of information already available on both al-Qaeda and ISIS, this overview will simply recognize their roles in the jihadi line of operation.

Jihad is positioned on the bottom of the diagram to indicate that the jihad function, defined in kinetic terms, is a culminating event that occurs late in the process, after the subject population is determined to be sufficiently subverted and demoralized through dawah. Ayman Zawahiri said that upwards of 85 percent of jihad is to be waged in the information battlespace. As Pakistani Brigadier S. K. Malik explained, **the war of muscle does not begin until after the war of wills has been won.**⁸

⁸ *The Quranic Concept of War*, 58. Brigadier S.K. Malik states: "So spirited, zealous, complete and thorough should be our preparation for war that we should enter upon the 'war of muscles' having already won the 'war of will'. Only a strategy that aims at striking terror into the hearts of the enemies from the preparation stage can produce direct results and turn Liddell Hart's dream into a reality."

Because al-Qaeda has a Salafist orientation, it follows Islamic law along the functional lines of a jihadi entity.⁹ When al-Qaeda is held to the doctrines the group says it follows, its actions become predictable. This means that al-Qaeda must have assessed, correctly or not, that the situation was ripe for jihad on 9/11.

In other words, al-Qaeda must have assessed that the dawah mission had sufficiently advanced and that the ummah was permissive of such activity. The dawah phase remains systematically unassessed. This is because the “kinetic” jihad is understood to be the culminating event in a process that includes the ummah and dawah phases. Yet, it is penetration and subversion in the dawah phase that the Muslim Brotherhood associates with “civilization jihad.”

Refusing to recognize the dawah phase as an essential element in the total “civilization jihad” process, or that this phase has an Islamic doctrinal basis that the Muslim Brotherhood recognizes, both diminishes and warps our threat awareness.

This lack of awareness helps facilitate such ridiculous behavioral “theories” as the “radicalization process,” “self-radicalization,” “leaderless jihads,” and “lone wolves.” “Lone wolf,” it should be noted, replaces the doctrinal term “individual jihad” that was adopted by al-Qaeda in 2010 to identify its new strategy in North America. Failure to recognize the role of individual jihad has cost American lives.

The very use of the “extremist/moderate” narrative distorts the reality of events being communicated. When Egyptian President Sisi spoke at al-Azhar on 1 January 2015, he said:

That thinking—I am not saying “religion” but “thinking”—that corpus of texts and ideas that we have sacralized over the years, to the point that departing from them has become almost impossible, is antagonizing the entire world. [...] Is it possible that 1.6 billion people [Muslims] should want to kill the rest of the world's inhabitants—that is 7 billion—so that they themselves may live? Impossible! **I am saying these words here at Al Azhar, before this assembly of scholars and ulema**—Allah Almighty be witness to your truth on Judgment Day concerning that which I'm talking about now. [...] I say and repeat again that we are in need of a religious revolution. You, imams, are responsible before Allah.¹⁰


⁹ What distinguishes al-Qaeda and ISIS from other jihadi groups is that they are also Wahhabist. This distinction can come into play in certain circumstances and should be kept ever-present in the minds of analysts when assessing events.

¹⁰ Raymond Ibrahim, “Egypt's Sisi: Islamic ‘Thinking’ is ‘Antagonizing the Entire World,’” Middle East Forum, 1 January 2015, URL: <http://www.meforum.org/4951/egypt-sisi-islamic-thinking-is-antagonizing>

Of importance, President Sisi was not speaking to “extremist” imams about “extremist” interpretations of “radical” texts at an “extremist” forum. Rather, he was speaking to elite al-Azhar imams and the Awqaf Ministry at the prestigious al-Azhar about long-settled and sacralized interpretations of Islam’s sacralized texts (i.e., the Qur’an and hadith) that declare the obligatory duty of jihad that is currently bringing ruin to both the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds.

Radicalization narratives demand that jihad and jihadis be understood exclusively in terms of violent extremism, so when pro-Sisi voices in the West applaud his speech to “radical clerics” about “radical interpretations,” they change the meaning of what the president said and to whom, warping the equities in the process.

Dawah: Dawah Entities & The Main Effort



The dawah mission is the main effort in the expansion of Islamic power. While dawah carries with it the mission of “preaching” Islam to gain converts, it is also associated with the ideological subversion elements of civilization jihad, or “stealth jihad,” as it’s sometimes called.

The group most closely associated with the dawah mission as it relates to the United States is the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood in America is best known through its front organizations, which include the Islamic Society of North America [ISNA], Islamic Circle of North America [ICNA], Council on American-Islamic Relations [CAIR], Muslim American Society [MAS], International Institute for Islamic Thought [IIIT], Fiqh Council of North America [FCNA], North American Islamic Trust [NAIT], and organizations inside the Islamic Movement,* such as the Muslim Public Affairs Council [MPAC]. As demonstrated in the United States v Holy Land Foundation case, NAIT holds the paper on a large number of mosques in the United States, with Persian Gulf interests serving as the bank.

According to the Muslim Brotherhood’s published strategic objectives for the United States, written in 1991 and entered into evidence in the Holy Land Foundation case, the group sees its work in America “as a kind of civilization jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and ‘sabotaging’ its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers.” In other

* As used in this discussion, and as stated in the Explanatory Memorandum, those Muslim entities under the influence and control of the Muslim Brotherhood.

words, they plan to defeat the United States through subversion campaigns that include the specific targeting of senior leaders to get them to undermine the very equities they are sworn to “support and defend.”

It is disturbingly ironic that the people most in need of receiving this message are often the ones most vulnerable to it and invincibly ignorant of it. Equally troubling is the realization that a high percentage of the people known to be associated with the Muslim Brotherhood are among those to whom senior U.S. leaders turn for guidance on issues concerning Islam and terrorism. While the Muslim Brotherhood is the dominant element in the American dawah mission, other dawah entities, most notably from Turkey and Pakistan, have likewise demonstrated a rising presence.

A common tactic of Islamic Movement front groups is to superficially condemn a jihadi activity (i.e., terrorist attack), ingratiate themselves to senior U.S. leaders, and then offer their services as outreach partners to the Muslim community. The near-term objective is to convert the relationship into an exclusive partnership, which allows them to manipulate national security and law enforcement entities into having Muslim Brotherhood entities (or its Islamic Movement proxies) serve as the sole points of contact into the Muslim community and as the exclusive information source for issues relating to Islam, Muslims and Islamic-based terrorism.

Through this usurpation of the intelligence mission, the Brotherhood then asserts its authority by incessant demands that it serve as the gatekeeper of threat awareness in the counterterror analytical processes. Indeed, as it happened, with the rise of Brotherhood influence in the national security space came the purging of the threat vocabulary and the emergence of the CVE narrative.

The group's longer-term objective is to gain *de facto* and ultimately *de jure* recognition of Muslim Brotherhood jurisdiction over the Muslim population inside the United States, an aim that is fully in line with OIC objectives. Josef Pieper got it right when recognizing the role cloyingly unctuous ingratiation plays in the seizing of power:

Plato evidently knew what he was talking about when he declared sophists' accomplished art of flattery to be the deceptive mirage of the political process, that is, the counterfeit usurpation of power, a power that belongs to the legitimate political authority alone.¹¹

A key effort in subversion campaigns is engagement in lexicon battles that impose vocabularies in direct support of favored narratives through relentless repetition and intimidation. Once these narratives penetrate into the senior



The Muslim Brotherhood in America:

Islamic Society of North America
[ISNA]

Islamic Circle of North America
[ICNA]

Council on American-Islamic
Relations [CAIR]

Muslim American Society [MAS]

International Institute
for Islamic Thought [IIIT]

Fiqh Council of North America
[FCNA]

North American Islamic Trust
[NAIT]

**With the rise of
Brotherhood influence in
the national security space
came the purging of the
threat vocabulary and
the emergence of the CVE
narrative.**

¹¹ Josef Pieper, *Abuse of Language – Abuse of Power*, Ignatius Press, 29.

decisionmaking and elite media strata, they are imposed along the Orwellian demand that $2 + 2 = 5$. While the near-term objective is the control of narratives that undermine successful prosecution of the War on Terror, the long-term goal is the criminalization of analysis not sanctioned by shariah as understood by the OIC and the Muslim Brotherhood. The hoped-for and planned result of successfully criminalizing competent threat analysis is the implosion of the U.S. national security apparatus through the subordination of free speech canons to Islamic speech standards.


The “civilization jihad ... by our hands” aspect of the objective is to get senior U.S. leaders to agree to enforce a hostile lexicon that denies decisionmakers, analysts and law enforcement the ability to define Islamic-based terrorism with reference to the Islamic identity and Islamic doctrines that drive those activities — essentially breaking the link between stated objectives and actions taken. The intended effect is the destruction of the intelligence effort through the negation of coherent threat assessments. A brilliant strategy—and tragically, it is working.

“By our own hand” in the context of lexicon wars concerns the struggle over control of the language used to define the enemy and his doctrines. Threat vocabulary is an intelligence function expressly arising out of the threat development process. In a war that the enemy says is primarily informational, the deep concern is that those responsible for threat development have lost control of the language used to define the threat. This is critical because control of the language one uses to define a thing controls one’s understanding of that thing. An essential nexus exists between the terminology used to define a concept and the concept itself. For this reason, the terms and concepts used to explain the threat must be the same as those used by the threat arising from within the threat environment. Otherwise, we will be unable to know the enemy and, therefore, unable to defeat him.

In this context, the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (DHS CRCL) ousted the threat language, swapping it for a lexicon that was placed in direct support of the CVE narrative in October 2011.¹² This dislocating assault on the integrity of the intelligence process effectively replaced fact-based intelligence analysis with narrative enforcement regimes. By ensuring that only garbage enters the intelligence cycle, the CVE assures that only garbage will come out of the decisionmaking process. This is the “here and now” reality of the Brotherhood’s “by our own hands” strategy.

¹² “Countering Violent Extremism [CVE] Training: Do’s and Don’ts,” Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, DHS, 11 October 2011, at URL: <https://training.fema.gov/emiweb/docs/shared/cve%20training%20guidance.pdf>.

Their long-term goal is the criminalization of analysis not sanctioned by shariah as understood by the OIC and the Muslim Brotherhood.



Mohamed Eliabary, former senior Homeland Security Advisor and member of the Department of Homeland Security's Security Council, was unconcerned by the UAE designations of Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) and Muslim American Society (MAS) as terrorist organizations. Eliabary, who is also founder and president of the Freedom and Justice Foundation and Committee Chairman and Board Member of the Dallas-Fort Worth chapter of CAIR, immediately condemned the designation of CAIR and MAS. Note: "Freedom and Justice" is a Muslim Brotherhood designation.

Source: Mohamed Eliabary Tweet, Twitter @MohamedEliabary, 13 August 2014, URL: <https://twitter.com/MohamedEliabary/status/499590321131782144>, accessed 14 August 2014. States: With my 22+ yrs @GOP, friends thru out 100s US security/policing agencies & academia; no future presidency will reverse reforms underway. The four-fingered hand gesture is the Rabia indicating solidarity with the Muslim Brotherhood. On Mohamed Eliabary background, see *Catastrophic Failure*, 18, 19.

Our defeat in the War on Terror is made inevitable by the enforced refusal to recognize the basic proposition that one cannot engage what one cannot define [which the CVE lexicon institutionalizes]. In keeping with known jihadi doctrines of war, the Muslim Brotherhood seeks the non-kinetic defeat of the United States through subversion of its deliberate decisionmaking process—by our hands. By controlling the language used by senior U.S. leaders and military analysts, the Brotherhood not only controls what America's decisionmakers think and say about the threat, it actually gains control of the decisionmaking process itself.

Over time, such relationships create predictable dependencies on Muslim Brotherhood leadership even as the Brotherhood's published strategy document states that the sole purpose for these relationships is the destruction of the United States through subversion. Not unlike North Vietnam, the enemy in the War on Terror is willing to lose tactical engagements “over there” if, in exchange, he maintains control of decisionmaking through control of the language “over here” that supports his mission while keeping the United States from achieving its own.

A calculated consequence of this operation is the American public's growing loss of confidence in a leadership rendered incapable of defining (and ultimately defeating) a self-identified enemy while blaming its failure on the complexities of a chaotic world. “By our own hands” means self-delegitimization, a primary goal of any insurgency. The object of jihad, it should be remembered, is the destruction of faith.¹³ Leadership's calculated incoherence in the face of a declared enemy is faith-killing to national populations. Watching fellow citizens get slain by obvious acts of jihad only to hear national law enforcement declare the act “workplace violence” only builds on that recognition. Delegitimization as part of a strategy is a concept so simple it used to be taught to first-year cadets. This was the concern raised back in the 2007 strategic intelligence thesis when warning:

The Current Approach stands for the proposition that the WOT [War on Terror] can be successfully prosecuted without reference to a substantive understanding of the enemy. In this, the Current Approach purposefully violates Sun Tsu's first rule of war: to know the enemy. Never understanding the enemy means never being

13 *The Quranic Concept of War*, 60. Brigadier S.K. Malik states: “Terror cannot be struck into the hearts of an army by merely cutting its lines of communications or depriving it of its routes or withdrawal. It is basically related only if the opponent's Faith is destroyed. Psychological dislocation is temporary; spiritual dislocation is permanent. Psychological dislocation can be produced by a physical act, but this does not hold good of the spiritual dislocation. To instill terror into the hearts of the enemy, it is essential, in the ultimate analysis, to dislocate his Faith. An invincible Faith is immune to terror. A weak Faith offers inroads to terror. The Faith conferred upon us by the Holy Qur'an has an inherent strength to ward off terror from us and enable us to strike terror into the enemy.”

By controlling the language used by senior U.S. leaders and military analysts, the Brotherhood not only controls what America's decisionmakers think and say about the threat, it actually gains control of the decisionmaking process itself.

able to generate an effective strategy to defeat him. At the operational level, this means never having the ability to convert tactical successes into strategic victories. The cost of not understanding the enemy has been high and is getting higher every day.

It will increasingly be measured by news stories that narrow in on senior leaders' inability to answer basic questions about the nature of the enemy and his environment. It will also manifest itself in official responses to terrorist attacks that become progressively less reality-based.

We have reached the point where one can reasonably ask: "Aren't we already there?" Every activity undertaken in dawah and jihad can be made comprehensible by simply mapping the enemy's stated strategy to published Islamic law as the strategy itself intends—if one recognizes the professional duty to do so and has the courage to see it through.

A priority objective of the jihadis has been to convince senior U.S. leaders and media elites never to undertake a review of published Islamic law. Because almost all terrorists insist they wage jihad in accordance with Islamic law, U.S. intelligence officers and decisionmakers bound by the oath to "support and defend" should have ignored the droning protestations and forged ahead with a rigorous review of Islamic law to penetrate the terrorists' mindset and anticipate their actions. But they did not, and now it is all but certain that this key dawah objective has been met. A bold strategy that assumes incompetent U.S. leadership has enjoyed uncommon success. The objective: Keep American decisionmakers in the dark and prevent them from suspecting that the enemy has a coherent strategy. Because the success of such a strategy is premised on our passive inversion of Sun Tzu's first principle of war—to know the enemy—collectively at the national level, this never should have happened.¹⁴

The success of this information campaign was assured when senior U.S. leaders conformed to the requirement not to undertake the most basic due diligence review of the same shariah that the enemy unequivocally states is the doctrinal basis for his actions. The consequence of such conformance is that it first necessitates and then, through repetition, legitimizes the impermissible outsourcing of the information requirements that support decisionmaking to outside third-parties known to have hostile intent. The act of delegating that which cannot be delegated—because it should not be delegated—compromises

A priority objective of the jihadis has been to convince senior U.S. leaders and media elites never to undertake a review of published Islamic law.

¹⁴ For example, when national security leaders and professionals are dissuaded from their due diligence responsibilities by demands in the form of offers of assistance—such as, "There are thousands of interpretations of Islamic law" [therefore don't read any of it; I will guide you] or "Only those who speak classical Arabic can understand the true nature of Islam" [so don't read any translations of it; I am here to help you]—why even bother with real threat analysis?].

both professional canons and national security. It's what Pieper meant by the "counterfeit usurpation of power."

Once American political, national security and media elites conform, success of the strategy is assured. Why? Because professional reputations will be put at risk if efforts to reassess those decisions cast doubt on the narratives they helped institutionalize. Co-opted by narratives they do not understand and yet have become wed to, they will intuitively suppress any and all substantive reviews. This is a perfect illustration of the anticipated second-order effects of "civilization jihad by our own hands." Co-option, subsequent subversion and eventual coverup remain the essential entry cost of Muslim Brotherhood assistance as outreach partners.

This is the dawah line of operation that the Brotherhood identifies as its main effort.¹⁵ As attested to by the Pakistani Brigadier, the "war of will" occurs in the preparation stage that he, likewise, identifies as the main effort. It is where they plan to win the war. The ummah and dawah entities are aligned. Entrapping ourselves in processes that subject us to withering ideological assaults that ensure defeat in what the enemy calls the preparation phase is precisely the type of process warned of in the 2007 strategic intelligence thesis:

In the War on Terror, it is the non-kinetic phase of jihad that presents the greatest long-term challenge for the United States. There is reason to know that Islamic concepts of submission are working their influence against the West generally and the United States



Congressman Mike McCaul [right] at a 2013 outreach program talking to Mustapha Carroll (left), the Executive Director of CAIR/Dallas-Ft. Worth. McCaul wrote on the photograph, "To Mustapha and the Council on American Islamic Relations, The moderate Muslim is our Most Effective Weapon. Michael McCaul, TX-10"

Photo from Breitbart National Security [see page 20]

¹⁵ The Arabic script in the Muslim Brotherhood's logo says, "**Against them make ready.**" This refers to actions in the preparation stage and is the opening line of Qur'an Verse 8:60, which reads in full: "Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into the hearts of the enemies of Allah and your enemies, and others besides, whom ye may not know, but whom Allah doth know." The Lone Mujahid Pocketbook, the Spring 2013 special edition of al-Qaeda's *Inspire* Magazine, likewise has on its cover, "and Prepare against them to the utmost of your power." The full text of Verse 8:60 is then provided in Lone Mujahid as the introductory lead-in to the section titled "Bomb Making – Kitchen Fun." [Lone Mujahid Pocketbook – A Step to Step Guide on how to become a Successful Lone Mujahid – OSJ Special, Spring 1434/2013]



specifically. A currently operating manifestation of submission may be a Current Approach that traps senior thinkers and decisionmakers in a process that keeps them from gaining traction against the enemy in the War on Terror. In this, submission does not reflect a subjective state of mind but rather an objective commitment to processes incapable of generating success against an openly declared enemy.

McCaul Meets With Islamic Leader Who Says U.S. Muslims Are 'Above Law Of Land'

by MATTHEW BOYLE, Breitbart National Security, 18 Feb 2015, Washington, DC

As President Barack Obama comes under intense scrutiny for his meetings with Muslim Brotherhood officials, it turns out a top Republican in Congress has had similar interactions with Muslim leaders who have made questionable statements. House Homeland Security Committee chairman Rep. Michael McCaul [R-TX] was photographed with—and wrote a personal note in silver sharpie to—an Islamic leader who said practicing Muslims in the United States are “above the law of the land.”

On May 13, 2013, McCaul held an open house at a district office in Katy, Texas. While McCaul’s Facebook posting announcing the open house said an RSVP was required, a spokeswoman for McCaul told Breitbart News that Council on American Islamic Relations [CAIR] Houston branch executive director Mustafa Carroll showed up without notice. During the open house, McCaul and Carroll were photographed speaking to one another. On top of the photograph, in silver sharpie, McCaul wrote to Carroll: “To Mustafa and the Council on American Islamic Relations, the moderate Muslim is our most effective weapon—Michael McCaul, TX-10.”

In January 2013, Carroll was videotaped at “Muslim Capitol Day” in Austin saying that U.S. Muslims are “above the law of the land.” “Following the law of the land is part of Sharia,” Carroll said in the video, according to a 2015 article in the *Texas Tribune*. “And we follow the law of the land. In fact, Muslims, if we’re practicing Muslims, we are above the law of the land. The law doesn’t affect us at all.”

When asked about McCaul’s handwritten note to Carroll about “moderate” Muslims, and his photograph with Carroll from the open house, House Homeland Security Committee spokeswoman Lauren Claffey said McCaul was not calling Carroll or CAIR “moderate.” “Chairman McCaul’s comments to Mr. Carroll were not a reflection of who Mr. Carroll is, but reinforced the argument McCaul had made to Carroll during a district open house in Katy, Texas – that the moderate Muslim community must combat the extremist wings of their faith,” Claffey said in an email.

Over the course of more than a week, Claffey—on McCaul’s behalf—had refused to answer many times when asked by Breitbart News if McCaul thinks that Carroll is a “moderate” Muslim. She also has refused to answer when asked if McCaul thinks CAIR, as an organization, is a “moderate” Muslim group. CAIR national spokesman Ibrahim Hooper, on the other hand, told Breitbart News he and CAIR don’t use the term “moderate Muslim” since—he says—there is no universally accepted definition of the term.

Since taking over as House Homeland Security Committee chairman, McCaul has been less aggressive with CAIR and other Muslim advocacy groups in the United States than his predecessor as chairman, Rep. Peter King [R-NY], had been. King held hearings on radical Islam and its efforts in the United States—hearings for which he was roundly criticized by Muslim groups, the institutional left and the mainstream media. . . .

. . . . A CAIR official, on its Facebook page after the Boston Marathon bombing in a posting announcing testimony it planned to submit to McCaul’s hearing on that matter, actually praised McCaul for not being as aggressive as King was in his chairmanship. “We appreciate Rep. McCaul’s sober and objective chairing of the hearing,” CAIR’s Government Affairs Manager Robert McGraw said. “Such a hearing contributes to protecting all Americans from violent extremists. This responsible approach is a welcome shift from Rep. Peter King’s tenure, which was characterized by unsubstantiated allegations and biased attacks on the Muslim community.”

In that written testimony, CAIR praised McCaul again. “Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member [Benjamin] Thompson, and other distinguished committee members of the House Homeland Security Committee, the Council on American Islamic-Relations [CAIR], the nation’s largest Muslim civil liberties and advocacy organization, appreciates the committee’s ongoing oversight of the Boston Marathon attacks and respectfully submits this written testimony for your consideration,” the group wrote in its testimony. . . . [<http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2015/02/18/mccaul-writes-on-photo-with-islamic-leader-who-says-u-s-muslims-above-law/>]

07.16.15 | Homeland Security Committee | Press Release

BIPARTISAN SUPPORT IN CONGRESS TO COUNTER VIOLENT EXTREMISM

WASHINGTON, D.C. – The U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security unanimously passed by voice vote, H.R. 2899, the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Act of 2015, introduced by Chairman Michael McCaul.

“In the face of mounting threats, our government is doing far too little to counter violent extremism here in the United States,” said Chairman McCaul. “Whether it is the long reach of international terrorists into our communities or the homegrown hate spread by domestic extremist groups, we are ill-equipped to prevent Americans from being recruited by dangerous fanatics.”

H.R. 2899 significantly elevates CVE as a key priority at the Department of Homeland Security, streamlines the Department’s CVE efforts under an Assistant Secretary who reports directly to the Secretary, and provides \$10 million dollars per year out of existing funds to ramp up DHS efforts to prevent Americans from being radicalized and recruited by terrorists. It was also amended to include, for the first time ever, a counter-messaging grant program to push back against extremist propaganda domestically.

Amendments offered by Rep. John Katko, R-NY, Rep. Barry Loudermilk, R-GA, and Rep. Jeff Duncan, R-SC, were adopted and included in the Committee passed bill. More information on each amendment can be found [HERE](#).


“Every day we wait, we cede more ground to our adversaries,” said Chairman McCaul. “I will not stand on the sidelines—asking for more reports and studies—while terrorists plot inside our communities, while people are murdered in their places of worship, and while violent extremists seek to divide our nation.”

“I did not want to put this on the floor with Republican and Democrats fighting each other as the enemy watches us do that. I think that is the wrong message to the terrorists, whether they be domestic or international,” concluded Chairman McCaul.

The bill was voted through the Committee with bipartisan support and moves to the House floor with favorable recommendation.

<https://homeland.house.gov/press/bipartisan-support-congress-counter-violent-extremism/>

The Ummah: Ummah Entities Set the Strategic Environment



The ummah is the Muslim community. As it relates to this discussion, the term refers either to the entity that makes reasonable claims to identifying itself as representing the ummah, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation [OIC], or to formal leadership elements from Member States of the OIC, such as principals in the Pakistani Government.

Through the policies it adopts, the ummah communicates positions that predictably cascade into a series of logical consequences and limitations that set the range of permissible activity. Through this process, the ummah determines what will and will not be enforced. Through the OIC, Member States can effectively maintain parallel foreign policies. This allows some Member States to be on both sides of an issue in the presence of non-Muslim entities that remain fundamentally unaware of the dual status.

For example:

- By stating that the General Secretariat of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation is to be headquartered in al-Quds [Article 21, OIC Charter], the OIC declares hostility to Israel on behalf of all its Member States, thus taking a permissive stand on acts of terrorism directed that way. [Al-Quds is Jerusalem.]

- The OIC takes a hard line on the killing of Muslims without right and calls for harsh enforcement against Muslim offenders. Non-Muslims who kill Muslims are designated as terrorists. In 2003, for example, Member States, through the OIC, suggested that the United States was a state sponsor of terrorism.
- By defining “human rights” as shariah, “racism” as defamation of Islam, and “terrorism” as the killing of a Muslim without right, the OIC facilitates a permissive attitude that is communicated through bifurcated narratives that provide two messages within the same statement simultaneously, one directed at the ummah and one to the non-Muslim world.


Through resolutions and conventions, some formally served as legal instruments to the United Nations, OIC Member States can maintain two foreign policies, one communicated through the resolutions and conventions they adopt as OIC Member States and the other through the more conventional diplomatic channels.

For example, a key OIC initiative, promulgated in 2005, is the Ten-Year *Programme of Action* to make defamation of Islam a crime in international forums and national jurisdictions throughout the world. The OIC has enjoyed considerable success in advancing this plan as an international legal standard. Indeed, the United States sponsored the plan at the UN in September 2010 and then again in 2011 through support of UN Resolution 16/18. The “Defamation of Islam” campaign, UN Resolution 16/18 and even the CVE are in line with both Islamic slander laws and the OIC’s Ten-Year Programme—both of which dramatically compromise the First Amendment.

Two examples:

- The OIC established the speech standard with the Ten-Year Programme, and dawah entities began enforcing it. For instance, when MPAC demanded that the language implicating Islam in the 9/11 Commission be sanitized, the U.S. Government complied.
- When Pope Benedict spoke at Regensburg University in 2006, the **ummah**, the OIC and Member State leaders called his statements an outrage. **Dawah** entities around the world called for a “Day of Rage,” and a **jihadi** entity killed a nun.

A key OIC initiative is the Ten-Year Programme of Action to make defamation of Islam a crime throughout the world.



Lines of Operations Defined by Functional Orientation to Islamic Law

Exhibit 6 repeats Exhibit 5, this time addressing the real cost of institutionalized indifference associated with fighting a war in the Muslim world against declared jihadi threats when our leaders have an institutionalized indifference to the Islamic drivers of that war.

As shown in Exhibit 6, the OIC sets the standard, dawah entities demand compliance, and jihadi entities enforce it. Again, this does not mean there is a formal chain of command and control. Enforcement comes from the functional roles each entity plays based on its line of operation and orientation to Islamic law.

Another example involves the issue of slander under Islamic law. The penalty for slander against Allah, the Prophet Muhammad or Islam can be death. When a Danish newspaper published cartoon depictions of Muhammad in 2005, the OIC and heads of state and foreign ministers loudly declared the act an insult against Islam. In Europe in 2006, numerous dawah entities (including the American "Jihad Jane") called for formal retractions, sparking demonstrations and riots that resulted in jihadi attacks. When the OIC made "Defamation of Islam" the standard, it became enforceable by dawah entities, and because the penalty for this crime is understood to be death, it became permissible for jihadi entities to take action.

The ummah entity [the OIC, for example] did not have to order the dawah entity to condemn the cartoons and stage protests, and no one had to order the jihadis to act. The permissive environment was established merely by the OIC's decision to declare the Islamic slander standard as an enforceable element of shariah. Given the functional orientation of dawah entities, they would see their role as enforcing that standard by providing warnings and protests when a given event deemed provocative reaches the slander threshold—especially when the ummah so signals. If the dawah demands are not met, and sometimes even if they are, a jihadi entity's functional orientation to Islamic law would demand action be taken.

As 2015 marked the tenth year of the OIC's Ten-Year Programme of Action, it should not go unnoticed that in the first week of January 2015, jihadis executed members of the *Charlie Hebdo* staff in Paris. Weeks later, an attempt was made to kill staff at *Jyllands-Posten*, the Danish publisher of cartoons depicting Muhammad. An ummah timeline and a jihadi reminder, and yet the spider's projection of a command relationship may never be established as those relations are understood in the West.

Even in the absence of an official, clearly identifiable “line and block” chain of command, there exists a form of command and control that is just as efficient, just as effective, and completely dependent on the functional requirements set by Islamic law as understood among the players involved. **There is no understanding this relationship without understanding the discipline-enforcing role that Islamic law brings to the Islamic functions and their associated entities when acting in subordination to shariah.** This relationship also helps explain the chasm between what we call “**lone wolf terrorism**” and what Islamic law and al-Qaeda identify as “**individual jihad**”—that ISIS is clearly intent on executing.

Jihadi Main Effort Exploits Internal Weaknesses




Exhibit 7 examines the ways in which many successful hostile information campaigns in the War on Terror are dependent on pre-existing postmodern influences focused on the deconstruction of America.

For a comprehensive analysis, it is necessary to address a fourth line of operation that, while separate from the three lines of operation used by “civilization jihad,” plays a pivotal role in support of the dawah mission. The fourth line of operation concerns those issues in any society that reflect discord and division.

The importance of this independent line of operation is that agents of subversion in the dawah mission ingratiate themselves with, and then mimic, domestic strife leaders and their issues in the host society so as to gain access to the “disenfranchised,” disenchanted or otherwise vulnerable elements within any population.

Early on, when still in a vulnerable state of weakness, dawah entities emulate their strife narratives and piggyback on the success of those movements. The creation of the term Islamophobia, which joins homophobia, racism, and sexism in the diversity and victimization narrative, is just one example.

There is also the current recognition that Islamic slander law, under the guise of Islamophobia, will be further subsumed in the facially neutral language of the looming hate speech narrative. There is an increasing awareness of an actual

alignment of effort with ideologies that trend left—most notably Alinskyist, related cultural Marxist and postmodern movements.

Among the most immediately harmful aspects of postmodern thought on decisionmaking are postmodern bureaucratic notions of complexity theory. Postmodernism holds that because there are no facts, there is no truth (one consequence of which is the denial of facts as a basis for analysis). Complexity theory holds that because the world is so complex, all one can do is manage chaos. It drives the “change” narrative.

The trend toward acceptance of these theories has dominated the war colleges. Listen to senior leaders speak about the War on Terror and notice how often the response to almost every question is that it’s “complicated” or “complex.” Then notice how often instruction on Islam in the current environment speaks of its nuances and complexity. It is so complex, in fact, that our military strategists—those with a sworn duty to support and defend this country—must rely on their Muslim Brotherhood “partners” to understand a threat environment that they are actually under some obligation to know themselves. They are the early oxygen that fuel the flames that envelop.

Postmodernism holds that because there are no facts, there is no truth (one consequence of which is the denial of facts as a basis for analysis).

Strategic Overview in Light of the CVE

This strategic overview of the threat from Islamic terrorism recognizes that we are spiders trying to understand a starfish by reference to addled pop-science models. It argues there are three lines of operation— the ummah, dawah and jihad—and that each executes along its own functional orientation to Islam that reconciles itself through a common understanding of shariah. As such, they do not require formal chains of command to interoperate successfully.

Picking up from an earlier thread, for example, how else does one recognize the unifying theme signaled by the opening lines of Qur'an Verse 8:60 ["Against them make ready"] if one doesn't recognize that it is part of a Qur'an verse known to have status concerning jihad that conveys an understood meaning? When a Pakistani Brigadier notes that "preparation must be 'to the utmost' " in the same chapter where he cites Verse 8:60 and argues that the "war of wills" in the preparation stage is the main effort,¹⁶ doesn't this reflect the **ummah** view? When the lead **dawah** entity, the Muslim Brotherhood, puts "against them make ready" in its logo,¹⁷ shouldn't this be accounted for and assessed? Especially when the lead **jihadi** entity, al-Qaeda, signals by using the same opening lines of Verse 8:60 on the cover of its special edition of *Inspire* and then positions the full verse to introduce the section "Bomb Building—Kitchen Fun" in that same edition [that came out just weeks before the Boston Marathon Bombing where terrorists used pressure cooker bombs as explained in that same edition]?¹⁸

With this example, we have the **ummah**, **dawah** and **jihadi** lines of operation all vectored on the same Verse 8:60, signaling a common reference point regarding actions in the preparation stage that all agree includes terrorism. And yet recognition of these facts, not to mention analysis of them, has been placed off-limits and subject to being criminalized.

When CAIR founder Omar Ahmad, then Palestine Committee member and future founding member of the Islamic Association for Palestine,¹⁹ told fellow members at an FBI wire-tapped meeting of the Palestine Committee in Philadelphia in 1993 that "**you send two messages; one to the Americans and one to the Muslims,**"²⁰ he wasn't necessarily just talking about lying. There is also

¹⁶ *The Quranic Concept of War*, 57-59.

¹⁷ Stephen Coughlin, *Catastrophic Failure: Blindfolding America in the Face of Jihad*, June 2015, 562.

¹⁸ Lone Mujahid Pocketbook— A Step to Step Guide on how to become as Successful Lone Mujahid – Collected from *Inspire* Magazine Issue 1 – 10's OSJ, OSJ Special, Spring 1434/2013, "Brought to you by ... Inspire, Issue 10, 1434/2013, URL: <http://ia601602.us.archive.org/5/items/Al.Mala7m.1/Mujahid1.pdf>, cover and 17.

¹⁹ Memorandum Opinion Order, United States Of America V. Holy Land Foundation For Relief And Development, Crim. No In The United States District Court For The Northern District Of Texas, Dallas Division, 1 July 2009, 7

²⁰ Government Exhibit: Philly Meeting—15, 3:04-CR-240-G, U.S. v. HLF, et al., at 2, 3, at <http://www.txnd.uscourts.gov/judges/hlf2/09-29-08/Philly%20Meeting%2015.pdf>.

the recognition of what can be said openly when knowing the other side doesn't understand your otherwise open communications.


Just by speaking in the shariah-based language of jihad, the Brotherhood can be certain of the meaning of their communication while also knowing that those who do not understand it will leave that same communication ignorant of what was actually communicated (and then rely on DHS Civil Rights and Civil Liberties to suppress any efforts to account for their narrative through CVE regimes designed to do so).

Don't believe it? Just check the *Catastrophic Failure* analysis of Fort Hood shooter Major Nidal Hasan's emails to al-Qaeda leader Anwar al-Awlaki. Analyzed through the prism of shariah, as Hasan intended, what the FBI classified as "workplace violence" when concluding that Hasan's communications were "not pertinent—not a product of interest" ends up being disastrously untrue. In this one event that plays itself out repeatedly, the deadly cost of systematically discounting the threat vocabulary the enemy uses to discuss his strategic design is dramatically highlighted.²¹ Measured against what Hasan actually communicated, "workplace violence" is misleading and woefully inadequate. And herein lies the rub: As the CVE enforces such politically correct standards (that align with UN Resolution 16/18 requirements), it not only undermines our national security, it kills.

To understand this, one must both recognize and account for the language of shariah and the discipline it brings to its actors. There is no understanding the dynamic interoperability and interplay of this strategic relationship without reference to the source code driving it: shariah. Yet the CVE disallows analysis of Islam to explain jihad while the OIC seeks to criminalize it through its Ten-Year Programme by way of UN Resolution 16/18. The resulting information void has reduced the counterterror effort to a state of strategic incomprehension.

The CVE disallows analysis of Islam to explain jihad while the OIC seeks to criminalize it.

²¹ *Catastrophic Failure*, 383-395.



Although the *Global Terror Index Highlights 2014* above notes that 66% of all terrorism came from four named entities known to be both Islamic and declared jihadis, the associated text box on "Causes of Terrorism" fail to recognize any Islamic component that could reasonably be demonstrated to be a cause in fact. While the larger *2014 Global Terrorism Index* referred to certain Islamic descriptors, it should be noted that Islam is not mentioned in the Highlights document that is made freely available at official Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] forums. Global Terrorism Index 2014 Highlight, Institute of Economics and Peace, 29 August 2015, web version available at <http://www.slideshare.net/ColMukteshwarPrasad/global-terrorism-index-2014>

Conclusion: Strategic Reality & the Fatal Fallacy of the CVE

The enemy plans to win this war in the information sphere by controlling the inputs to our threat analysis. This cannot succeed without our participation. Hence, “civilization jihad ... by our hands.” There is no understanding the enemy in the War on Terror without reference to the known doctrines that service the enemy’s doctrinal template. There is no substitute for the real thing.

This means substitutions will not be found in any of the soft-science models that continue to capture the attention of our national security community. These models cannot solve the problem because they are designed not to; the opportunity cost of these empty constructs is to be found in the recognition that they are used to replace relevant facts in the intelligence process. It is a modern form of sophistry that creates the illusion of higher level thinking when fighting with content drawn from null set domains.*

These professionals—whose job is to protect America from her enemies—are conforming to Islamic requirements when they choose to accept counterfactual narratives as the basis for War-on-Terror plans at the expense of real threat analysis. The enemy envisions its assault on the United States along three classically Islamic lines of operation where functional roles determine the mission when mapped against Islamic law.

The goal of this overview has been to introduce the strategic design and highlight both its internal coherence and the independent, yet mutually supporting, nature of these interlocking lines of operation. Understanding the relationship depicted in this strategic picture brings an ability to generate predictive intelligence. Failure to understand it will bring certain defeat. The American public does not believe we are winning or that our leaders understand what it takes to get the job done. Who would seriously argue against the truth underlying this rising public awareness? The house not only can burn down, it will if action is not immediately taken to put out the fire. That house is America and our way of life is smoldering ready to take flame.

The fact that the enemy in the terror war “self-identifies” the basis of his threat doctrine points to the complete knowability of this enemy and his doctrines. Unawareness or refusal to accept this basic fact raises genuine concerns of negligence because ignorance in this matter is evidence of never having properly analyzed the issue. It also raises basic questions of competence, strongly suggesting that our own doctrines on threat development have been severely compromised by those who are not even aware that they compromised them and have been compromised because of it. Ignorance blinds.

* Borrowed from math, an information domain in which no information exists.

There is no understanding the enemy in the War on Terror without reference to the known doctrines that service the enemy’s doctrinal template.

It is argued that our current situation is the outcome of a well-considered information campaign tailored to create this outcome. The enemy plans to win the war by convincing national security analysts and decisionmakers they can fight an adversary without defining him by rejecting the facts and forgoing their own doctrines on threat development. To do this, the Islamic campaign is masked in postmodernist guise designed to disarm. The enemy plans to win this war on the altar of postmodernism. If we do not change our course, he will succeed. It is feared that 2016 may be the year when we begin to recognize the true costs of an imposed policy of enforced ignorance.

In light of the strategic framework identified in this overview and creeping efforts to criminalize this type of analysis, two questions are in immediate need of answers:


- What does a national security professional have a duty to know when made specifically responsible for national security in the counterterror effort?
- When does a willful failure of the professional duty to know ALL enemies constitute a breach of the duty to “support and defend” the United States against ALL enemies, as the Constitution demands?

Conclusory assumptions are the only thing supporting the notion that violent extremism serves as a proxy for jihad. Such assumptions will not stand scrutiny. We can touch a jihadi. We can read his doctrines and map his intentions to actions that do occur. The same cannot be said of a “violent extremist”—a deliberately vague, hollow term that becomes increasingly meaningless as the War on Terror rages on. We have yet to obtain a single doctrinal writing or capture a single enemy document that says, “We are violent extremists and we fight for ‘root’ or ‘underlying’ causes.” If you confront our leaders with this, they will simply respond with deer-in-the-headlights stupefaction and mutter, “It’s complicated.” Not only are they unable to explain it, they depend on narratives structured to keep them from ever having to try.

We have yet to obtain a single doctrinal writing or capture a single enemy document that says, “We are violent extremists and we fight for ‘root’ or ‘underlying’ causes.”

***Corruptio optima pessima est!*²²**

²² “The best, corrupted, become the worst!” Josef Pieper, *Abuse of Language*, 35.



unconstrained
analytics

in a struggle, analysis must be unconstrained by preconceptions

*unconstrained*analytics.org